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I. INTRODU CTION 
Until t he b eginni n g of t he indus tri al age , t he dream of 
an abundance of goods and services appeared incapable of 
realizati on . Before th e development of powered machinery , 
the physical labor o f th e majority of t he population was re-
quired t o produce eno u gh f o r me r e survival of these laborers 
and the continuance of th e economy. 
Durin g the seconj half o f t he nineteenth century , th ere 
were indications that in the f utur e , p r oductivity and t o tal 
production in the U~ it ed States wo uld r ise so f as t t ha t an 
abundance of goods and se rvices was at t ainab l e . But , even 
with abundance ther e r emains th e q ues t f o r econ o mic security 
for a maj or ity of t he po p ulation . Ab und anc~ and economic 
security are not neces s arily synonymo us terms because the 
ec ono my still faces th e p r ob l em of pe r manent and temporary 
unemployment, whi ch in turn r esults in economic in securit y 
for many indi v idual s . 
- However, t he attainability of abundance in ou r age 
constitute s a mea s ur e of s u ccess in the movement t owa rd social 
justice and individual freedom. It has b ee n 2 r gued through -
out t he centuries that th e ideal of justice and freedom could 
have no fi r m ba s is until each i~dividual enjoyed h is nat u ral 
righ t t o re sources sufficient f o r his subsist~nce . Un less man 
possessed enough landed property t o ensure his subsistence 
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he would, in effect, be a slave, both physically and mentally , 
in th e service of his emp loyer. 
The ideal of freedom and justice was brought together in 
Edward Be~lamy ' s influential novel, Looking Backward, 
published in 18 88 (5). The central theme of the book is the 
concept of an absolute "guarantee " to " abundant maintenance" ; 
in other words, a private g uaranteed income concept ope rating 
in a well-established society , functionin g on abundance 
economic principles, and not according to the div is ive econ -
omic theory of scarcity. 
Desp i te much init~al enthusiasm following the publica -
tion of Looking Back.Hard , the co n cept cf private gua ranteed 
inc ome dropped out of discussion around th e turn of the 
cer..tury. On the other hand , government guaranteed income 
plans were discussed and r esea rch e d fre q u ently . An example 
was the thorough i nvestigation of guaranteed wages by the 
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion under Pres ide nt 
Rooseve lt and President Truman (15) . 
The imminent reality of abundance has l e d t o a revival of 
interest in guarant eed income during the sixties . It has been 
advanced as the mos t appropriat~ method available to prevent 
furth er encroachments on social justice . Guaranteed income 
with its implications for increased individual freedom , 
provide s a possib l e fir s t step toward the fo rmation of new 
inst i tutio ns appropriat e to a society o f abundance . 
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In recent months attention has been focused on a private 
industry guaranteed income as a means to attain increased 
economic security for some groups of unionized industrial 
labor. This attention has been cultivated and demanded by 
some labor unions as the ultimate weapon against income 
insecurity resultin g from layoff s and temporary unemployment . 
Because of the growing influence of labor unions , private 
guaranteed incom e has changed from a Utopian dream in the 
first half of the c~ntury to a very r ea l possibility at 
present . * 
A battle ha s arisen between the union labor leaders and 
some segments of corporate management . The uni on leaders 
thin k it is time t o give the production worker the sec urit y 
and status o f a g uaranteed annual inc~me. Company ma na gers 
think they mus t ke ep labor a variable cost unle ss th e r e 
would be some way to also guarantee an annual profit . They 
also question the psychological advanta ges and disadvantages , 
and productivity of employees under such a system of payment . 
Unions are takin g two di ffe r ent approaches which basi-
cally end in the same result , g uarante ed salari es for t he blue 
*The private plan is of t en confused with the government 
sponsor ed plans of guaranteed national i nc ome and negative 
income tax . Their aims are different. The gove rn men t plan is 
aimed at th e population who cannot provide a minimum income 
for themselves ; th ose in poverty . Its purpose is t o provide 
these individuals with self-supporting and sus tain Lng income. 
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workers . In som e ind u s tries unions are prep2ring to demand 
th at factor y workers be paid on a weekly o r month l y ba sis 
in s t ead of by t he hour. The i r aim is to p r otect members' 
paychecks in t he ev e nt of brief illness o r tardiness , contin-
gencie s t ypically n ot co v e r ed under existing con tracts . 
In other industri es , particularl y t hose where benefits 
paid by co mpanie s to l aid - off wo r ke r s a r e not sub~t~ntia l, 
un ions a re s eeking th e o nc e - Utopia n goa l of a nnua l inco me 
g u arant ees . The pur pose h e re i s to ass ur e wo r ke r s in cyclical~ 
indu s tr ies or t hose in wh i ch th e size of t he wor k f o r ce is 
clo se l y tied to sale s , of a b as ic annual income they can rely 
on . 
Last May , Unit ed Automobile, Aerospace , arcl Agricultural 
Impl emen t Wo rk e r s of Ame ric a (he r ea ft e r r e f e rr ed t o a s t he 
UAW) president, Walter P. Re ut he r, vowed that '' we will not 
si g n a b as ic a g reemen t excep tin g t ha t it contains salaries for 
product ion and main t enance wo r ke rs'' (2 1, p.l). 
It is eviden t t ha t g u ara nt eed in comes will be demanded by 
the UAW this year and su r e ly _other unions will fo llow . Since 
the la bor union se ems to view the propos al in t he sho rt r un , 
it will b e u p to management and o t he r s t o ana~yz2 th is system 
of payment for mo r e f a r r eac hing mic r oeconomic and mac r oecon -
omic effects. 
In ord er t o thoroughly study t he economic imp l ications 
of conver t ing fro m a wa ge ~ncentive t o a gua r an t eed an nual 
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sal a r y meth0d of pay~ent for production workers at :he fi~m 
level, I chose one fir m and one union . The ~i rm is Deere and 
Compan y, one of the lar gest manufact11re r s of farm implements 
and industrj.al equipment; t he union is the UAW international 
and its eigt t Deere a n d Company locals (Locals 450 , 94 , 865 , 
81, 74, 434, 79, and 838). Negotiations for a new ag r eemen t 
started August 1 6 , 19 67 . The present agreemenc expires 
October 1, 1967. 
My t hes i s i s that the company and the un i on will ba r gain 
collectively in 1 967 without undue conflict ; tha t th e r e-
sulting n ew agreem e nt wi l l adopt a limited liability guaran -
teed annua l inc ome or sa l ary because of inherent advan t ages and 
abandon t he s t andard hour incentive p l an because of in h erent 
di sadvantages .* To arrive a t an intellige~t conclusion to the 
th esis it will b e ~ecessary t o exp l c r e th e demand for guaranteed 
an~ ual income o r salary, the reasoning behi nd it , the presen t 
envir onmen t, the areas and functions affected at the company 
level, and t he macroeconomic effects if this type of payment 
is ado p t e d by many o t her firms and indust r ies. 
Th e ref erence in t he followi n g d i sc u ss ion of the thesis 
will be th e union (hereafte r t o mean the UAW) ve r sus t he com-
pany (hereafter to mean Dee re and Company or John Dee r e) o n the 
demand ( he r eaf t er t o mean g uarante ed ~nnual income or sala~y) . 
*Because t he t hesis relies on cu rr ent e~ents , I have 
establi she d t he date of Sep t ember 15 , 1967, as the last day 
any change in content can occur. 
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I I . RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Because t he t hesis is of such a current nature and i s 
r es tri cted to one c omp an y and one union , u seful research was 
l imited t o so u rces which would r ef lect p r esen t prevai ling 
attitudes , dat a , and opinions . Few r e f e r ences , current or 
past, are available t ha t deal with econom i c implica ti ons of 
pr ivate g uarant eed annual salaries . Th e r eason is t hat few 
s u ch plans are or were u sed b y p r ivate en t erprise i n t his 
countr y or any o t h e r country . Therefore , the thesis does not 
contain a chapter o n r eview of l itera tur e . Instead re v iew 
of litera ture is paraphra se d or co v ered in the main text . 
The pr oposed demand for guaranteed a nnual income or 
salary is hypothetical and attempts to paraphrase available 
union documents and O?inions on th e d emand . Litt l e informa-
ti o n i s ye t a vai l able on th e specific s ti p ul ations of the 
d emand , so a l ist wa s accumulat e d from what has been proposed 
in th e past b y th e uni on and present q u a l ified opinions o r 
" leaks" . 
Aft er the pr esent ation of the demand, the existin g 
environra e nt is explored . Some current literatu r e and s t udies 
ar e avai l able on prese n t b lu e -col lar salary sys tems. These 
are r eviewed with trend s and cha r ateristics n o t ed . In order 
t o go beyond th e shallowness of this literat ur e , a detailed 
re port was comp il ed on Aluminum Company of Canada ' s recent 
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conversion to salary . This pro v id es t he r eader with a goo d 
background of a successful salary p l an for p r oduc t io n wo r ke r s . 
Since De ere and Company and th e agricultural mac h inery 
manufacturin g indust r y is an impo rt an t part of t his thesis , 
t heir characteristi cs are g iven ext e n s ive coverage . This 
i n dustrial setting a lon g with the facts pr esent ed are co mmon 
knowl edge within the industry and are re spons ible . for its 
tremendous growth . To provide proper environmental ba ck -
ground on the comp any , considerable data was ga ther e d on 
income, productivity, costs , personnel , and o th e r pe rtin e nt 
areas for a t en yea r period (1957 - 196 6 ) f r om Deere aud Co mpany 
records. These fi g ure s repr e~ent th e company's fisca l year 
which run s from November first to October t hi rt y-fir s t . The 
informati on was pr~ bab l y mo re re adily available to me because 
of my em p loymen t b y t he company . Much of the info r ma t ion 
presented about th e c ompany operations a t presen t reflect my 
experience wi th J ohn Deere Des Moi n es Works. Before entering 
graduate school , I spent t wo and one - ha lf years a s a methods 
engineer . Sinc e June 1 967 I have had expe r ienc e as a depart -
mental for eman and incentive and s t andards enginee rin g 
auditor. Th is fir s t- hand in volve me nt wi t h the compa n y p ro -
vides further validity to t he presentation of the present 
envir onmen t. My h ope i s that it has not blased the co nclu-
sions drawn. Since t he standard hou r incentive p lan is the 
current me thod of paym e nt , -many pages are spent exp laining the 
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plan and develop i n g i t s inh e r ent adva nt ages a nd d i sadvant ages. 
The same ho ld s true for th e company ' s sup p l em.enta J un employ -
ment b enefit p l an . 
Sinc e the res ea rch r es ts heavily on qua li fie d opini o n, 
f o r ma l and informal int e r views were conducted with u nion 
lead e rs, union memb e rs, company manag e r s , and sa lari~d emplo y -
ee s . The spe c ific for mal int erv i ew me t hodology and re sul ts 
ar e th e contents of Chapter VI I . The in t erviewees p r oved 
to b e t he most interes ting phase of ray r ~ search . 
The potential effec t s at the com~any level of g u a rant ee d 
annua l sal a ries ar e formulated b y t he au~h0 r f r om qualified 
opini on and wha t ever timely data e nd facts we r e obtainable 
thr ee mon ths bef ore stra t e g ic and impo rtan t co ncract n ego ti a -
t ions. The cooperation of t he company and, i n ~ost instances, 
th e uni o n was r estrained when i t came t o obtaining facts and , 
at times , opinions . Th i s , howeve r, hdd th e benefit of 
furtherin g the aut hor ' s awa r eness of the comp l exi ties and 
strate g ic maneuve r ing involved soon before collective bargain -
i n g . 
Lastl y , an "armchai r" a n alysis o :: the raac ro economic ef -
fects of g u ara nt eed annual income , assumin g i t might be adop t-
ed by a majority of th e firms and indu s trie s in the Un ited 
States, was a tt emp ted. Thi s final chapter is mo r e fiction a l 
in nature, since t he possible future macroeconomic effects 
have ne v er actua lly been experi e n ced hy a free economy a s our s . 
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III. '!.' ROPOSED METHOD OF l'AY!1ENT -
TlfE UNIO N ' S DEMAND FOR GUARANTEED SALARY 
In th e following pa ges I will at t empt to hypothesize th e 
argum en t th a~ the union might make f or gua ran t ~e d annual 
salary, in the fi r st p e r son , as UAW n egot iators would pr esent 
it at th e bargaining t able . 
A uni on negoti ato r ' s hypothetical opecing demand for 
guaranteed ann u al sa l a ry . 
We h ave now r eached a point, a n d t he productivity and 
pro f itability of th e agricul tu ral impleme nt industries have 
r~ache d a point , * dt which it has become possible and neces -
sary t o chal l enge r>.nd to end the " do u ble !::i tan <la r d " which is 
t he mos t serio us remaining obstar.le to our members ' reali-
zatio n of their full equi t y as workers . That " double stand-
ard'' is the now indefensihle division which John Dee r e main-
t ains b e tween men wh0 are hourly rated and those who have 
salar ied status . 
To b e hourly ra t ed is t o be under-rated , to be pu t d ow n 
from th e human standpoint , to be down graded in company book-
ke ~pin g as a v ariable cost , which in essence mea ns to b e 
* The union claims t&e agricultural implement industry 
ha s increa sed afte~ c2x p rofit s 85% from 1 963 to 1966 . Deere 
and Company net income increased 62% in th e same pe riod. 
10 
expendabl e . Salaried workers , on th e other hand, have th e 
privil eged r anking of overhead; t he costs of t hei r salaries 
is re garded as part of the continuous cost of business . 
Th e hourly wage sys t em has been th e source and symbol 
of exploita t jon of industrial wo r kers by emp loyer s since the 
primitive beginnings of the first revol ut ion . This system 
can no lon ger be defended in a society with access t o th e new 
to o ls of sci~nce and technology and committed to the advance -
ment of democratic and human values, not only in th e poli -
tical sphere, but in the econo~ic sphere as wel l. 
wage system has 9utlived its time. 
The hourly 
In turn, the ic~entive system has ccmar.dec ~ore from 
worker s than is humanly hea lth y. It is true that the workers 
enjoy th e short r un income benefits , but through properly 
administered salaries they can enjoy a steadie r income and 
a longer lif~. As a union representing our members best 
long - t erm int erests , we fee l that John Deere ~us t sac ri f ice 
increased pr~duction and worker exp lo itatio~ through aban-
donment of t he incentive system . Guaranteed annual salaries 
will enable worke r s to use less effort , enjoy th ei r job s more, 
experience a better , more secure family life , and live a 
longer, more produ~tive life before and after ~etirement . 
Stabilization of individual income for John Deere ' s 
20,000 UAW employees is a basic economic tool needed to 
bal ance increasin g productive power and greate r purchasing 
1 1 
power; n o th i n g b reeds unemp l oymen t l ike u nemp l oy men t . 
The Un ited States NatlouaJ Commission o n Technology , 
Aut omat ion and Economic Progress ca l led for t he abolition 
of the "in v idious dis t inc t ion " be t ween hourly and sala-
r ied worke r s as a ma tt er of " co mmun i t y co n scienc e ". 
The Commission , c r eated by Co n gress and composed of t op -
leve l managemen~ , labor , and public r epresentatives de -
clared : 
" The indust r ial revol uti on , despi t e some t ime 
piou s d isavowals , did t ur n l abor into a ' com-
modit y ', no more so than by instituting t he 
prac t i c e of paying production workers by the 
piece o r by the hou r. At the same time , white -
colla r workers and other technical and admin -
i s trative personnel are paid by the week , the 
month, or ~he year . Thus an old s t atus dis -
tinct ion and so cial stigma is s til l being r e-
in fo r ced . 
.•• We believe , therefore , that industry and 
un ions shoJld begin to discus s the question of 
paying all ucrkers by the same s tanda r d , and 
of extending ~o blue - co l lar employees the 
usu a l prerogatives which most salaried em-
ployees enjoy today . 
••. We see l i ttl~ jus t ice i n a system whereby 
a production worker is l aid off or wo r ks short 
we eks when the schedule so dictates, while office 
workers and clerks receive full salaries , 
wh a t ever th'= flow of wo r k" (45 , p . 91) . 
What we must have is not a mere change of s t atus , 
but a c h a n ge of substance which goes to th e p r edictability 
and s e curity of income . This is a demand whose value in 
human t e r ms is high and his t oric . The executive of a 
comp a ny wi t h$ 78 . 7 million of ne t income last year has 
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provided for mana gemen t' s and the stockholder ' s annual well 
being, but is not re conciled t o th e need tc make compa r ab le 
provisions for th e annual well being of the production 
workers . * 
Ne t i n com e increased from 1965 to 1 966 by 54 %, while 
employment onl y inc r eased 1 0% . The p ro fitabi lit y r esulting 
from the increased inc ome is the s o urce of the monies re-
quired for g u a rante ed annual income . Increa s ed product 
prices paid by th e c o n sumer wo uld not be req uir ed . The 
disp r oportionate sh ar e of t he fruits of increased t echno l ogy 
in farm implement manufacturing is profi t an d shoul d be 
shared with the consumer and with the wo r ker . A mor e equi -
t able distribution will help sol ve th e national pr oblems of 
une~plo yment ar.d avoi<l periodic r ecessions in t he economy . 
The continuity of inco me , which executives and most 
salaried persc nn e l n ow enjoy i s comprised of these aspec t s . 
One is that of absolute shor t t e rm security , frequently a 
month - to - month assuranc e of employment and income . The 
second consists of t he assurance t hat th ey wi ll not suffer 
loss of income if th ey find it nec essary to be absent be-
cause of illness or for persona l' re asons . The t hi r d as -
pect which must be d eveloped contractually is lon g - t er~ 
* See tab l es 1 , 2, 3 , 4, a nd 18. 
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security, a continuing security largely immu ne to th e sea -
sonal flo w o f. produc~ion. 
We propos e~ a guaranteed annual wage in 1955 and c ame 
away from th e bar ga inin g table with a pla n of suppl e me ntal 
un employment benefits (h e r e a f t e r r eferred to as SUB) i n s tead.* 
What resu lted was a redu c t i on in th e frequency of sho rt 
workwee~s because of the short workweek benefi t p~ovision 
of our SUB p lans . This affords the pr oof needed t ha t th e 
short - t e rm form of s e curity is feasibl e. 
With respect t c t he second aspect , John ~e e r e wi ll 
say that if blue c o l la r worke r s ha ve th e freed o m of ~e rs onal 
leave, they vill abus e le . There i s e vid ence to demo n s trate 
th at blue ··collar ~·10 r kers , when given sala r ied e tatus a nd 
the freedo m of persoual l eave, do n ot abuse l t. Studies 
show t hat when p r oductiun wo rkers have attained salaried 
status and the righ ~ t o unlimited personal leave , absen -
teeism among them may ri se t empo rar ily , as they ta s t e free -
dam they had not b e for e en joye d. Aft e r a sho ~t per iod , 
however , their rate of absent ee i s m declin es a nd levels o f f 
at a rate comparable t o t hat of wh i t e - co ll ar ~o r ke rs. 
There is n o r eason t0 believe that wa ge emp lo yees a t 
John De e re are any le ss responsib le than salaried employees . 
Allegations t ha t wage earners are in capabl e of coping with 
levels of freed om and di g nity that other people enjoy 
*See Chapter V . for exp l ana tion of present plan. 
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s i mp 1 y r e f 1 e c t t h e " d o •J b 1 e s t and a r d " o f t h e p a s t t h a t w c a r e 
not p r epareo to t ole r at e in t he future . Susp i cion of l esser 
human i t y fi r st crea t ed and has s i nce pe r petua t ed t he hourly 
wa g e s ys t em . 
Th e h eart o f th e prob l em of gua r an t eed inc ome li es in 
t he ar ea o f J ong term secu r ity . Long - t erm sec ur ity is n ot 
wr itt e n out o r specified for sa l aried worke r s because they 
ar e n o t r epresented by unions and th ei r condi t ions of employ -
ment ar e u nl l a t e r a lly de~e rmined by managemen t . Where its 
auth o r i t y is n o t limited by contract , mana gement can , in fac t, 
t ermin ate the sala r ied workers employment at will . Layoffs 
of s alaried worke~ s h~ve occurred , but f a r less frequently 
th a n in th e case of hourly wo r kers.* In practice the job 
t enur e of salaried ~orke r s is qu~te diff eren t f~om that o f 
ho ur ly worke r s . As a general rule, salaried ~orkers can 
look forward confidently to employment and continued income 
int o t he l ong t erm future , except under unu s ual circumstances . 
John Dee r e l ays off hourly workers eve ry year due to 
s easo n al va r iations in s ales or , as the case is this year , 
excess i n ven tories . To cut back cost , management could have 
laid-off o r te r minated the salar~ed workers , b~t th ey do not . 
In pr ac ti ce , salaried workers are tr eated as though they 
a r e p r otected by a " contract of employment" from which manage -
me n t is r eleased only when the firm suffers serioas adver sity . 
* See App e n d i x I. 
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Salaried workers normally are n ot laid-off excep t when 
ther e has been a drasti c decline in company business , con-
tinued ove r an extended period. Barring such a major and 
prolo nged decline, salaried workers can generally a nticipate 
continued steady employment and income int o the indefinite 
futur e. 
Ther e is a nation a l e lement also . When workers at 
John Deere are laid - off and lo se income, their purchasing 
power is diminished , thereby affecting other industries and 
worker groups. Therefor e , guaranteed annual s alary is not 
only a matter of ec0nomic justice t o the worke rs, it . is a 
matter of economic necessity to o ur whole eco~omy in the 
effort to achieve full production and full emp loyment. 
The problem of guaranteed salary , which we propose to 
r esolve in 19 6 7, boils down to translating a nebulous and 
unwritten, but nevertheless meaningful , rul e unilaterally 
established by managenent fo r unorganized employees into 
the precise and binding l ang ua ge of negotiated contracts 
applic ab le to or ganized worke r s , whether they be blue-co l lar 
or white collar workers . 
The objective is not to obligate Deere and Company, 
regardless of the fate of its business , to retain all its 
present employees on payroll for the rest of their lives . 
It is rather to immunize their inc ome and the security of 
their families for a period of time against adve r se efforts 
1 6 
f l owing from fluct4~ tion s in the volu~e of bu s iness . I n 
t he case of t he annual guarantee, upon which we shal l i nsist , 
th e immuni t y will be assured for a year at a t ime . As each 
n ew year begins , workers and their fa~ilies will be able to 
l ook forward with confidence to a s t eady flow of i ncome, week 
b y wee k , for the next twelve months. The UAW member _would , 
in effect, have an annual contract of employment . 
I f actual employment was not forthcoming , income would 
continue. When wo rk e r ' s incomes must be counted as overhead 
cos t s , corpo r ate management wi l l conc:ntrste more effo rt o n 
t he task of making the flow of work a3 steady as the flow of 
worker income s to which they will be obligated . 
It wil l be a complex task to r ew rit e the agreement t o 
accommo dat e and imple ment the concept of gua ranteed salary . 
Bu t, we are determined co put an end to t h e degrading hourly 
~age system and to r eplace it with an annual inc ome guarantee 
o r contract of employment f o r production workers at John 
Deer e . 
At t he special UAW Resolution Convent io n , April 1 967 , 
i n Detroit , seven reso lutions were pr0po sed on conversion 
to salary . The f ollowing resolution , as proposed by the 
Agricultural Impl emen t a nd Industri al Workers Wage and Hour 
Co u ncil , sums up our ge n e ral demand f o r g uaranteed annual 
income . 
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Salari es for all . 
Wh e r eas : The syst em of employment b y the hour, 
which grew out of the early days of the Indu s tri a l 
Revolution i s obsolete , irrespon3ible a nd unju s t. 
It denies t he d ignity of man and d eg r ades hi m to 
a s tat us of less importance t han th e mach ine he 
serve s . The r en t al of men and w0men by t he t enth 
of an hour makes a mockery of ou c b e li e f in t he in-
dividual wo rth of human beings f•) r it treat s human 
lab o r as a c ommod it y to be purchased as r e quir e d 
and cast aside when it is n o t n e!d ed . It i s time 
we move t o e nd a sys t em of pay t ha t forces one 
group of peop l e - th e so-called b lue - co lla r wo r ke r s -
to b ear th e b runt of the insecurl t y of o ur economy ; 
n ow , t her efore , be it res o lved : The 1 96 7 Special 
Conventio n go on r eco rd r ecommending a g uaranteed 
yearly salary f o r a ll bar ga inin g unit emp loy ees 
(35, p.36). 
This compl e tes th e n ego tiat o r' s hypothetica l opening 
dem and for g uar a nt eed annua l sa l a r y . An i~~ortant imp l i ed 
demand hidd e n within th e abo v e porposal i s gua ran teed mon thl y 
income . 
A. Th e Implied Union Demand for 
Guaranteed Monthly Incom e 
Eve n seasoned lab o r ana l ysts wo u ld agree t ha t th e UAW 
dem and for guaranteed annual salary for blue-collar worke r s 
is as ambitious as any so far presented to fa r m im p l emen t 
manuf ac tur ers in thi s yea r ' s round of collective bargaining . 
Howe ve r, there is a potentially more expens ive proposal 
being quietly considered . It t oo ca ll s for a n inco me g uaran-
t ee , and par a d oxically , the p r otec tion is fo r a one month 
durati o n . Ho w can a monthl y gua rant ee oe po t en tially mo re 
exp e n sive th an an annual g uar antee? The a n swe r i s found in 
th e way the annual income demand has been modifie d a nd through 
18 
a st u dy of wo rke c habits, t he production p r a~ tic es and 
complexi t ies of present income protection s revised . 
I n t he opening demand, the UAW wan t s a worke r wi th 
senio r i t y who is laid off t o re ce ive enough income t o main -
t ain h is normal livin g s tandard f o r a period of t ime 
g r aduated accordin g to his l eng t h of service up to a full 
year . The un ion i ndicates this protecti on cou l d b~ bui lt 
on top of existing unempl oymen t compensation and SUE. 
The u n i on f urth e r admi t s it i s willing to limit th e 
liability of t he company in e ve~t of a serious de c lin e in 
market d emand and that the prot ec tion only seeks t o ma t ch 
a wo r ker's normal "t ake home " pay . 
Guarant eed month l y in come ~ould provide a worker on 
salary at the b eg in ni n g of a mouth a f u ll sala r y for that 
entire month . If the worker were called in at any tim e during 
tte month , he wo u ld receive full salary fo r t he r es t of that 
month and all th e fo llowing month. It has been indicated tha t 
this protec tion would not be limi t ed to worke r s wi t h sen ior -
i t y. 
Un l ike t he r es tri c ted g uarant eed a nn ual sala r y proposal 
that woul d protect wor kers l eas t li ke l y to be laid off , t he 
guarante ed month l y income wo ul d provide n ew p r o t ec ti o n t o 
work~rs mos t l ikely to be laid off . Presently , wo rker s must 
wait on e year before being e ligible f o r SUB which provide s 
much l ess than a worker woul d receive f or wo r kina . 
0 Under 
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guaranteed m~nth l y income t hese wo r ke r s woald ge t full pay 
dur ing sho rt wo r k weeks and pe r iods of t empo~~ ry l ayoff . 
Even workers with sen i o r ity mus t wait one week after 
b eing l a id o ff for th e fi r st ti me each year before th ey can 
collect SUB in most stat es . Th e s up p l ement i s tied t o 
u n em pl oyment compensation and most s t a t es re quir e one week's 
wait before an idled worke r can co ll ec t s tat e compensation . 
Thu s un der gua r anteed monthly in come a worker could r eceive his 
full sala r y o r ovEr 50% more t han he current l y would ge t on a ' 
typi cal three week layof : , if he would r ece ive S UB and 
unemploymen t compensation . 
Gua r a nte ed mo n th l y inco rue pay for excused pe r sonal 
ab sence wou ld be another expens ive e lement . W:-irkers now get 
fort y p aid hour s off each year for sho r t illness and pe r so n a l 
busines s . After using up this paid absence time , workers 
are " docke d" and ultimately face disciplina r y ac t ion if they 
ar e r a t ed ch r onic absentees . However , absen te eism among wage 
e mployees ave rages more than fo r ty h o ur s pe r year . General 
Motor s says i ts studies show that t he average wo r ke r is 
mi ssing ab o ut 5 % of his available workin g time, which is abou t 
on e hundr ed hour s a yea r . Alth oug h th is informat i on is not 
read ily avai labl e from John Dee r e , the estima t e by General 
Mot o r s is p ro b abl y f3irly univ ersal. Conside ri~g John Deere ' s 
av e r age st r aigh t-ti me hourly earnings for the eigh t UAW plan t s 
is $3.77 or $4 .90 includ i n ~ f r inges , u sing the above 
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abs en t eeism rat e , it wo u ld co s t th e company $3 77 . 00 per 
employee in earnings and an extra $118 . 00 in f ringe benefits. 
By soft e n ing th e d ema nd for annual income guarantees and 
placin g more emphasis on s h ort- t e r m prot ec tion , the g u a rant ee 
pro gram becomes more ma r ketab l e , especial l y among th e youn ge r 
members . A poll of some UAW membe r s at J oh n Dee r e Des Moines 
Work s s h owed t ha t guaranteed annual income ran t h~rd (wa ge 
inc reases and g reat e r insurance cove r age we r e first and 
secon d ) amo n g t he lis~ of prio riti es demanded . Thi s alte r a -
tion to t he guarantee should please b o th ol d and new membe r s 
and help t he union ' s l ong sluggi s h drive to organize th e 
whit e - collar wo rkers . 
B . Th e Ass umed Specific Union De mands f o r G ~ aranteed 
Ann ual Salary or In come 
Th e spec if ics of th e union ' s d emands fo r gu arant ee d 
s3l ary bave n ot beea r ev~a l ed to dat e . Therefo r e , I am 
required to make so me assump t ions from what fa c ts I ha ve about 
th e d emanded sa lari ed me thod of paymen t. The gua r a nt eed annual 
or filOn t hly income , i s a cont r ac t of employe men t with t he 
fo l lowin g stipulations: 
1. Maximum g uaran ceed earnings fo r th e year is e qual t o t he 
n eg otiatec o c c ~ pa t iona l year l y r a te ( based on f or ty h ou r s 
per week , fift y - t wo weeks per ye ar) . 
2 . The company i s under unlimit e d l iabilit y t o pay t he 
g uar a nt ee t o t hose eligible except unde r c ondi t ion s of 
serio us d ec l ining ~arket d ema nd. 
3 . Pay would be by weekly sa lary r a th er than hourly rate 
plus incentive . 
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4 . Em p l oyees wi t h jive or more years of seniority on layoff 
will re c ~ i ve full salary minus state unemployment 
c omp ensation and pre~ent supplemental unemployment 
b enefi t s . 
5 . Employees mus t have five years or more senio r ity to be 
e l igib l e f o r gua r anteed annual incom e . 
6 . Emplo yees wi th o r wit h o u t se n io r ity on sho rt work weeks 
will r ece i ve forty ho urs ' salary . 
7 . Employees wi t h or without seniority on temporary l ay-
of f wil l r eceive guaranteed monthly income anq after 
on e week guaranteed month l y income minus unemploment 
compensation . 
8 . Emp loyees on t emporary layoff with les s than five years 
s en io r i t y b ut more than one year , will receive p r esent 
SUB b enefits plus guaranteed mon t hly income and u nemploy -
ment compensation so that earnings equal 100% . 
9 . Ye a r end bonuse 3 will be r ewarded on a negotiated hours 
work ed and sen i ority basis, but will not be guaranteed . 
10 . Ab sences due to health will be paid up to t~enty-six 
weeks . 
11. Pe r sonal convenience absences will n o t be paid except 
f o r t he preser.t five " casual days" . "Rea sor.ab l eness " 
wil l be used in determining whether to p2y for absences 
due to personal reas ons . 
1 2 . T ime off with ?ay is considered as hours wo r ked for the 
pur pose of computing dai l y or weekly overtime pay . (This 
all ows c l earer inte r pretation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act wi th regard to section seven - basis for overtime 
pay . ) 
13 . St a n dard hour inc en tives will be abolished in favor of t he 
s ecu ri t y of guar~nteed salaries . Standard hours or 
me asured day work will sc ill be used to c~n trol produc-
t ion. 
14 . · All items under the rilan are a r bitrat able exc ept eligi-
bil i t y for state be~cfits . 
15 . Al l f r inge benefit s wi ll he inc r eased to t~ose of present 
sal a r ied pErsonnel , th e reby eliminating dua l insurance 
programs , etc . 
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IV. THE ENVIRONME~T 
A. Pre sent Salary Sy~tems 
The preceding is my prediction o~ th e ultimate UAW demand 
for 1967 regarding gua r anteed annual Lnco me o r salary . No 
p as t prec eden ts with available statistics have been found on 
which to base conclusi ons concerning negotiations and. 
accept ance of this demand by John Dee=e and eventually by other 
firms and industries in t he United St3tes . Of some 1 , 770 
major agreements studied by t he Bur eau of Labor statistics 
in 1963 , fewer th an 10% had a salary 0r employment guarantee 
provision . Only six of the major agr~ements studied contained 
provisions for annual guarantees . Th ~se plans w~ re in food 
p roducts or non-manufacturing industries (7) . 
Another study , in November cf 1965 was sp6nsored by t he 
National Industrial Conference Board cf 184J n anufacturing 
fir ms with 250 or more ~mployees . The r eport revealed that 
salaries (not g u aranteed) for blue-co l lar worke rs were twice 
as pre valent (12% t o 6%) at non - union companies as they were 
at fir ms where unions represented som~ part of the wo rk 
force (48). About 7% or 138 firms in1icated that some of 
their production workers were salaried . 
Salary status for blue - collar workers was most common 
among manufacturers with 5,000 o r more empluyees . Non - union 
companies of this size we re wore likely to follow this 
practice than un ionized companies of t he same size . There 
we r e only fifteen companie s in the sample that had pu t all 
23 
blu e-collar workers on salary an d a ll were no n-union . 
The only standard indust r ia l classificai t ons that did 
not answer af fir matively to the question , " Are there any 
group s of blue-collar employees , who in most companies would 
be paid by t he hour, paid on a sa l ary basis in_ your com-
p a n y?" , were tob acco , appa r el , and "miscellaneous man_u factu r-
ing". This p r actice is mo re common in some i ndu s tri es than 
in ot hers , but the differences we r e u3ually reflected in 
th e size of companies and i n the proportion of non - union 
c ompanies in each industry sample . 
Farm machinery i s inc luded in tha ma~ hinery (except 
e lect r ical) sta n dard incust r ial classificatio~ . Of t he 282 
companies surveyed, only thirt een or .5% said ~hey had some or 
al l salaried blue - collar workers . 
The study show3 so~e other conclusions ~hich should prove 
helpful in clarifying the t hesis . Most of t he salaried blue-
collar workers were in technical or experimen t al jobs that 
requ ired close contact wi t h white -co ll a r employees . 
res ult ed in an unu sually h omogeneous work force . 
This 
Th e companie s th at co nverted to salary 100% had , fo r t he 
mo st part , a higher general l eve l of skills , many jobs being 
technical o r more specialized than they are in other manu-
fact uring indus t ries . Their production workers needed more 
t echnic al kno~ledge and , hence, a higher level of education 
and trai-aing . Those companies that did not p r ovi de salary 
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status for the entire wo r k force generall y singled out certain 
type s of non-produ ction jobs for salary status . Those j obs 
included t ecr.nicians , mai ntenance , tocl makers, c u s t odia l, 
plant se curit y , inspectors , machin e se t - up, and others . 
A majorit y of co mpan ies offered salary status to blue 
collar workers because of t he differentiating effec t of wage 
versus sal a r y . Also, t he belief that sa l ary sta tu s wo uld keep 
employees o ut of an existing or threatenin g bargain ing unit 
was a re curring r eason for the swi t ch . Only fi v e companies 
changed employees who al r eady belonged t o unions over to 
salary stat us . 
Only a minori ty of comparries reinfor ~ed s~~ary status fo r 
blue-collar wo r kers with fringe b enefi ts better than those 
enjoyed by the r emaini~ g hourly wcrk for c e . Most c ompanies 
offered a f r inge benefit progra m t o all wo r ke rs, blue and 
white c o llar alike. Salaries provided status not available 
throu g h fringe benefits, but t he shift to sala r y did not cause 
a major in crease in fringe b enefi t costs. 
Of t hose companies converti3g some of their blue-collar 
worKers to salary, certain diffe r entials were no t ed . Time off 
with pay was given t 0 salaried emp l oyees in certain cases, 
(such as illness in th e family , medical or dental appoint -
ment s) , while it was not given to hourly employees. Salariec 
work e r s also were not r equi red to punch a time clock and we r e 
not dealt monetary penalties for being late . Punching time 
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clocks and penalties for lateness secrued co be widely 
recognized as inverse status symbols. 
No doubt, since 1965 the percentage of unionized c ompa-
nies convert~ng some or all of th ei r blue-collar workers to 
sa l ary has increased above th e 6% fourd by the National 
Industr ia l Conference Board study . If th e UAW realizes its 
demand in the important industrial sec tor s it repr esents , a new 
trend t oward " salaries for all" could begin . In order to go 
beyond the National Industrial Conference Board study on 
conversion s to salary, I chose one firm t o st u dy in detail . 
It was difficult to find a company that has a lready converted, 
operating unde r th e sa me conditions as John Deere . The 
Aluminum Corr.pany o f Can n da, LTD, Kingston, On t ario Works 
provides some simila riti es . This Canadian c om p any recently 
converted to salary , there was a uni on invo lved , and infor-
mation about the conv e rsion was made available by the company . 
Thre e major differences between Alcan and John Deere must be 
kept in mind . 1) Alcan did not have a wage incentive system 
bef o~ e conversion . 2) Their manufacturin g is mostly con-
tin uou s process rather than short run job shop t ype . 
3) The wo rk ers involved are Canadian rather than Ame ri c an . 
With these differences ~n mind , Alcan ' s bac kgr o und and salary 
operatic~ for blue-collar workers which was obtained f ro m 
interv iews , correspondence and the col l ective agreement , will 
be pre sented . 
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Al can' s Kingston Works an d Lo d ge 54 of t he I n t e r na t ional 
As s ocia ti o n o f Machinists and Ae r ospace Wo r ke~s ch a nged f rom 
h o u rly pa y t o a weekly pay sys t em o n Oc t obe r 3 , 1 96 6 . In 
s hort, this me an s tha t emp l o y ees are r e c eiving a full week ' s 
pay when a b sent b ecause o f si c k nes s or o t he r just ifia b l e 
re a so n s , f o r a p eriod ra n g i ng u p t o f if t y -two weeks , d epe nd ing 
on l en g t h of s erv i ce . T he week l y pay is comp ut ed o ~ t he 
basis o f fo rt y t imes the hou r ly r a t e . The week l y s ala ry 
pr o v i ~ i c n do es n ot apv l y wh en r e d uc t ion of t he wo r k f o rc e is 
nece ss ar y , which el i minates any layof f guara~ t ee of sala r y . 
Sh if t pr emiums a n d overtime compensat i o n a r e pa id as t hey 
were und e r t he hourly pR y system . 
The fi r m r ega r ds hou rly pay as a h o l dove r f r om a pe ri od 
i n indus tr ia l history wh e n work patterns we r e mor e u n certain ; 
wh en a g r ea t dea l of casual he l p was employed ; and wh en t he r e 
wa s l i ttle co n fidence between ma n agemen t and emp l oyees . 
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Management ' s e x perience in d i ca t ed t hat the grea t majo r i t y 
of t he e mpl oyees were p r ep ared to t ake r ea l in c e r es t i n t h eir 
wo r k and t o a c t i n a r espons i b l e manne r . The r e f o r e , t hey 
a d j"u st e d t h ei r p o l ic i ~s t o d emo n s tra te t hei r c onfi d en ce in t h e 
em p l oyees a n d e n co ur aze t hem , ra t he r t han retai n c l ose 
con t r o l s o n ever y one fo r t he sake o f a f ew who eigh t ac t 
i r r es p ons i bili t y . 
Th e f i r m wan t s t o a rr a n ge fo r t he ma ximum deg r ee of 
int e lligen t de cisio n makin g a t a ll level s of t he o r gan i za ti on. 
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Tradit ional control s , rule s , and regul a t ions created a basic 
atmosphe r e at Alcan which hindered everyon e ' s responsible 
b eh a v i or . The follo win g conditions have been stressed and 
est a bli shed in an effort to maximize th e human contribution . 
, l. Gett i n g t he fo r eman t o accept his re sponsibi l ities as 
a d ecision maker. 
2. Ge t ting t he fcre man t o accept his full responsibility 
as t he manager of his g rou p of employees , an~ ad-
j u s t in g t h e p 1 an t p r o c e d u r e s s o t h a t h e · ._ c Q u 1 d ex e r c i s e 
thi s r esponsibility . 
3. Get t i ng t he foreman to delegate wore responsibi l ity 
to hi s peopl~ . 
4. Giving machine operators , mainteLance men , etc ., 
mor e info r mation abou t what they wer e doinc and . why 
they were doing it . 
5 . Providing b oth the foreman a nd hi s m? ::. wi t l1 so me of 
the t ools and concepcs of manage~ent so that they 
could better evaluate wh a t th ey were doing and how 
they were doing it . 
6 . Teachin g the f oremen how to use the staff g roups 
( engineering , indust rial ~ngineerin ~ , ~e tallurgi c& l , 
accountin g and personnel ) to add to his own resources 
o f experience anci knowledge. 
7. Teaching people at all levels to try to do '' what 
makes sense in t he circumstances '' rather than f o llow 
th e rules and instruc tion s blindly . 
8, Encouraging people at all levels tc s peak up , to 
a sk questions and to add th ei r inf ormed i n telligen t 
id eas to the st r eam of productiv e effor c in th e p lant . 
9. Re - o rganizing departments to make it easie r for some 
o f t he objectives l istec above t c be accompli shed 
and t o permit bett e r t earnuo -::-k . 
10. Re-allocating managemen t people to im p =ove the effec-
t iveness of the above program . 
Fo r t he above r easo n s . the practice of punching a time 
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clock at thE b eginni~g and ending of each shift was discon-
tinued i n 1962. I t was felt t hat emp l oyees were honest and 
conscientio~s a n d would wo r k a full shift witho ut a t ime 
clock as a r o l iceman . Cases whe r e the employee i s ob ligated 
to com e in l ate o r l eave earl y are wo r ked o u t b et wee n the 
e mp l oyee a n d his foreman . 
In 19 65 t he i n s?ecticn department was elimi n ated and 
t he r esponsjbility placed on the operator . These al t e r ations 
a n d t he conve r sion to salary are all a pa r t of management ' s 
prog ra~ of adjusting their system to release the poten t ial of 
huma n r esources . 
A g u a r a nt eed salary is offered under the fo l lowing con -
ditions . 1) Emp l oyees ab ~ ent from work for s~ort pe r iods due 
t o il l n ess o r other justifiable reasons receive full pay . 
2 ) There is n o specific l imi t on the number o~ absences 
a l lowed , however if excessive, the case would come unde r re-
v iew . 3) In cases of a leng t hy illness , the sa l ary is con -
t inu ed for a period of time in accordance with t he length of 
s e r vice . 
Lengt h of Se r vice P eriod Salary Continued 
Ov e r 90 days u p t: 0 2 :,rea r s 4 weeks 
Ov e r 2 yea r s u p t o 5 years 1 3 weeks 
Over 5 yea r s up to 1 0 years 26 weeks 
Ov e r 1 0 years 5 2 weeks 
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The Employee ' s Mutua l Bene fit Society (E.M . B.S.) supplied 
b enefits t o emp loy ees whose wages we r e int e rrupted due to 
ab sence from work. Under the salary plan , the lodge-operated 
E. ~ . B . S . has discontinued op e ration . The sala r y plan caused 
no a lt erations to the firm ' s contribution or wo rker ' s coverage 
under the p r ovincial unemployment insuranc e cove rage . 
I n an effort tc find out how the salary 3ys te~ has bee n 
workin g fer the last year , I corresponded with Mr . R . S . 
Collins, personnel manager at Alcan ' s Ki n g~ton Wo rks . He is 
of t he opinion that communications ar.e better, people are 
workin g together more closely , t here is more helJ>ful ~ritical 
co mment from employees , employees are showing a greater in -
t erest in their wo r k , and t he re is more j ob satisfaction . The 
fi r m is a l so opera t ing with fewe r fo r emen . 
The change in the pay system ha s re quir :d a more drastic 
c hange in behavior patterns , therefor e , it is taking longer 
f or Al can t o change thes e patt e rn s than ~as expecte d . For 
example, problems arise because the hourly system p2rmitted 
more casual absence tb ~ n t he salary s ys teo. "Emp ~loyees we re 
used t o t aking a day off occasionally and fe lt that t h ey paid 
for it by losing a day~ pay . Th e fo~cman was of th2 opinion 
that the l oss of t he day and the loss of the wages cancelled 
each o t her out. Now th e emplo ye e feels he no longe r has this 
fl exibility and the foreman feels he is under a greater 
30 
obligation to control the se casual absences ," said Mr . Collins . 
Mr . Collins thinks that the salary system causes frustra -
t ions for th e manager . When al l employees are encouraged to 
accept responsibili t y, managemen t is of t en jus t ly c rit icized 
and the n eed for making d i fficult , di sc r imi n a ting deci s ions 
by for emen is increased . 
It can be concluded that Alcan is in favo r of t he sal ary 
plan, bu t is havin g management and absenteeism control diffi-
cul ties . Their program , philosophi es , and prob lems e n coun-
t ered have been present ed because they provide background 
for ch e reader o n a wage t o salary conversion that has been 
we ll p lanned ~nd implemented . The ba 3 i ~ hu~an motivations 
should n o t differ greatly among l abor, but c~r tain envi r on -
ment a l factors at Joh~ Dee re may negate the nat ural healthy 
expression of t hese motivations . 
B. The Setting for the Industry 
In 1967 th e United S c ates farmer makes up approximately 
7% of th e nation's labor forc e , but he has more than compen -
sated for his dwindling numbers . Through the use of a power -
. 
ful, ingenious a r ray of new machinery , t he American farmer 
pr oduces abundance . While machinery has elimi nat ed agri-
cultur a l job s , lab o r shortages have also caused forced 
mechanization . 
An hour of farm labor produces more than six times as 
much as i t did in 1920 . Fer-acre ~rop productio n has risen 
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80%. In the 1960's alone, prod uctivity of th e average 
farm worker has incr eased by 6% a ye ar corapared to 3% a year 
for all ot h er wo r kers. The average 1967 fa r m laborer produces 
enough food and fiber for thirt y- nine people . 
Approximately 3 , 200 , 000 farms ma~e up this na t ion ' s 
number one industry. Asset s total $273 billion with abou t 
$20 bil lion ti ed u p in machi n ery . Far m owners withou t mana -
gerial capa c ities a nd c apita l h ave had to leave the farm. The 
average farm wa s 175 acres in 1940 , i t n ow covers 359 acres , 
and in 1 980 will p r obably grow to 600 a c re s . In order to 
make a profit, farmer s must have volu!lle . To have vo lum e , 
t hey must ha ve lar ge acreage . To hav~ l arge a creages, the y 
must have machin ery to make t he land p ro duce most efficien tl y . 
The machines that filake t he mode r u facm r un efficien tl y 
range fro m a $600 Qanure sp reade r to a $36 ,0 00 thir teen ton 
t rac t or . Sevent y-f ive per cent of all f a rms hav e tractors 
in 1967; in 1 952 , 47 % of a l l Unit ed St ates fa r ms had tractors. 
While th ere a re abo u t 5 , 000,000 trac t ~ rs in u se on today's 
farm s , the re are also about 880,000 g rain corabines , 775,000 
hay bale r s , 655 , 000 corn pickers and shellers . v.irtually 
all of th e nation ' s whea t, c o rn , and a u gar beets &re n ow 
h arvested by machine, so a r e most soybea n s , oats , cotton, 
a nd hay. 
All th is mechani za t ion t o tal s $3 . 8 b illion in sales for 
t he nat ion 's 1, 600 farm mac hinery makers . The la!'ge, " ful l 
·. 
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line " ma nufactur e r s acco u n t fo r n ea rl y 66 % o f al l e q ui pment 
sales . Th e l a r ges t ma 11ufac tu re r s a r e Deere a nd Com pany and 
Interna ti o nal Ha rv es t er . Th e n e xt l a r ges t corapany , i n t e r ms 
of sale s , i s t he Ca nadian bas e d Na s sey- F ~rgu s on Ltd., wh ich 
sells 41 % of its pr o du c t s i n th e Unit e d States . 
The futur e l ooks brigh t f o r man u fa c ture r s as e q uip me nt 
is generall y ge tting bi gge r and mo r e p owerf u l . Th e a ve ra ge 
farm trac t o r in 1967 has six ty - seven ho r sepower ve r sus t wen t y -
seven ho rse p owe r in 1 950 . The in c r eased pow~ r enab l es far me r s 
to pull bi g g e r i mpl emen t s , cove r br oa d e r swa th s , and move 
faster in th e fi elds . The lar ge r ma n u f acture r s ar e al as e n-
gaged in ext e n s iv e r esea r ch an d deve l opmen t p r ogr ams . Dee r e 
and Co mp a n y i s of t h~ opin i on t h a t in t h e [Jt ur e f a r me r s 
will cultiv at e t he soil with ina udible sound wavas , work 
fields by c omp ut er- contr o ll ed pr ograms and use t elevis i on 
to mon i t o r re mo t e - contrclled machin es . 
Not only d oes t he size a nd comp l exity of fa r m mach i nery 
mean gr ow th for f a r m implemen t manufac tu rers , b u t al so 
the gro win g ?Op u lation . At t~ e p r esen t r ate of g r o wth , wo r ld 
popula t ion wi ll d o u b l e by the e nd of t he c e ntury. T h es e 
addit io n al p eo pl e mu s t be feJ , clothed , en d h o used . 
larg e n umbe r3 of t he pre3ent wo rl d p op ulati o n are de r e r mined 
to be better f ed, bet t er c l othed , a nd b e tt e ~ hou s ed . Th is 
is cre a ting a gradua l, b u t s i gn i f i can t i n crease in dema nd all 
over th e world . 
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C. The Comp a ny Background 
The agricultural equ ipmen t manuf ac t urer chosen for 
analysis is Deer e a nd Company. Thi s 130 year ~ld company , 
founded by John Deere ' s success with the cold steel plow, 
has t hi rt een Unit ed States factories a nd nine foreign 
fact ories . These factories manufacture, in addition .to 
agricultural machin ery , equipment for construction , forestry , 
land s capin g , earth~oving , and materials handling . In 1966 
farm equipm e nt accounted for $877 mil li on in sales , indu s trial 
equipment $15 7 million, and lawn and garden eq uipment $27 .7 
million. 
The data present ed in Tables 1,2,3,17, a nd 18 provides 
the most pr ecise picture of Deere and Com9any's g ro wth over 
th e past t e n years . Tota l un ion man ho ur s wo r ked increased 
65 %. Net income increase d 169 %. Uni~n woL k ers ' t o tal 
strai ght time ear n i n gs inc r eased 123%. Stock dividends 
increase d 87 %. It can be conclud ed that union labor ' s 
earnings have kept a close pac e with net income when stock 
dividends and capital investment are co n s idered . 
Since the th es i s is co nc e rn e d with interactipn of 
Deer e and Company and the United Automobile , Aeo r space, a pd 
Agricultural Impl ement Worke r s of America o n g u arantee d 
annual inc ome , o nl y t he firm ' s e i gh t UAW p lant s will b e con-
sidered . 
Table 1 . Seven- year summary (1960-1966) o f consolidated 
income and surplus - Deere and Company* 
Sales and othe r income : 
Less : 
Net sales . 
Interest and finance charges 
Net income of credit company 
subsidiaries . 
Miscellaneous income 
Total . 
Cost of goods sold . 
Selling , administrative and 
general expenses. 
Provision for income taxes 
Interest . . . . . . . . . 
Foreign exchan ge loss (gain) 
Miscellaneo u s charges . 
To t al 
Income before gain on sales of chemical 
company assets 
Gain on sale of chemical company assets 
(less r elated income t ax ) 
Ne t income fo r the year 
Earned surplus at beginnin g of year 
Total . 
Less : 
Cash dividends on preferr ed stock . 
Cash dividends on common stock 
Stock dividend - 3% . 
Charge t o earned su r pl u s arising 
from conversion of preferred 
stock to debentures 
Total 
Ea r ned surplus at end of year 
Earnings per common share (based 
on average number of shares 
outstanding during the year) 
Common div idends dec l ared per share . 
*From 1 966 Deere and Company Annua l Report . 
1966 
$1 , 062,061,506 
9 , 859,785 
$ 
3,365,691 
3,813 , 709 
1 , 0 79,100 , 691 
759 , 999 , 785 
111 , 772 , 07 0 
98,975 , 843 
26 , 021 , 666 
490, 819 
3 , 131 , 938 
1 , 000 , 392 , 121 
78 , 708 , 570 
78 , 708 , 570 
416 , 398 , 909 
49 5, 10 7 ,4 79 
26 , 205,957 
__ 26 , 205 , 95 7 
$ 468 , 901,522 
$5.46 
$1. 80 
+ Pe r- sha r e fig u res have been adj u s t ed fo r 2- fo r - l s t ock 
soli t in 19 63. 
$ 
$ 
$ 
1965 
886 , 619,587 
8 , 041 , 620 
3 , 143,573 
4 2136 1800 
901 1941 , 580 
6 59 , 840 , 332 
99 , 903 , 678 
69 , 293 , 339 
1 9 , 206 , 931 
466 , 548 
2 2196 1133 
850 , 906 1961 
5 1 , 034 , 61 9 
55 , 792 , 619 
382 , 091 , 461 
4 37, 884.,0 80 
2 1 , 48 5, 1 71 
21 , 485 1171 
416 2398 , 909 
$4. 03 
$1. 55 
$ 
$ 
$ 
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1964 
816 , 636 , 214 
9 , 181 , 056 
3 , 284,558 
3 25222884 
832 2624 , 712 
591 , 567 , 246 
98 , 397 , 328 
69 , 426 , 074 
11 , 893,935 
369,323 
1 1525 2399 
773 11791305 
59 , 445 , 407 
59 , 445 , 407 
343 2386 1715 
402 , 832 ,1 22 
20 , 740 , 661 
20 , 740 , 661 
382 1091 , 461 
$4 . 30 
$1. 50 
$ 
$ 
$ 
1963+ 
688,9 31 , 372 
9 , 536,047 
3 , 023,005 
3 22382026 
704 , 728 , 450 
505 , 074 , 954 
80 , 625 , 892 
58 , 412 , 456 
9 , 672 , 612 
881 , 897 
1 2690 1171 
656 1357 2982 
48 , 370 , 468 
48 , 370 , 468 
312 2964 2751 
361 , 335 , 219 
17 , 948 , 504 
17 2948 2504 
343,386,715 
$3 . 50 
$1. 30 
Table 1 . Continued 
$ 
$ 
~ 
1962 
5 7 2,829,013 
9 , 645 , 093 
2 , 970 , 384 
2 1133 1364 
587 , 577 , 854 
4 18 , 226 , 618 
70,614 , 551 
44 , 379 , 197 
10 , 092 , 338 
4 , 772 , 206 
1 2522 2546 
5 49 2607 2456 
3 7 , 9 70 , 398 
37, 9 70 , 3 9 8 
290 2176 , 553 
328, 146 , 9 51 
15 , 182 ,2 0 0 
15 2182 , 200 
312 1964 2751 
$ 2 .75 
$1. 10 
$ 
$ 
$ 
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1961 
561 , 631 , 043 
9 , 182 , 379 
2,977 , 503 
2 2146 1329 
575 , 937 , 254 
423 , 286 , 340 
71 , 199 , 964 
33 , 007 , 158 
10 , 673 , 974 
616 , 263 
1 2188 2380 
539 29 7 2 20 7 9 
35 , 965 ,1 75 
35 , 96 5 , 1 7 5 
268 2013 23 7 8 
303 , 9 7 8 ,5 53 
13 , 802 , 000 
13 2802 , 000 
290 2176 , 553 
$2 . 61 
$1. 00 
$ 
$ 
1960 
511 , 858 , 672 
7,684 , 504 
1 , 380 , 423 
2 2250 2642 
523 , 1 74 224 1 
409 , 528 ,0 38 
67, 010 , 728 
15, 14 2 , 390 
11,199 , 125 
(216 , 072) 
255 2526 
502 , 919, 735 
20 , 254 ,5 06 
20 , 254 ,5 06 
261 , 560 2872 
281 , 815 ,37 8 
13 , 802 , 000 
13 2802 2000 
s 268,013 , 378 
$1. 4 7 
$ 1. 00 
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T ab 1 e 2 • Ne t in c o n1 e p e r p r o <l u ~ t i on u •1 i o n m a n ho u r w o r k e d -
Deer e and Compa ny , 1957 -1 96G 
Year Net income 
(milli on) 
Total union 
man hours 
worked 
(million) 
Cents p e r union 
man h r . o r n e ' t 
income p e r union 
man hr. work e d 
Index of 
net income 
per union 
man hour 
worked 
1957 
195 8 
1959 
1960 
19 61 
1962 
19 6 3 
1964 
19 65 
1966 
1. 
29.2 27.165 $ 1.08 100.00 
43 .4 29.249 1. 48 137.03 
50.9 35. 0 06 1. 41 133.65 
20.3 31 . 635 .6 4 88 . 41 
36.0 32.251 1.1 2 144.44 
38.0 27.625 1. 38 167.65 
48.4 33.922 1.43 171.27 
59.4 40.052 1. 48 174.77 
51. 0 40.299 1. 27 159.58 
7 8. 7 44.946 1. 7 5 197.38 
The UAW factories and their product s o. r e : 
John Deer ·: Des }1oines Wo rks , Des Mo in es , I owa 
Equipment for har ve sting corn , cotton, and b e ets ; Culti -
vators, Chisel Plo ws , and Self - propelled Spraye rs . 
2. John Deere Plan ter Wo r ks , Moline , Illinois 
Disk Harr ows , Planters , anci Sprayers . 
3. Johe Deere Mallea b l~ Works , East Moline, Illinois 
Malleable, Pearlitic Ma lleable , and Nodular Ca stings for 
Deere factories. 
4. John Deere Harve s t er Wo rks, East Mo lin~, Illinois 
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Tabl e 3 . Net sales per producti on u nion man ho u r worked -
Deere and Compa ny , 1 95 7-19 66 
Year Dollar s Total un ion Sales/union Ind ex net 
sales man hours man hour sale s /union 
(milli o n) wo r ked man hour 
{million) wo r ked 
1957 $ 424.3 27.165 15 . 62 100.00 
1 958 507 . 4 29.249 17 . 35 108 . 77 
1959 577 . 3 35 . 666 16.19 102.09 
19 60 511. 9 31.635 16.18 102 . 03 
1961 561. 6 32 . 251 17 . 41 109 . 63 
1962 572.8 27.625 20 . 71+ 128 . 76 
1 963 686 . 9 33.922 20 .31 1 26.69 
1964 816 . 6 40.052 20.44 127.33 
196 5 886.6 40.299 22.00 134 . 96 
1966 10 62 . 1 44 . 946 23 . 63 142 . 3 7 
Combine s . 
5 . John Dee r e Waterloo Tractor Works , Waterloo , I ow a 
Far~ and Indu s t rial Tr actors . 
6 . John Deere Dub uque Tractor Work s , Dubuqu e , Iowa 
Far m, Industrial , and Forest Tractors, a nd Engin es. 
7 . John De e re Spr eade r Works , East Mol~ne , Il linois 
Fertili zer Spreaders, Farm Loader s , and Fe e d Hand li ng 
Equipment . 
8 . John Deera Ottumwa Works , Ott umwa, Iowa 
Hay and Fo r age Harves tin g Eq ui pment. 
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Nego ti a tions a r e centralized between Deere and Comp any , 
with pl a nt r epresen t at io n , and th e international UAW , wit h 
repr esentati o n fro m th e eigh t l ocal u n i o~s . 
Since I am familiar with John De~re Des Moines Wo r ks ' 
operation s and thi s facility is a r ep r esentative Dee r e and 
Company plant , it ~ill be u sed a s a basis to desc ribe general 
enviro~men tal conditions that exis t fer t he company . 
Fo r the most pa r t farming is a s easonal business 
(De s Moines Works and the eight UAW plan~s manufac ture agri -
cul t ur a l equipment alreos t exclusiv e l y) , thus , man ufacturing 
is basical l y seasona l . For thi s r eason , blue - co llar .wages 
and employment v arie s considerably through ~ut the yea r . 
Generally , t he period ~f slack ac t ivity is b~ twee n Septembe r 
and February . 
Des Moines Works and tbe company operate on a " job 
shop t ype " basis with relatively sho rt ru ns and fai rly high 
set-up cos ts. Th e factory at Des Moines has ~pprox i mately 
45 ,0 00 diffe r ent parts ~ it h 200 , 000 ma nu facturing ope rations . 
Thi s re q uir es producti o n wo r kers to be moderately skilled 
and extremely adaptable . Mach i ne opera t ors , i n add iti on to 
piece p r oduction , pe r form their own set -u ps . They mu st be 
well qua l ified and familiar with t he ir particular machine. 
The part s a re routed through the plant by the Metl1ods 
Depar tment . These s ~ l a ried engineers determin e the ope r -
ations , machines , acd tooling needed t o p r oduce a part at a 
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defined qua l ity . The Incentive and Standard s Engineering 
Department determine through estlmation, standard data , or 
dir ec t time study , the standard time toget he r ~i th the 
o pe r ation occupational rate which determines the operation's 
earn i ngs . The hourly occ u pationa l rate of pay fo r incentive 
e mpl oyees is determined by job evaluation and union- manage -
men t negotiation. The hourly rate of pay for the non-
i ncen t ive emp l oyee is set b e twe e n a minimum and maximum , 
d e t e r mined by merit r a ting. The hourly and incentive rates 
o f pay, along with a comparison of straight time earnings 
with th e aut omobile industry, is shown i n Table 4. 
Sin ce t he mec~anics of converting to salary o r gua r anteed 
a n nual salary would be relative ly simple for non-incentive 
e mp l oyees , this present method of pay will not be pursued 
any further . The major hypothetical p~oblem and disagreement 
b e t ween management and union lie s in aband on~en t of the 
present standard hour incentive me thod of pny and adoption 
of a salary or guaranteed annual income for in ce~ tive em-
p l oyees . In order to mo re fully under s tan d the problems for 
un ion and management , the present method of o ut p u.t incentive 
pay must be fully explored . Firstly , general unio n and 
manage ment views on monetary output iacentives will be re -
v iewed , then Deere and Company ' s standard hour plan ~ill be 
presented as the present method of pay. 
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Table 4 . ff + Ty p ica l wage rate schedule ' - 1965 and 1967 
Hourly Wages Occup ational Rates 
{Non-inc entive2 {Incentive) 
Lab o r Range Range* Labor 
Grad e 19 65 1967 Grade 1965 1967* 
1 3 . 335 - 3.890 3 .7 5 - l. . 370 H 3 . 110 3 . 4 9 5 
2 3 . 18 0- 3 . 735 3 . 575-4 .19 5 G 2 . 9 9 5 3 . 365 
3 3 . 040 - 3 . 575 3 . 415-4 . 015 F 2 . 875 3 . 230 
4 2 . 890-3.425 3 . 245-3 . 850 E 2.765 3.105 
5 2 . 710 - 3.205 3 . 045-3.615 D 2.665 2.995 
6 2 . 590-3. 065 2 . 910-3 . 445 c 2 . 565 2 . 880 
7. 2 . 495-2 . 920 2 . 804-3 . 280 B 2 . 4 7 5 2 . 780 
8 2.450- 2 . 78'.) 2 . 755-3.250 A 2.380 2.675 
9 2 . 405 - 2.635 2 . 705-2 . 960 
10 2 . 365 - 2 . 500 2 . 660-2.810 
+Fr om John Deere Des Moines Works , effec tive 
Jun e 5, 1967. 
*Include s 
additives 
1965 
1966 
2 . 5% Gener a l wage increase 
2 . 8 % Gen e r a l wa ge inc r ease 
7.0% Cost of livin g additive 
#T h e average straight time hourly e arnings of 
Deere and Company ' s eight UAW plants. 
= $3.28 w/o addi tives o r 
= $3 . 77 ~/additives or 
$4.90 including fringe benefits 
#The ave r age straight-time hourly earnings at UAW 
aut omobile manu f~ccuring plants (Ford, Chrys ler, 
General Motors) . 
= $3 . 41 w/additives 
= $4. 7 0 including fringe benefits 
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V. PRES ENT METHOD OF PAYMENT - WAGE INCENTIVE* 
Th e bas i c theor y of incentives , di scoun ti ng th e possi-
bili t y of abuse s , i s to get p eop l e to produce mo re . During 
mediev a l times , feudal l andowne r s l ived in splendor whi l e 
serfs tilled the soil for a small p o rtion of t he ir labo r s , 
t he larger share going t o t he l ord of t he manor . Through 
history, one can see rep ea ted instances in successive socie -
t ie s of large g r oups of peop l e labo r ing hard and being paid 
less than their worth in o r der that a favor ed few can live 
in compa r a t ive indolenc e and receive much mo r e than t hei r 
worth. I t cannot be disputed tha t certai n wo r kers contri -
bute much rao re to th e success of ~n o r ganization than others , 
and on t hat basis a r e en t it l e d to hi ghe r benefits in propor-
tio n to their inc~e2sed production. 
The prob l em of motivation has also e x isted as l ong as 
the employer-employee r e l at i onship . Kith t he advent of the 
fact o ry system of man u facturing , management has been faced 
with the problem of ma intaining s u pe rvi sion while provid ing 
incen t ives t o emp l oyees in order to encourage p r oduct i vity . 
Essentially, there are t wo app r oaches ; the negative method 
of supervision and disciplina r y action and the positive 
*During th e discussion a f wage incentives the reade r 
shouid keep in mind the union's proposed guaranteed 
annu al sa lary p l an as a n a lt e rn ative . 
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me th od of providin g i ncent i v es , f i n a n =ia l a nd n o nf i n a n c ial , 
f o r gr e a te r e f f ort. 
All en Ru cke r, in a speech entitl ~d " Wha t does t h e Wo r ke r 
Wa nt'', l i s t e d f i ve human des ir es wh ic~ sho u l <l be sa t i sfi ed to 
genera t e hi g h e r pr od u c t i vity. They a r e : 
1. Emp l o yees wa n t t o be l ong t o a t e am . 
2 . Emp l o y ees want a n oppo rt u n i t y t o t ake pa rt in wh a t 
t hey t hin k i s a n import a nt e nt e r p r ise . 
3 . Emp l oyee s want t o assoc i a t e wi t h peop l e whom t h e y con -
s i der i mport an t . 
4. Emp l oyees want an oppo r tuni t y to in c r ease t hei r p r es ti g e 
an d i mp o rt a n ce whi l e havi n g t h a t 1a i n ma t ched by 
a d dition s t o t heir i ncome . 
5 . Emp l o yees wa n t t o be ab l e to do s0me t hing t o preven t 
a r b it rary an d un pleasan t c han ges i n the cont inuit y 
of thei r emp l oyment , i n come and s0cial p r es t ige (37 , p . 2). 
Al t hou g h t he task of e l i ci t ing e1ap l oyee effor t e n com-
pa sses n o n f inancial mo c ivati0n , t he m0s t common posi t ive 
me thod i s wage incen t ives . 
Fr e d ric k W. Taylor a nd scien ti f i c mana g emen t i ntr od uce d 
th e form a l wa5e incentive system . Th e de~oc ratic ch a r acte r 
of s cie n ti f i c ma n agement pays me n r ather t han posi ti ons and 
th rou g h methods of p aymen t , r ewa rd s e a c h wo r kman on th e bas is 
o f hi s e f i ciency . 
A. Managemen t an d Labo r At t i t udes 
In t h e e i gh t y-five yea r de v e l opme n t ~£ formal wage in c en-
t ive s y s t ems , ma n y varia t io n s h ave emerged . These sys t ems 
have beco me a n im po rt an t, but controversial , t oo l of Americ a n 
mana g e ment . Th e r e is muc h d i v e r si t y of opinion a mo n g indivi -
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duals and group s in r ega r d to the me rit s , va lues , and 
desirabilit y of incentive systems . 
There i s a gen era l feeling that output i ncentives have 
not increased in coverage , but may be declin ing . Case 
studies of incentive abandonment have be en sufficiently 
prevalent in the l i terature to give t h is i mp re ss i on . However , 
available empirical d a t a in the United States does hot show 
this to be true. A 1 945 -19 48 Bureau of Lace r Sta tistics 
survey of 55,000 establishments r eport e d a n over - all incentive~ 
coverage o f 30 %. Twelve years l a t er , anot he r Bur eau of 
Labor Statist i cs study l im it e d to manufacturing reported 27% 
of the emplo yees we r e paid on a n incecti ve basis ( 32 ). Ther e 
is a lac k of ~ont i n uity b e t ween the t~o studies , since t he 
earlier study covere~ non - manufa cturing as wel l as man u fac -
turin g firms. In t hose industries whe r e a compa r ison is 
possible, approximate l y as many showe~ an in c r ease as showed 
a de c rease . 
According to th e l i terat u r e , it seems that new appli -
cat ~ns of incent ives have b een o n the decline , but are offset 
by inc rea se d cov er age (2 6 ,27,29,30,31,32,3 8 , and 4 7). For 
United State s St eel ' s Ir yi n Wo r ks in Pitt sburgh , P enn s y lvan ia, 
incentive cov e r age has increased from 20 % to 80% in fifteen 
years. Deere and Company has abou t 53 % of their wage em-
ploy ees on incentiv e (Table 21). In the ga rment indu s try 
about 90 % of the employ ees .are covered by incent i v es . Gener~ 
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ally, it can b e concluded t ha t incentive coverage is not 
declinin g in t he Unite d States , but i s rema ining fairly con -
stant (2 6) . 
The fact remains t hat th e r e is still a ce r tain a mount of 
demoralization in r egard t o in cent ives . I ndust rial Re l ations 
uses t his term, demoralization, t o describe incen tiv~ systems 
which h ave develop ed sebstan ti a l inequities in earn ings and 
effort, a growing average incentive yield or bonus , a 
declining average l evel of effort , and a high proport i on of 
" off standard " payment and time . Although no measu r e of the 
inciden ce of d emoralization is avai laole , a geed dea l of 
disencha ntment i s evident (26) . 
Sev e r a l major firms , such as General Elect ric and West -
inghouse , have dropped output wage incentives in favo r of 
measur ed daywork . Other firms hav e replac ed individua l and 
s mall group incentives wi th a plant wide type , for example , 
the Lon g Ra n ge Sharing Plan between Kaise r S teel and t he 
Unit ed St ee l Wo rkers . Othe r s have added a new rewar<l system 
to th e existing structure, such as t he development o f a 
p r ofi t sharing plan between Ame ri can Mo t o r s and t~e UAW . 
Stated directly, the emphasis for t hese com~anies is not o n 
individual output, but indirec t p lans t hat focus o n aspects 
of economic achievement for th e t ota l organi~ation . These 
trends s u ggest an effort to reinstate the stimulus and effect 
that has be e n d emo r alized over a period of time . 
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Ther e are many factors which hav e made the field of 
in cen tive pay ap pli ca tio n and t he effects complex . Incentives 
n ow encompass a wide vari e ty of methods and plans . io one 
pl a n or system can be u niversa lly applied. Howe v e r , incen-
tive s can be applied wi t h some ve r y c l ea r c ut economic r et urn s 
whe n the basic fundamen tal s of the p l an are understood and 
c o rr ect ly adreinistered . 
The success o r failur e of any incentive system is depen-
dent upon management and labor objectives and philosophies . 
A mana gemen t decis i on to adopt an incentive pro gram will 
gen erally be aimed a t one , or some blend o f the follo wi n g 
obj ect i ves : 
1 . To i mprove t h e net profit of t he fi r m th r ough r educed 
unit costs for lab o r, overread , or both . 
2 . To avoid o r miniraiz e the l ~c r eased capi t a l investment 
n ecessary t o enlerg e production capacity , or t o redu ce 
costs via mechauiz atio n of J Obs . 
3. To provide improved earnings fo r employees , thu s 
in creasing contentmen t with their jobs without l ocking 
t he firm into a higher wage r ate structure , r egardless 
of productivity in th e p lant. 
4 . To attain the highest machine, overhead , and employee 
ut i lization possible . 
5 . To provide greater organ i zational control ove r pro-
duction uhile furnish!ng a barometer for production 
problems or maladjustme nts . 
6. To r educe th e direct watching and supervision of em-
ployees , thereby providing some favorable influence on 
indu s trial relati o3s and their personal interest in 
produ c t ion . 
Union s are traditi onal~y opposed to wage incentives . 
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Th i s hostility t oward incentives exists b ecause of earlier 
expe r ience with in cen t ive plans in the absence o f uni o n 
pr o t ection. " Yet en balance t oday un io n s probably exert 
mo r e pr essu1e fo r exten sio n than for limitatio n of wage i n cen -
tive c ove r age " ( 26 , p. 7 3) . 
The r e ha s been no unif o rm union attitude o r objectiv e 
t owa r d incen tives . Policies differ amo n g unions , within 
un i on s aqd changes with time . For example, t he UAW national 
p o li c y avoi6s incentives , while Local 450 in Des Moine s 
gene r ally favors the incen tive system . Pat Rogers , John Dee r e 
Des Mo i nes ~arks industria l r e lations sup e rvisor , says he sees 
in ce nt ive acceptance and performance high e r among rural 
wo r kers t han among metropolitan worker8 . With a n increasing 
amo unt of industry m~vin g to rural areas , a ge ~ e r a l adoption 
of a more f a vorable uni on attitcde may re sult . 
Ass u ming a pcsitive uni o n and labo r attitude t oward wage 
i ncent ives , their objectives would b e one , or some blend of 
th e f o llowing: 
1 . To share in the cons tantl y risin g leve l of manhour output 
an d t he declinin g input costs per un it cf output . 
2 . The r ight to n egotia t e s tandards and rates . 
3 . Th e r ig ht to challen ge standa r ds a nd rates throu g h 
g r ievance procedur e a nd arbit r ation . 
4 . The adoption of rule s gove rnin g th e adminis tration cf 
incentive sys te ms desi g n e d to protect the wo rk e rs inter -
e st in the operat ion . 
5 . The adoption of a labor group at t itude by ~anagement and 
a d e-emphasi ~ of individual discrimin a tion a n d 
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diff e r entiation . 
6. The establishment of financia l rewar ds by management 
that are meaningful. 
7 . The establishment of a salaried me t hods department to 
r elieve th e wo r ker from additional risks of t he business 
or ganization or ope r ation . 
8 . To provid e a smooth an d eff i cient adrnluistra tion of 
incentives a n d a means of un ion r echeck . 
9 . To p r ovide some form of work and income g uarante es . 
10. To increase emphasis on j ob rights cf the employee. 
1 1 . To change t he term "wage incentive plan" to " productivity 
wage " which would imply a contra.:t between ma n agement and 
l abor to establish the right to ~ spec ified hourly wage 
at a nor ma l pace. Thus, t he wor ke r would obligate him-
s elf t o mee t t he jointl y set production s t andard . In 
additi on , i ncentives might be more acceptable under this 
new na me. 
Management philosophies wil l hav~ an effec t on union 
attitude and will conditioP. the c h oica of an appropriate 
in centive sys t em . Generally , management philosophies follow 
thr ee patterns . Th e f i r s t is , " Lab o r t i n1 e i s a ma r k e t c om -
modit y . 11 The attitude is that employ ees of a f~rm a r e a 
"necessary evil" in the production and sale of t he product . 
The belief is that employees should r ece iv ~ the open market 
r eplacement price for the time they spend at wo r k and that 
th e firrr. can maximize output by care ful planning,. detailed 
wor k a n alysis and forced conformance co standardized wo rk 
paces . This view l eaves littl e o r no ro om for an inc en tive 
and will result in an equa l ly " hard nosed" at titud e by the 
uni on . 
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"A fair d ay ' s work for a fai r day ' s p ay " is a sof t e r 
attit~de :1h ~c h often ~dopts individual carro t-t ype incentives . 
Th e individ ual i s tr eated as an " economi c island", his strict 
motivation ~s money . The r a te of pa y is toward the high 
r ange for tl1 e indus tr y ; th ere are good benefits and incentives 
p aid on direc t production as l ong as effort is above 
nor ma l and can be oeasured accura t e l y . The indirect emp l oyees 
often h ave no incentive , so must still be man aged to coun t e r-
act t heir " laziness and ineptitude ." 
are easily app lied in this case . 
Individ ual incentives 
"L et ' s get everyone on the team" is a philosophy that 
can le ad a l ac ge group of people i n t 0 ef f ic~ent wo r k c a t her 
than forc ing t he~ i ~to it . Empl oyees a~e ~ol~ what must b e 
dcne , constructive t hinking ia encouraged and both res~on­
sibility and a ut hori t y are assigned to the lowest level at 
which both can function within executive guidance and control . 
This i s r efe rred t o by Ha rold Ruttenber g as Hu~anation (36) . 
Individu a l i n cen ti ves do n o t work in this si tuation . 
Manag emen t philcs ophy seems to be changing f r om the 
t raditi o n a l vi ew that people need a direct push o r pull (which 
u s uall y l e ad s to installation of. out!J ut incentives) t o one 
of e l iminat ing histori c c l eavages between man u a l, cle r ical an d 
manager ial employees wi t hi n the organization . Th is i s 
probabl y a r esul t of unio n pres su re s and atci tudes , mo re 
indire c t lab or in t he work force , increas ed t ech n ology , and 
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greater management skill. In some instan ces it takes th e form 
o f placing a ll employees on sala ry ; in other situations it 
involves the install a ti on of a t otal group bonus plan (30). 
Mana gement need fo r long o r short run gains can also be a 
determin ing factor in th~ type of system t o adopt . If the 
need is fo r r ealizing short run results with a high degree of 
certainty, then some fo r m of output incentive is appropriate . 
Output i ncentives can be compared to a stiff drink , the shor t 
ru n effe ct is terrific, but the long run headaches are seldom 
worth the sho r t run kick . On the othe= hand, if the l onge r 
run view is tak en and short run r esults can be sacrificed for 
long run imp r ovemer.ts . th en a cos t reduction plan or salary 
status migh t b e b es t. 
B . Advantages ar.d Disadvantages 
Now some general arguments for and against monetary 
output incentives should be explo r ed . Most 0f the disadvan-
t ages of incentive plar.s can be applied as advantages of 
salar y plans. 
Output in centi ve plans can tend t o induce cheating , build 
up " kitties" , jockeying fo r juicy jobs , e tc. Con.tract pro -
visions often tend co fre e ze incentives at a high level and 
provid e incentive e~rnings when not really earned, for examp le : 
average earnings , t empo rary transfer, experiQeota l work , etc . 
Generally speaking , output incentives have iccreased in 
importan ce d ur ing periods of extended labor sho r tage . For 
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examp l e, during World War II in thi s co unt ry , oytput in cen -
t ives provid ed a mean s of paying more than the r ates allowed 
under wag e stabilization or under an " incomes policy " . 
Ou t put incenti ves t end t o be used more frequently whe r e 
th e pl an t is characte rized by a l ow s tat e of tec hnology . 
This raises a seriou s cha ll enge to outp ut incentives since 
the pace of technology is acce lerating everywhere wi t h the 
co r respondi ng area of man - paced operation~ diminishing . Much 
o f i n dustry is b eing automa t ed , and t he r esu lts to be achieve d 
by systems engineering have barely been touched . I n an 
equipment-pa ce d econooy , even though tl1e wa=ke r s are literally 
at t end ants , such opera t ions are not at all amenable to incen-
tives , for the pace 0£ prodcc tivity is d etzrmined wholly by 
t he equipment . However , t he net effect of recent t echnolog-
ical changes thus far seems to have been expans io n rather 
t han abandonmen t of output incentive coverage . This is due 
t o increased ccver age of incentives and adoptio~ of equipment 
ut i l ization incentives by many fi r ms . 
Turnin g to automati on in the mo r e complete sense , there 
seems to b e litt l e do ubt regarding its impa ct o n i ndividua l 
o r small group wage incentives . . Both t he production stan~a rds 
and t he concept of work measureme nt becom e mean ingleas as 
r elated to wo rk e r incentives with complet e automa tion. This 
will p r obably l ead t o an increase in collective plans , which 
ar e concern e d with t he long- ran ge we l fa r e of t he firm. 
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Ther e is little o r no mo ti vation for production employees 
t o make methods improvements which will increase outp u t and 
technology of the firm . Many b elieve a good methods engineer 
and competent management are all that is needed t o develop the 
best method for doing a job . The fac t i s that worker s make 
met hods improvements frequently , but they realize it is to 
their advantage no t to t ell anybody about these changes . 
John Deere ' s a tt empted solution t o this prob l em is the 
establis hmen t of a suggestion plan . This encourages t he 
opera t or to submit his idea under t he suggestion plan b y 
offering a r ewa r d based on yearly savings . The suggestion 
plan ha s sufficienL rewards, reasonable poli~ies , and adequate 
publicity, an d therefore works fairly successfully . However , 
t he employees and the union feel cer t ain disadvantages to the 
suggestion p lan: 
1. It fosters competitition among t he workers for more pay . 
2 . The short run re~ard of ten cannot match the addi t ional 
long t e r m wage the worke r can receive. 
3. Loose rate s cou l d be retimed sine~ a change in me th od 
usually occurs . 
For th ese reason s and others , suggestion plani a r e good in 
the o r y , but in practice few suggestions are received on incen-
ti ve operations ( Table 5). The official local union policy 
is t o not re cognize the suggestion p lan in t he contract o r 
othe r wise . 
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Tabl e 5 . Typ i cal suggestion award breakdown , 1 966* 
Employee 
t ype 
No . sugges -
tions w/ 
award s 
% of t otal 
suggestions 
w/awards 
Net dol l ar % of total 
savings _front net saving 
suggest ions f r om 
su gges ti on 
Sal a r ied 19 25 $4,089 50 
Hour ly wage 40 53 1, 458 18 
(non-in-
centive) 
Incentive 17 22 2,600 3 2 
wage 
Total s 76 100 $8,1 48 1 00 
* F r om Jo hn Deere Des Moines Wo r ks . 
The fol l owing is one exce r pt from a letter distributed 
to UAW Local 450 members . 
Sugg is t ion plan is al l company 
For the benefit of the new me n at the plant , the sugges-
ti on plan is a project of the company on l y . It is not a 
part of the agreement with th e UNION , although the com-
pany has attempted severa l times to insert it into the 
contract . The UNION has r efused to agree to the sugges -
tion plan because we believe our members l ose more than 
th ey ga in from it . The Company makes the biB gains 
from any suggestions that they accept ; occasionally , of _ 
course , th ey award an employee a fairly large amount of 
money . The man in a carn i va l booth allows someone to be 
a big wi nner occasionally - - usually someone he has 
p lanted , t he motive of course is to d=aw more suckers . 
There has been more than one case where an·employee has 
turned in a suggestion and receiv ed a sraal l amo unt of 
money only t o have his earnlngs or hi s fe !lov un i on 
bro t hers wages cu t by many times the amount paid (fo r 
th e suggestion)(2~. 
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The frict ion encountered in making methods improvements 
tend s to discourage managemen t from making all but the most 
dramatic and profitable changes . Also in areas with loose 
rate s , management may initiate "uneco n omical " changes in 
methods aimed at cutting the r a t e rath er than in c r easing out -
put. 
Abu se of equipment, poor u sage of materials , l ow quality 
of exces s ive rejects may be a by -product of an output incen-
tive sy stem . In th e garment industry, experience has shown 
that thi s does not occur unless management slackens. Quality 
of the work performed depends mostly on the p rop e r supervision 
and training of th e operators. If incentives a r e usP.d in 
pl a c e of good supervision , quality will t end to deterio r ate . 
Assuming adequate supervision , quality is ~aintained at John 
Deere by paying incentives on "good" productio~ on l y . If 
defective work is found to be produced by an incentive wo r ke r, 
he rec e ive s th e occupational base rate for time spent on the 
job without th e incentive and , whe n p0ssible , must rework the 
defective work on his own time . 
Effective administration is the key to a smooth runni n g 
incentiv e system . Output incentive systems moYe often seem to 
fail, demoralize, or deteriorate because of poor administra -
ti on . If a firm is not willing to make a sizable investmen t 
in incent ive administration and maintenance , the system will 
surely fail in th e l o n g run. 
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Distortion of incentive plans h a ve r £su lted because of : 
1. Sizable inequalities in earnings and effort 
2 . Large and growing incentive yield acco mpa nied by low and 
d ec l ining effort lev e l s 
3. High proportions of payments of a~erage earnings and other 
gua r antees for non -i ncentive work to incentive employees 
Because of the tremendous number of good or bad effects 
administr a tion can have upon incen t ives , a summary list is 
provided of the major effec ts . 
Good effects resulting from effective administr a tion of 
an incen tive system could be any number of the following : 
1. At traction of good lab o r 
2 . Placing workers where th ey produce most e ff ec tively 
3. Focusin g attention on training ne e ds 
4. Inducin g workers to co ntribute servi ces with high 
intensity . 
5. Close control of work groups and departments 
6. Determination of t he best me thod s for performing work 
and standardizin g job conditions 
7. Promotion of harmonious relations between workers and 
service groups 
8. - Promotion of more efficient management 
Bad effects res u ltin g from ineffective administration of 
an incentive system could be any number of the f o llowing : 
1 . Establishment of a social level of output accep t able to 
t he blue collar g r oup 
2. Inflexibility to schedule men and equip me r.t because of 
slow-d owns 
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3. Lazy supervisors who allow an incentive system to replace 
th e ir fu nc t ion 
4. A ma r gin of e rr o r by indust r ial engineers i n the manpaced 
area of p lus or mi nus 1 0% 
5 . Co ope r a t io n by s upervision in l oose r a t e app li ca t ions , 
"t o k ee p my boys happy " 
6 . Ant agon ism t owa r d t hose who do ad~iniste r incentives 
7 . Cy ni cism wi t h r espect t o managemen t s ' in t egri t y and 
fairness 
8. Th e fea r of unemplo yme nt and l oss of self - esteem by the 
wor kers 
9 . Th e feeling t hat incentives reduce the skill r equired 
on a job 
10 . P oo r u nders t anding by emp l oyees as to how the i ncentive 
rat e i s se t 
11. Unf ai r o r a r b it ra r y setting of s t andards by managemen t 
1 2. Management i ns e nsitivity to employe e feelings toward 
s t a n da r ds 
13 . The r eplacement of incentive earning$ (or increases 
i n pay 
A t ype of li fe cycle has been found to ope rate on the 
e ffec t i v eness of output incentives . At first , wh en adminis -
tr a t ion is keen and workers enthusiastic, the y us u al l y wo r k 
we l l . T he n t he l etdown begins . The administration makes 
co ncessions rathe r than lose output and employees tr y to 
manip ul a t e t he system or . become b i tter toward it . Th e res ul t 
i s aba n donrner.t or revision of the system . Usually the l atter 
re s ult s , si n ce once individual o u tput incentives have been 
us e d , t he effect of a pull through direct reuard i s u sually 
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still n eeded*(29) . 
Complete automatic~ will le ad to destruction of incen -
tives, but such developme nts are far ~ nto the future. With 
the advent of increased use of inc entive coverage , th e 
decreased supply of effective supervision , and the ingrained 
incentive philosophy in the United States , incentives are 
likely to r~main . 
The l argest present threat to incentives fo r production 
worke r s i s guaranteed annual salary. Thi s will probably be 
the only method of pay which, through p r essure by t he union, 
coul d replac e the company ' s incen t ive syst em . 
In th e f utu re the union i s like!~ to continue to probe 
for and exploit wea~nesses in the individual ince ntive system . 
Company management mus t ei ther continue to be aware of the 
weaknesses and fig h t demoralization throu gh cos tl y and caref ul 
~dainistration or accept the union de~ands a nd abandon t he 
incentive sys t em. 
C. The Standard Hour Wage Incentive Plan 
Straight piecework is the simple s t and most common form 
of output incentive . Its chief characteristic i s that a ll 
standards are expres3ed in terms of a certain amount of money 
for a given unit of production . The time s tanda rd s deve l oped 
*De ere and Company converted fron a costly piecework plan 
to a s t a n da r d hour plan on August 8 , 1955 . 
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by time studies are converted into money by applying the 
time a llowed t o perf0r m the job against the base r ate for that 
job. Ordin~ rily t here is some minimum hourly guarantee . 
Hence , for low levels of output , t he plan becomes a time wage 
plan. 
The standard hour plan , which John Deere uses , is very 
similar to ~iecework as an outpu t incentive . The standard 
hour plan is expressed in terms of time per unit of production. 
The standard hour is t he amount of wo r k which wi ll be per-
formed wi t hin an hour by an average competent worker under 
certain prescribed conditions . Pieces produced over and above 
tho se spec i fied in the sta~dard hour is the incentive . I ncen-
tive workers should b e able to earn 25% to 35 % mo r e than 
hour ly workers . John Deere finds the average performance 
le vel of their employees when they are wor!:ing on incentive 
t o b e 13 5% (Table 24) . The company goal at present is to keep 
empl oyees on incentives 85% of t he time (Table 22 and 26) . 
Statistical evidence indicates workers paid under output 
incentive systems generally earn more than they wou ld under a 
time wage sys t em (Tab le 21 and 22) . 
The principles and operations of t he standard hou r 
incentive plan are relatively easy to use and understand . 
The standard hour incentive plan is operated ~n the principle 
that t he normal performance expected of ave r age emp loyees 
skilled in their assigned tasks is 100 % performance . 
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P e r fo r ma n ce beyond 100% is compensated for on a o n e - for - one 
pr i n ciple . Po t entia l earnings on i n centive work where the 
op e r a t o r i s no t l imited or rest r icted by process or machine 
time i s e xpecte d t o average 30% above occupatio n al rate . 
Th e u nit of measure i n t his s t and a r d h~ur incen t ive p l an 
i s st a n dard hours pe r 100 pieces o r units . This is the uni t 
of t ime measuring the quantity cf work that mus t be produced 
in order t o earn the equivalent of t h e occupational rate . 
All in cen t ive standards are estab l ished by the Incentive 
an d S t anda r ds Engineering Department of each plant to cove r 
p e r ma n ent condi t ions or special conditions for a limited 
per i o d . In cen t ive standards may be calculated by: 
1 . Analyzing each eleme nt of the operation by time study , 
2 . th e use of data (standard data or plant da ta), o r 
3 . a combination of the above . 
In c enti ve standards estab l ished to cover S?ecia l condi -
ti o n s are , fo r purposes of control , desi gna t ed as temporary 
and app l icable fo r a speci~ic length of time o r for a specific _ 
n u mbe r of un its o r pa r ts . 
The ulti mate goal in ince n tive wage ad~inistration is 
. 
to es t ablish incentive standards with such equity that indivi -
du a l earnings will be in direct ratio t o the skill , e£fort , 
and t ime expended. The most effective tool devised for this 
p ur pose i s s t andard data , and the p r esent company built 
de v e lopment prog r ~m , started in 1 957 , is designed to event -
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ally pr ovide t he highest practica l degree of standa r d data 
coverage (T ab l e 28 ) . The purpose of this data , wh i ch i s 
b uilt on 1 00% performance , is to s tand a r dize time e lements 
b etween all John De e r e Plants . Standard data i s u sed t o 
d etermin e standard hours on 61% of a ll productive operations 
at John Deere. Thirt y-three per cen t of this 6 1 % are preset 
by indu s t rial eng i neers wi thout ever looki ng at the operation 
being performed. Thi s means that only 39 % of th e operations 
are actual ly time s t udied. Jann Deere finds standard data 
extremely accurate, quick to appl y , and relatively easy to 
calculat e . 
The maintenance of t he incentive system a~d the continued 
effecti ve use of standard data requi r e strict conformance co 
the provi sions of the incentive p l an , proper construction and 
applicati on of standard data , accura t e r ecording of all off 
incenti ve time , and strict observance of established me th ods . 
The firm ' s experi ence shows that deviating f r om an incen ti ve 
plan as it was designed to ope r ate invariably results in 
deteri o ratio n of the effectiveness of the plan. For th ese 
reasons , John Dee r e wants to expand the use of th e standard 
data t o ove r 90 % of all its ope r ations in the near futu r e . 
The company has always intended that the incentive system 
be operated in a fai~ and equitable manner , both from the 
s tandp oin t of th e e~ployees and of t he company . Cons i s tent 
wi t h this desire, th e fella.wing s t ateme nt of policy is 
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int e nd e d to g u ide the operation of the incentive sys t em i n · a ll 
fact o r ies of t he company. 
" Em p l oyee effort res ult ing f r om a wel l -managed incent i ve 
s y s t em is essen t ial to the continue d succe~sfu l opera t ion 
of t he Company , and a sound i ncen ti ve basis of compen -
s a t i o n i s advantageous and eq u i t able fo r emp l oyees , 
a s wel l as fo r t he Com p any . 
To a ss ur e continued successful operation of the incen t ive 
syst em , o u r procedures must : 1) Fo l low prope r a d minis -
trative p r actices and accurate interpretations of co -
tr ac t p rovisions ; and 2) Avoid p r actices which crea t : 
e mp l oyee or union resistance to t he incentive system . " 
Mr . De l no Br own , plant manager at John Dee r e Des Moines 
Works , said , 
" The main advan t age of the s t anda r d hour plan over the 
p i e cewo r k plan is in no t reca l cu l a t ing wages due to 
increases . Managemen t can p l an year to year manpower 
r e qui rements because ho u rs don ' t change , whi l e dollars 
d o .. .. Int e r national Harves t er is still on the c l d piece 
r ate sys t em and they have a one dollar base with about 
three do l lars worth of addi ti ves . They set their rates 
by compari son to other similar jobs thereby magnifying 
t heir mistakes and carrying on possible bad rates . . .. 
John Dee r e is in.a better position profit - wise because 
of our s t andard hour system . . . Our rate of pay is t he 
hi g h est among any major company under the UAW . " 
Th e s t anda r d ho u r plan is f l exible , it can be applied 
t o comp l ex p r oduction processes and to those in which the 
contr ib ut ion of the individual wo r ker is not separable or 
measurable . Mr . Pat Rogers , manager of i ndustrial r elation s 
at J ohn Deere Des Mo i nes Works , prefers the scandard hour 
plan f rom an industrial relations standpoint because it is 
e a sy t o adminis t er and unde r stand . 
To c ompute incentive ea r nings under t his plan the 
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f o llowing steps are required . Fi r s t, multiply t he producf i on 
i n pi eces or units on each operation by the app r opria t e stan-
dard t o a r rive at earned h ours . Ea r ned hours a r e then mu lt i -
pli e d b y t he occupational rate to calculate incentive 
e a rnin gs . 
The i ncen t ive earnings of an emplo y e e on any giv en job 
will b e i n cirect prcp ortion to his rate of production , excep t 
th a t t he minimum pay f o r incentive employees is the occupa-
ti o n a l r a t e . 
The worke r is guaranteed earnings (make - up to occupa-
ti o n a l r ate) for the day equal to hours worked t imes the 
oc c up a t io n al r ate o r rates approp r iate for the work performed 
dur ing t he day (Table ?.6 ). This is really a d~ily g u aranteed 
income (The propos e d monch l y or annual g ua ran teed income 
ex t ends the time liability of the present plan and adds to it 
pay f or days not wo r ked due to a company initia t ed layoff 
o r ad eq u ate emp l oyee initiated reason for absen teeism) . 
I n add i t io n t o guaranteed ea r nings , the incantive 
e mp loyees can receive average straight-time hourly ea r nings 
f or special ci r c umstances (Tab l e 26) . Average straight - time 
ho ur l y earnings are cumputed by aividing the sum of money 
paid f o r al l hours wor ke d during the last two c umputed work 
we e ks by the sum of th e hours work~d during such a pe r iod . 
Rea scns for average earnings are as follo ws : 
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1 . Wh en it is i mpossible to run the operation at mach ine 
speeds and/o r feeds u sed in determining the incentive 
standard due t o excess or hard stock 
2. When th e emp l oyee is directed t o r ework returned material 
oth e r th a n his own defective work 
3. Wh e n an emp lo yee mus t rework his own materia l because 
of impr oper blue prints, wrong instructions , or defective 
machine and tools 
4 . When an employee i s taken away f r om his regu l a r incentive 
work to: 
a . rework another ' s defective work 
b. take care of an emergency 
c . do mai nt enance ~o rk 
d . do work of an exper i mental nature 
e. do the work of an absen t employee 
f. perf o r m work 0£ a trial nature t o try o ut tooling 
for a n ew product , j ob , or process 
g . serve as an instructor t o another ope ra to r 
h. to repair equip~ent needed to run the incentive 
op e r ation, upon direc t ion of the foreman 
i . t o perform union business 
These particular contrac t s tipul a ti ons cause many con -
flict s at t he fo r eman-employee level and often lead to 
grievances . In 19 66 , 11 % of the written gr i evance~ filed 
at John Deere Des Moines Works concerned average earnings 
(Tab l e 6) . Th ese conflicts are ca u se d by differen t interpre-
tation s of re aso ns for average earn in gs. 
Gri evances a l so arise frequent l y regarding i mprop er 
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incentive standards (Table 6). Standard grievances may on ly 
be filed if an incenti ve s t andard is not adjusted when ; o r is 
altered for reasons other than when : 
1 . Cl e r ical errors occ ur . 
2. Chan ges occur in design , equipmen t, material specification 
or manufacturing methods and th en only affected e l ements 
may be adjusted . 
3. Standards were set prio r to August 8 , 1955 (conversion 
from a piecework to a standard hour plan): 
Gri evances of this type , and only incentive grievances 
of t his t ype , are s~bject to arbitration . 
The jurisdiction of the arbit r ator is spe cifical ly 
limited and rest ri c t ed to the sole determi~ation of the 
followin g questions: 
1 . Was th e r e a clerical error in computation? 
2 . Was th ere a change in design , equipment , material speci -
fications , or manufacturing methods? 
3 . If there was a change in the above , what elements were 
changed? 
In addition , standard grievances can be filed if the 
grievance raises the question of whether or not the standard 
was established in conformance with t he standard hour incen-
tive plan or whether the standard is adequate o r ' inade quate . 
Writt en gr iev ances concerning incentives and average 
earnings accounted for 37% of th e tot a l grievances filed at 
John Deere Des Moines Works in 1966 . Since Des Moines Works 
i s assumed to be a t ypical Deere and Company UAW plant , this 
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figure is probab l y average fo r all plants (Table 6) . If a 
salary was a dopt ed and the incentive plan abandone d , a 
majorit y o f s t andard grievances , and all average earning 
grieva nces , wo u ld be eliminated. Some stand a rd ho ur o r 
meas u r e d d aywo r k g r ievances wo uld remain. However , o th er 
t ype s of grievance s , such as discipline, could possib l y arise . 
Althou gh J ohn Deere has neve r est i mated the cost of processing 
a grievance , th e overal l reduction (estima ted at 30% by a 
company indu st ri al r ela t ions manager) would re duce t he yearly 
cost for pr ocessing written grievances . 
As poi n ted out ear lier, admin i s tr a t ion of the incentive 
sys t em is th e k ey t o it s efficient operation . Accurate 
r ecords are required f or effect i ve adrnini~tration . On all new 
or changed incentive standards , the Incen tive and Standards 
Engineering Department prepares a n d files , in t he foreman ' s 
office or at th e work location , a re cord oE pe r tinent da ta of 
t he stud y fro m wh i ch the incent i ve standa r d was estab li shed . 
This dat a is r ecorded on a fo r m (hereafter refer r ed to 
as a job d eta il and standar d sheet) which shows the fo llowing 
i t ems of infor ma ti on : 
1. Date in cent i ve standa rd is issued 
2 . Part number 
3. Machine tool na~e and numbe r or wo r k l oca t ion 
4 . Machinin g speeds an d feeds 
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S. Operation description 
6. Part specifications and sketches 
7. Tool and die information 
a. Sket ch of tool layout 
b. Tool and die numbers 
c. Description of tools 
d. Type of clamping 
8. Elemental breakdown including: 
a. Material handling conditions 
b . Allowed time 
c . Elements identified 
d . Occurrence factor 
e. Pi eces per cycle 
f. Machine time 
(Gives at least sufficient 
information to identify 
the equipment to use that 
relates to the standard 
established.) 
9. Total incentive standard or piece price 
10 . Labor gra d e or occup a tional rate 
The purpose of recording this data i s t o furnish the 
foreman and worker with the necessary information for identi-
fying the methods u s ed in p e rforming the o peration . It 
also makes this data available for inspection in the foreman's 
office by interested parties. This job detail and standard 
sheet is at the machine or work l ocation while the operation 
is .being performed . 
In addition to the discus s ed data, the job detail and 
standard sheet also contains the following statement : 
"The approved :nethod is a s shown on this form and 
no change in me thod may be made by the erapl o yee 
without securing approval of the Compar.y as indicated 
by th e issuance of a revision . " 
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In any case. where a job detail and standard sheet is 
is s u ed . it usually is r~viewed by the operator who is, or will 
b e , runnin g th e j ob . The ope r ator under stands t ha t the 
operati on is to be performed in accordance with the me t hod 
shown. 
On e me~sure of t he effectiveness of an incentive system 
is th e percent of time that inc e ntive employees wo rk on incen-
tive; this j s maintained through effective administra ti on 
(Tables 23 and 24) . 
The company speculates there a r e several reasons why 
incen tive e~ployees should be on incentive as near to 100 % as 
possib l e . These are : 
1. Inc e ntive employees want t he opportunity to ~o rk on 
incen t ive a t all times . Therefore, a lack of sufficient 
inc en t ive cover~ge crea~es dissatisfaction on the part 
of th e incent ive employees and increases labor p robl ems . 
2 . Th e mixing of incentive and non-incentiv~ work makes t he 
administration of an incentive system more involved 
bec a u se of t he ~ifficulty of controlling the time rep orted 
on non-incentiv e work. 
3 . Employee effo rt is considerably greater when they are on 
in cen ti ve work th an on . non-incent ive work . The r efore , the 
cost of non-incentive work is much higher than that of 
incentive work . 
4 . A high percent age of off -incentive hours is us u ally an 
indi cation of having too man.y employ~es fo = the work 
t o b e perf o rmed. 
Of f -inc ent i ve hours fa ll into one of four categori es . 
These with their percentages of total man hours for incentive 
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employees are itemized below. 
1. Delay h0urs - 5 . 8% 
2. Unti med op e rati on day work hours - 4 . 5% 
3. Untimed job chan ge hours - 1.9% 
4. Other day work hours - 9.2% (Tables 24 and 25) 
A decr ease in the perc e nt age o f non - incentive ho urs is 
accompli she d by either putting wo r k on incen tive o r by 
elimina ting o r r educing the causes f or these hours (Tab le 2 6) . 
The co fu pany claims that non-i ncentive wo r k p ut on incen-
tive decreases th e ti me for th at work by ha l f . The incentive 
earned hours result i n higher earnings , but since only about 
one-half as many hours a r e required, a cons id e r ab le saving s is 
realiz ed. 
When excessive off-incentive hours are eliminated , eithe r 
by intense managemen t effort under the inc2ntive system 
or adoption of a salary sys t em , all the excess cos t of th ese 
h o urs is saved. Th e c a l c ulati o n of average cost pe r hour f o r 
off-incentive time for 1 966 (T ab l e 7) a n d year co date (June) 
1967 (Table 8) re s ult s in $2.80 per hour and $3 . 40 per hou r 
re spec tively . 
Analyses of incentive emp l o~ees ' per1ormance in s everal 
plants during the pas t few yea r s hav e shown that employees 
perfor mance below 100% is a n i mpo rtant factor in low average 
incer. tive perf o rmanc e (Tables 23 and 24) . 
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Table 7 . Calculation of average cost per hour for off - incen-
tiv e time - Deere and Company , 1966 
Ex cess cost per ho u r for each category of off - ince ntive time 
1. Del ay time 
Exces s cost per hour = $3 . 01/h r. avg. occ . rat e+ 
$1 . 18/hr . frin ge co s t = $4 .19 /h r. 
2 . Untimed operations and untimed setups 
Excess cost per hour - day work cost - cos t if on incen-
tive + fringe cost 
Cost of ( 1 ) day work h o ur = ~3 . 0 1 /h r. avg . occ . r ate 
Cost o f (1) day work hour if on inc . = $3 . 0 1/hr. x 65% 
est. d ay work perf . = $1. 95/h r. 
Exc ess fringe cos t _65% d ay work perf . x $1 . 18 /hr . f ri nge 
cost = $ . 59/hr. 130% inc . pe r f . 
Exc ess cos t per hour = $3 .01 /hr . - $1 .95 /h r. + $ . 59/h~ . 
= $ 1.65 /h r. 
3. All other dav work 
All o t her day work is a mixture of idle time , make work 
time and work "time; ther efo r e , t he calculated excess 
cost for t his category is based on average of the 
excess co s t for de l ay time and untimed work . 
Excess cos t per hour _$4 . 19 /h r. + S l. 65/hr . = $2 . 92/hr . 
2 
(1) (2) (3) ( 4) . 
Exc ess Cost % of % of Tota l 
oer hour Tot al Time Off - Inc . Tim e 
De l ay time 
Untimed Oper . 
Untimed Se tu ps 
Other Day Wo ·r k 
$4 . 19 
1. 65 
1. 65 
2. 9 2 
S . 8 % 
4. 9 
2 . 5 
9 . 5 
25 . 5% 
2 1. 6 
11. 0 
41. 9 
( 1) x ( 3) 
$ 1. 068 
. 356 
. 182 
1. 2 2 3 
TOTAL 22.7 % 100 . 0% $2 . 829 
Use $2 . 80/hr . 
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Tabl e 8. Calculat i on of average co st pe r hour for off - incen -
tive tim~ - Deere and Company - year to date (June) , 
1967 
Exces s cost p er hour for each catego r y of off - ince nt ive time 
1. Delay time 
Exc ess cost per hour= $3.77/hr . avg . acc . r a t e x 
$1.299 f r inge cosc $4.90/h r. 
2 . Unt imed operations a nd unt imed setups 
Exce ss co s t pe~ hour 
tive + fringe cost 
day work cos t - cost if o n inc e n-
Cost of (1) day work hour - $3 . 77/hr . avg . acc . rat e 
Cost of (1) day work hour if on inc . - $3 . 77/hr. x 65% 
est. day work p er ~ . = $2 . 45/hr . 
Excess f r i n ge cost .65 % day work pe=f . _ X$1.299/hr . 
frin ge cost= $ . 63/h r.1 35% inc . perf . 
Exces s c ost per hour 
hr . = $1.95/hr. 
$3 . 77/hr . - $2 . 45/hr . + $ . 63/ 
3. Al l other day wo r k 
All other day wo r k is a mix tur e o f idle time , make 
wor k time and work time; th erefore , the c alculated 
exc e ss cost for this category is based o n the a verage 
of the excess cost for delay time and untimed work . 
Excess cost per hour =$4. 90/hr . + $1 . 95/h r._ $3 .43/hr. 
2 
Delay t ime 
Unt imed aper . 
Unt imed se tups 
Oth e r day work 
TOTAL 
(1) (2) ( 3) (4) 
Ex cess C~st % of % of To tal 
P er Hour Total Time Off - Inc . Time (1 ) x (3) 
$4 . 90 
1. 95 
1. 95 
3 . 43 
5.8% 
4.5 
1. 9 
9 . 2 
21.4 7. 
27 . 1 % 
21. 0 
8 . 9 
4 3. 0 
100.0% 
$1.327 
.410 
. 174 
l. 4 7 5 
$3 .3 86 
Use $3 . 40/h r. 
• 
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For examp le, the average incentive performance of incen -
tive employees at one plant was running around 119 % and 1 20%. 
Plant management ' s concern for t his l ow performance r esu lted 
in an investigation which showed t hat there were comparatively 
few incentive employee s at this p erfo rmance of 119 % and 120%. 
Rat her , th ere were a considerable number of emp l oyees at 125% 
to 140 % p er f o rmance and ano th er considerable number below 
10 0% performance. Fro~ this investigation it seemed r ather 
obvi o u s t hat it was ne cessary to raise the performance l evel 
of all employees to at least 10 0%. 
Mana gemen t act~d to get each incen t ive emp l oyee up t o at 
le ast 100 % performance , i f possible , in the follow in g ways. 
1. Th ey gave each forernon regular reports list~~g his men 
who wer e bel ow 1 00 % perforwance . 
2. Th ey talked t o these low performance e~p l oyees . 
3. They rechecked incentive standards if they felt it 
n e ce ssa r y . 
4. They gave warnings to l ow performance employees who did 
not show i mp ro vement. 
5. Th ey discharged some of th e n ew ninety day proba ti onary 
empl oyees . 
Following thi s action , the ave rage incentive performance 
of incentive employees increased steadily and r eached 1 27% in 
four mo nt hs and 130 % in ten months and stayed with in 1 % o r 2% 
of 130 % from then on (Tab l e 26) . 
Althou gh the average incentive performance of incentive 
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employees increased from 120 % to 130%, there p r obably were 
few , if any , individual employees whos e performance increased 
in t he same wa y ; that is from 1 20% to 130%. Ra t her , it was a 
cas e of gettjng t h ose employees whose perf o rmance was below 
100% up t o o r ove r 10 0% . 
r esul t of t h is . 
The overa ll average i nc r ease was a 
Another plant ' s management was concerned because of 
r a t he r low average incentive performance of incentive em-
p l oyees . The resulting inves tigat ion concluded that fore men 
we r e keeping new e mp loyee s past their probationary period 
( nine t y days), even where their performance record d~ring 
th e proba t ionary pe~iod did not justify their retention . The 
r eason mos t common ly given was that if the employee was let 
go a t the end of t he probationary period , i t would take one or 
t wo weeks to get a repla cement and production was lost during 
· t hat period . They acted to solve this problem by giving the 
fo r emen a r ecord of each probationary employee ' s performance 
af t er thirty days , sixty days , and seventy - five days . This 
l a t ter r eco r d was the last one the foreman would get on the 
p a rt icula r emp l oyee and his decision to retain the employee or 
l et him go had to be made on this record . This gave him a 
week o r t wo to get a replaceme~t before actually t er minatin g 
t he unsa t isfactory employee . This action , alo ng with action 
simi l a r t o that i n t he first example , apparently contributed 
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to a g ene ral incre3se in the average inc en tive perfo~mance 
of inc en tive employees ove r the following couple of years . 
These examples a r e provided to show th e amount of administ r a -
tion and co n cen tr ation needed by management to prevent 
demoralization or ineffectiveness of t he incentive system . 
A summary of steps taken in va r ious plants t o k~ep the 
number of employees with performance under 1 00% t o a minimum 
at all times is as follows : 
1 . Provide each foreman wi t h a list of enployees with 
perf o rma~ce under 100 %. 
2 . Che ck re ason in each case . 
3. Talk t o those employees where a good reason is not 
apparent. 
4 . Watch probation a ry e mp loyees especially c l ose so 
that l ow performance employees are not kept ~ beyond 
t he p rob ationary period. 
An effective methods audit program is essen tial to insure 
that operations are performed by the method established and 
as covered by the standard hour study . To be effective , the 
audit prograrr must be a continuing one wi th the operations to 
be audited selected to provide coverage of al l t ypes of incen-
tive work . The audit consists of a careful and ~borough 
compari son of the meth o d shown on t he job detail and standard 
she e t with the method used by the operator . This is usuall y 
performed daily by the for eman . 
Employ ees ' time sl ip s are audited periodically to assure 
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t hat: 
1. Ope r ations, part s numbers , incentive standords and 
labor grades are accurately recorded . 
2 . Pr ope r factor y acco unt s are indicat e d. 
3. All owances to occupational rate and a verage earnings 
conform to contract pr ovisi ons . 
4. The time r eported is accurat e l y record ed and p r oper ly 
approve d by th e r espons ible s up erviso r . 
In a d dition t o the above audits, special audits by 
d epartme nt s are taken t o determine t he department 's incentive 
performa n ce and accurate adm i nis tration of the ince n ti ve 
system . 
Other special audits a r e a l so perfo r med , a good example 
wou l d be the one per:ormed th e summer of 1 9 66 a t one J oh n 
Deere plan t. The Incentive and Standards Engineering Depa rt -
ment aud i t ed a ll cu rrent par t r o uti ngs agains~ s tandard hour 
me mos an d job detail and s tandard sheets; 40 , 9 1 7 par t numbers 
were audited which consisted of 140,46 0 op e rations. This 
audit t ook 6 , 050 man hou r s t o comple te. Approxima t ely 
20 , 000 discrepancies were discovered and cor rected . 
Ano t her a dmini stra ti on t oo l is t h e vast numbe r of com-
p u ter generated incentive reports. To provide t h e reader 
with an idea o f th e i nten t and exten t of these reports a fe w 
wil l be revi ewed. 
The we ek ly incentive l abo r analysis i s compi le d to g ive a 
br ief and co mp reh ensive breakdown for a ll hours wo r ked by 
incen t ive e mp l oyees . Th e informatio n de sc r ibed b el ow is used 
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co inform a nd assist managemen t in th e ir effor t s for maximu m 
prcd uct ivity or e ffi c i en c y . 
1. All productive or n on-productive tours worked o n 
incentive 
2 . Hours wo r ked on operations and set -ups wh er e incen ti ve 
stand a rd s h ave n ot b een set 
3 . Hour s paid for d e lays 
4. Hours earned on incentive 
5 . Hour s pa~d to an in cen tive employ~e t o bring his ho ur s 
earned o n incen tive up to his ho ur s wor k ed on incentive 
6. All hours rep o rted as hours workec where ave ra ge earnings 
are guara nt eed 
Anot he r simi l ar report , the incer.tive labo r ana~ysis , 
shows a s e ries of pro g r ess i ve weeks wi t n montnly totals. The 
current w~ek is followed by accumulated totals. 
There ~re also daily report s . After clme sli ps are 
checked by clerks and foreme n th ey are key punched fo r 
computer entry . The r esul t ing r epo rt has thirty - seven e rror 
codes which a r e inves tig a t e d by acco unting . The info r mation 
in erro r is corrected and ano t her rep o rt is gene rated for u se 
by industrial engin~ering in t he ir daily audi t s of all dep a rt-
ments . 
Spec ialized reports are also ge ne rated showing on ly 
allowances t o occupational rate and daywork taken by incenti ve 
employees . Thes e are used by ind u s trial engineer ing and 
distribut ed to sh op supervis i o n to enable mo re e ffective 
control of the inc er. t ive s ~s tem. 
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All these report s are probably necessary for a properly 
administered incentive system , but add to the cost of adminis -
tration . With a salary pay system the above reports could 
probably be reduced to one or two performance reports at 
a greatly reduc e d cos t. To calculate the reduction in cost is 
b eyond the scope of thi s paper . I only wish to point out here 
that pay system administration and control costs could be 
great l y reduced through adoption of the salary p lan for 
production workers. 
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VI . SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS 
Inclu ded in the present system of pay are a few addi -
tional p l ans which supplement the wage employees income . 
A . Bonus 
Year- end b onuses are rewarded in October on company 
pre r ogative using an unstipulated formula . These bonuses are 
n o t guaranteed or ~entioned in the collectiv e bargaining 
a greement . The bonus usually amounts to about one week ' s pay . 
B. Sup plemental Unemployment Benefits 
John Deere uses the Ford-type SUB pl a n . For purposes 
o f t h i s pl an, an employee is in active employment when he 
d raws p ay d uring any pay period , or is on disciplinary layoff , 
v a cation , personal leave of absence , sick leave, strike , 
o r military leave . At all other times a UA W bar g aining unit 
wage employee is cons~d e red as laid off , as determined by the 
company . A layoff , for the purposes of this plan , inc l udes 
any layoff resulting from a reduc t ion in the work force or 
t emporary layoff , or from the discontinuance of a plant o r 
operation , or a l ayoff occurr i ng or continuing because 
t h e employee was unable to do work offered b y the company 
alt hough able to perf c rm other work in the plant to which he 
wo u ld have bzen entitled if he had sufficient seniority . 
There are three types of benefits offered by this plan 
a n d t he emp l oyee can receive any o r a ll three depending on the 
ci rcumstances invclved. 
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The regular benefit means th e benefit payable t o an 
eligible employee for a week of l ayoff in which he perfo~med 
no work for the company . He could also be e li gible if he 
performed some work, but neither the peri od worked nor pay 
receive d was suffi cien t to disqualify him fo r a sta~e system 
benefit. 
The follo wing is a summary list of eligib ili~y require-
ments for a r egula r benefit as provided in the supplemental 
agreement between Deere and Company and the UAW (41) . 
An employee shall be e ligible for a regular benefit for 
any week, if with respect to such week he : 
(a) was on a qualifying layoff , for al l or part oi the 
week 
(b) received a state system benefit not currently under 
protest ~y the company or was ineligible for a state 
system benefit only fur one or more of the following 
reas ons : 
(i) he did not have prior t o layoff a sufficient 
peri od of emplo ymen t or earnitlgs cove r ed by the 
stat e system; 
(ii) e x h austion of hi s state system benefit r ights ; 
(ii i)the period he worked o r his pay (from the 
company or otherwise) for the week eq ualled 
or exceeded his Estimated State System Earnings 
Limit (hereafter refer r ed t o as ESSEL); 
(iv) he was si;;rving a "waitin g week" of layoff ur:de-c 
th e appli cable state system during a period 
while he has sufficient seniority to work in 
the pl a nt but is la id off o ut of line of 
seniorit y . (This makes an emp l oyee eligible 
for a l eveling we ek benefit for which he is 
pai d SUB for the wai ti~g week) 
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(v) !:h e week was a second "w a iting week" 
wit hi n his benef~t year ~nder th e state 
syst em , o r wa s a state sys t em " wa iting 
we ek " immediately fo l lowing a week fo r 
whi ch he received a state sys te m benefit 
or occu r rin g within l ess than fif ty -two 
weeks since his last s t ate system " waiting 
we ek". 
(vi) 
(vii) 
(ix) 
he was o n l ayoff b ecause he was unable to 
do work offered by t he company while able 
to do other wor k in th e p l ant t o which he 
would have been e ntitl ed if he had 
suff icient seniorit y ; 
h e fail ed t o cla im a state system benefit 
an d hi s pay r e ceive d o r receivab le from 
t he company for th e week such state 
benefit would have amounced to l ess than 
$2 . 00; 
he was e nt it led t o statutory retiremen t or 
disab i lity benefi t s which he receive d o r 
could have r e c eived while wo r ki n g full 
time; 
(x) he was deni ed a state system benefit and 
it i s d e termine d that, und~r t he circu~­
stances, it wou ld be coPt=ary t o the 
int eut of th e plan to deny him a benef it. 
(c) has me t any registration and reporting req ui r e -
men ts of an employment offic e of che applicable 
stat e system; 
(d) had t o his credit a credit unit or f raction 
thereof; ( a credit unit means the units dete ~­
mining duration of an emp lo yees benefi t s wh ich 
are credit ed to him genera l l y by reason of his 
wee ks o f ac tive se r vice and cancelled at s peci -
fi ed r a t es for t he' paymen t of benef its . The 
details of this system are complica te d and no t 
ne cessary for an understanding of t he subject 
be ing discussed) 
(e) did not r eceive an un employ me nt bene fit under 
any contra c t or prog r am o f anocher employe r or 
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under any other SUB plan of the company (and was 
not eligible f or such a benefit under a contract 
or pro gr arr. o f an o th er em p 1 o y e r · ~1 i t h i·: ho r.t he has 
greater seniority than with the company nor 
under any other SUB plar, of the company in whict-
he has credit units which were credited earlier 
than his oldest credit units under this plan) ; 
(f) was not eligible for an automatic short week 
benefit; 
(g) quali fies for a benefit of at least $2.00 ; and 
(h) has ~ade a benefit appli.cation in a~cordance with 
proce dures established by th e company hereunder 
( 41) . 
The amo~nt of the regular benefit is such that when added 
to the state benefit and other compensation s wil l equal 62% of 
the employees weekly straight ti~e pay, plus $1.50 f~r each of 
not more than four depe<ldents . For a John Deere wage employee 
this means the maximum he could recei\e, if he has four or 
more dependents, is $109. This breaks down to $46 from th e 
comoany's SUB fund and $63 from state ben e fit s . The average 
r egular benefit ch eck for a John Deere wag e emp loye e during 
1966 was $40 . 39; in 1965 it was $43 . 27; previous to 1965 the 
average was about $30 to $32 . When leveling benefits are 
included the average payment ·increases to $4 7 .86 (T a bles 9 
and 19). 
The drop in the cocpany average f r om 1965 to 1966 was due 
to an increas e in Illinois and Iowa state benefits. Al thoug-h 
th e company does not maintain any definite rec ords as to the 
average length of layoff per employee , it is estimated to be 
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Table 9. Supplemen~al une mp loyment benefit payments for Deere 
and Company's eight UAW plants, 19~6 
Regular Lev e lin g To t al 
Month Number Dollars Number Dollars I Numbe r I Dollars 
Nov-65 1911 81,039 87 5,265 11998 86,304 
Dec-65 1554 61,692 34 2 ,549 11588 64 , 241 
Jan-66 544 6 398 20,580 20,18 2 550 
Feb-66 83 2,815 1 77 84 I 2,892 
Mar- 66 8 288 - - 8 288 
Apr-66 6 195 3 119 9 314 
I 
May - 66 
I - - 4 340 I 4 340 
l June-66 - - 12 1,184 12 1,184 I 
I I I 
July-66 - - 10 I 799 I 10 799 
Aug - 66 10~ 4 ,885 I 404 I 39,27 2 I 513 44,157 I I I l I I I I Sept-66 114 4 ,64 l1 213 19,905 I 327 24,549 ' j 
Oct-66 215 7,778 21 2,114 I 2 36 9,892 i 
, I . 
Total 4544 183,51 8 79 5 72,022 5339 255,540 
Aver/Mo. 379 15,293 66 6,002 445 21,295 
Aver/Em. 1 40.39 1 90.94 1 47.86 
% of Total 85 % 15 % 
approximately thirty days . This means the average laid off 
employee receiv ed $161.50 in regular SUB paymer.t s during 1966. 
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Tot a 1 r eg u 1 a r benefits paid in 196 6 w: re $ 18 3·, 5 18 ( this t ot a 1 
does not include $72 , 022 paid in leveling benefits) . 
The special short work week bene~it is a benefit payable 
t o an eligible employee for a short work week (an employees 
compen sated or available hours are le5s than forty) for 
which his company pay did not equal o~ exceed his ESSEL , or 
his period of wo rk for the company was not sufficient t o 
disqualify him for a state system ben~fit or waiting week 
c r edit. 
An employee is eligible for speclal short week benefits 
for any ,,,ee k if: 
1 . During such week he performed some work for the company 
but had less th an forty compensated or available hours ; 
2 . with respect t o such week his company pay and any com -
pany pay which te could have secured f o r hours scheduled 
for or made ave~lable to him but not workec did not equal 
or exceed his ESSEL o r his period of wo rk for t he com-
pany was not sufficient to disqualify him for state 
syst em benefit or "waiting week" credit : and 
3 . with respect t o such week he satisfied all of the eligi -
bility conditions for a regular benefit except the 
r equirement that such benefit amount to at l east 
$2.00 (4 1 ) . 
Th e special short week benefit payable to an eligible 
employee is an amount which, when added to the employee ' s 
stat e benefit and other compensation (excluding the amount of 
p ay rec eived from th e company), will equal the product of 
th e hours less than forty, counted to the nearest tenth of 
an hour, multiplied by : 1) 75% of his base hourly r ate if 
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the sh o rt work week is scheduled : 2) 50 % of ~is base hourly 
rat e if th e short work weEk is un scheduled . If the re g ular 
benef it is eq u al t o or greater than the special sho rt week 
b enefit, t h e employee receives the r eg ul ar benefi t. 
For an hourly worker , base hourl y rat e is his st r aight 
time hourly rate of r ecord within 1 80 days preceding his 
last d ay worked. For an incentive worke r, base hourly rate 
is hi s average earned hourly rat e for the last four or the 
f i rst four ~ay p e riod s within 180 days preceding his last 
day worked . If an e~ployee worked both on incentive and 
hourly durin g chi s 18 0 day period, his base hourly r ate is 
computed as if he we r e an incentive enployee . The base 
h o urly r ate includes t he cost - of - living all owance and 
general wage increas e in effect at th e tim e of the benefit . 
The au t oma t ic short week be n efi t is payable to a n 
eligible em p loyee for a shor t wo r k week for which his company 
pay and a ny company pay which he could have received for 
hours scheduled for , or made available t o him, bet not 
worked, equalled or exceeded his ESSEL; or h i s pe r iod 
work ed was sufficient to disqualdfy him for state system 
benefits or waiting week c redit . 
An empl oyee is eligible fo r an automatic short week · 
bene fi t if durin g such a week: 
1 . He per formed some work for the company but had less than 
forty compensat ed o r available hours; 
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2. he h ad at l east one year of seniority as of th e l ast day 
of th e "Week ; 
3 . he wa s on a qualifying layoff for some pa rt of t he week : 
4. h e was ineligible to receive a state system be n e fit 
only because h i s company pay and 0 nly company pay which 
he could have r eceived for hours sched u led fo r or mad e 
ava ilable to him but n ot wo rk e d, equalled o r exceeded 
hi s ESSEL , or his period of work for the company was 
suf ficie nt to disqualify him for a sta t e system b~ n e fit 
or wa iting week credit : and 
5. he did no t have a period or periods of layoff in th e week 
and in th e prec eding or following week occurri n g i n such 
sequ e n ce as t o constitute a " week of une:nplcyme nt" (as 
defined under th e applicable stat~ system) which incl ud-
ed some p~rt o f che week; provided , ho weve r, that whe n 
an employee r et ur ns to work for t he company af t e r a 
p e ri od of seven or mo r e co ns ecutive days o f layoff with 
r espect t o wh ich he has es t ablished suer. a sta t e system 
"week of un employment " he will be e nt itled to rec eive 
a pa r t ial a ut omatic short we ek b enefit with re s p ec t to 
an y ho u r s o f 1 c y c f f o n d a y s w i t h i n t h e •,; o r k ~., e e k i n 
wh ich he returned to work ~h tch are n ot included in 
su ch es t ablished state system " we~k of unemployment ". 
6. An a u tomatic sho rt week benefit payable for a week sha ll 
be in li eu of any other benefit under th e pla n fo r t ha t 
week (41) . 
Th e automatic short week benefit payable t o an e l igible 
employ ee is an amou nt equa l t o th e product of the hours less 
th an forty, counted t o the nearest tenth of an hour , ... 
multi plied by 1) 75 % of h i s base hourly r ate, if the short 
work week is scheduled: a n d 2) 50% of his base hourly r ate 
if th e sho rt work week is unsch ed uled. For the ho urly 
empl oyee , the base ~ourly ra t e is the highest st r aight - time 
hour ly r a t e paid durin g th e pay period in wh i ch the short 
wor k we ek o c cur s . For t he incentive employee t he bas e hourly 
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rat e is his average straight tim e hourly earnings during the 
two work weeks prior to the short wo r ~ week. The base 
hourly r ate includes 75 % and 50% , res?e ctively , · of the cost 
of living allowance, but excludes all other pr emiums and 
bonuses of any kind . 
The company has no avai la b le figure on average short 
week benefits paid or the number of employees who received 
this benefit . The total shor t week (special and automatic) 
benefits paid in 1966 were $ 151,392, .~32,126 l ess than . 
re gular benefits paid (Table 19) . 
The company makes these payments from a fund . If the 
fund is less than the maximum level , the company makes a 
contributi on to t he fund. This amoun~ is determined by 
multiplying $.QS by the total number of hours for wh ich 
employees received pay from the company , er such a lesser 
amount as will bring the t o tal market value of the fun d 
assets up to the maximum funding (Table 18). The company 
is not obligated to make any contribution to the fund when 
the market va lue of the assets in the fund is equal to or 
in excess of the maximum fun ding level. In additlon, the 
company is not obligated to make up any depreciation in the 
value of the securities held i n the fund. If th e fund should 
ever be exhausted, th e company has no obligati o n to contri -
bute cntil the next monthly pay perio<l. Exhaustion of the 
fund is protected, however, by the credit unit cancellation 
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bas e (h er~after referLed to as CUCB). Th is base is deter-
mined periodically by dividing the market value of th e fund 
by the sum of the number of employees in active se r vice plus 
t hose l aid cff with c r edit units. If the CUCB for any week 
is $12 . 80 or more, but less than $4 1.60, any benefit for 
t h e week (other th a n scheduled short week benefits) will be 
reduced by 20 %, but in no event less t han $5 . 00 . If th e CTJCB 
is less than $12.80, no benefit for the wee k (other than 
schedul ed shor t week benefits) will be paid. 
The employer ' s contributions are considered a welfare 
plan cost, not wages , and are non-taxab~e. Empl o ye es have 
no vested inter es t in the assets or contributions t o the 
fund, and consequently, some workers may never r eceive 
any benef it s from th e fund . 
To review, thi s plan has a definitely preciictable cost 
and repre sents a limited company obligation . Some imp o rtant 
major aspects of th e plan in relati o n to the guaranteed 
salary proposal are: 
1 . Cover age i s l imited by seniority r equiremen t s (one year 
seniority befor e being eligib l e ) . 
2. There is a non-comp e n sab le wgiting p eriod before b e nefits 
beg i n, the first week of unemployment . 
3 . Benefit payment s are limited to a maximum of fifty -two 
weeks . 
4 . Benefit payments are limit ed by t h e "t rust fund position" 
and the nu mber of credi t un i t5 held by each employee . 
5. Company contributions are set at $ . 05 per hour worked 
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... 
by every employee subject to the ~ lan, are known and 
d efi n ite; they ceas e when the " maximum fu"nding l evel" 
(a one hundred per cent trust f u nd p osition) is r eached. 
I t is important to note that there are vitally signi -
fi ca n t l imitations ~hich surround employer liability. 
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VII. MANAGEMENT - UNION INTERVIE WS 
CO NCERNING GUARANTEED SALARY 
A first hand view of key John Deere managers and UAW 
union officials opinions about the demand f o r g uaranteed 
annual income was obtaine d throu gh depth interviews : The 
intervi ews were conducted ov er a three month p e ri od in 
early 1967 and were recorded on a po rtabl e tape recorder. 
A. Methodology 
All of the manag e rs interviewed h o ld key positions at 
John Deer e Des Moin es Works or Deere and Company. These 
managers are typi cal company men. They wer2 chosen mainly 
because of thei r availability and my previ ous business 
association with them . Their resp onses were probab ly less 
biased than those cf the union officials b ecaus e of the more 
casual aspects of our relationship as employ ees of the 
same company. 
The interviews were held with th e follo wi ng managers 
in .their described p osi tions. 
1. Delno Brown 
2 . Earl Lynn 
3. Ralph Gongwer 
4 . William Bond 
Plant Manag e r, John Deere Des Mo ines 
Works 
Plant Superintendant , John Deere 
Des Moines Works 
Production Manager , John Deer e Des 
Moines Works 
IQcent ive and Stand 3 rds Engineering 
Manag er, John De e r e Des Moines Works 
5 • Pat Rogers 
6. Ro be r t Wo lf f 
7 • Eldon Zeigler 
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Manager, Industrial Relations , John 
Dee r e Des Moines Wor~s 
Manager, Industrial Re l a tio n s , Deere 
and Company 
Inc entive and Standards Engineering, 
Ass i s t ant Manager , Deere and Com -
pany 
Mr. Rogers, Mr . Wolff and Mr. Ze i g l e r have a more direct 
conne c t ion with th e collective bargaining its e lf. Cons e -
quentl y their r esponses a r e pr obabl y more nearly based on 
facts r a th er than opinions , and may t end to be mo r e biased 
bec a u se of col lective bargai n ing st r ategy . 
Union official interviews we r e diffi cul t t o obta i n. 
My int en ti o n s and plans for equal r ep~esentatio~ o f manage -
rnent and union were chwart e d by the informat i ona l security 
ne eds of the union and conseq u ent "unavailability " o f some 
uni.on officials . It should b e made clear here t ha t thes e 
int erviews were se t up wi t h the int erviewer id en tified as 
an Iowa Stat e Graduat e Stu d e nt, not as a former John Deere 
salari ed employee . Appointments were arranged with UAW 
internaeional r ep r esentatives at Des Moines , Iowa and Moli n e, 
Illinois, but we r e continua ll y ca n celled at the l as t min ute . 
On e UAW uni o n official in Holine said the day after I had 
int e r viewed the UAW Sub -regional Di r ec t or in Water l oo , I owa 
tha t, " We h ave b ee n instructed by national headqua rt ers not 
to d isc u ss g u ara nt eed a nnual income wi th anyone ". 
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I rec eived three cancellations of intervi ew appointments wi th 
th e Des Moines UAW International Representative . I was told 
. by his secretary two months be fore ne go ti at i ons were to 
begin that, " Mr . Roberts said that he will be far too busy 
to see you from now until negotiations wi.th John Deere" . 
Upon this rejection, t he following letter w~s composed and 
sent to Mr. Robert s and Mr . Karpan on July 31 , 1967. 
Dear Sirs: 
I very mu c h regr et not being able to ge t together 
with ycu . The int e rviews on the economic effects of 
guarant eed annual in come will play a n important 
part in my masters thesi s . Without your partici-
pation, my re s u l t s have more management re spo nses 
than union re spon3es , which tends to bias the findings. 
Mr. Carl Dahl provided excellent answers to my 
questi o ns, so I am sure your respons e s would be 
equally helpful . 
I r ealize you wi ll be ext reme l y busy ~rom no w 
until negotiati ons . If you ever find en e xtra hour 
somet ime in the next month or so , even if it is on 
a Saturday or som e eve nin g , p l ease give me a call and 
I will gladly meet with you . 
Let me r eemphas i ze that my th esis is a part of 
th e requirement s for a masters d egree at Iowa State 
~niversity and in no way is con ne c te d wi t h Jo hn 
Deere. If ther e ls any . formally directed r eason from 
th e international union why you cannot t a lk with me, 
please let me know , for this would be useful in my 
proj ec t . Without your p ar ti c ip a tion my thesis wi ll 
be l ess exact and lose muc~ of its s~gnifica n ce . 
Formal n egotiations have begun a nd I have not h eard 
from either man . Yhis l ack of parti c ip ation forced me to 
canc el these p l anned interviews and consequently t ends to 
limit the union resp o n ses . Seven mana gers and three uni on 
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official s wer e fin al l y intervie~cd . No doubt th is uneve n 
balance will cau se s o me bia s to e nter in th e r es ult s . 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4 . 
5. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The following uni o n official intervi ews we r e cancelled: 
Pat Greathou se 
( due to illness) 
Rob e rt Rob e rt s 
John Karpan 
Don ald Harris 
(due to he a rt 
att ack) 
Kenny Ha wks 
Vice Pr es id e nt, International 
Union UAW 
International Representative UAW , 
AFL - CIO Subregional Office , De s 
Moines, Io wa 
Int e rnationa l Represen t a tive UAW, 
AFL-CI O Sub r egional Office , Des 
Moine s , I owa 
International Repre se n tative UAW , 
AFL-CIO Subregi o nal Office, Waterl oo 
Iowa 
S u b r e g i o n a 1 D :!. r e c t c :- , l' AU , AF L - C I 0 
Subreg i ona l Offic e , Mo l i ~ e , Illinois 
The following un io n officia l s we r e inte r viewed : 
Carl Dahl 
Charles Mcken n a 
Jacob Mincks 
S ubr egiona l Dir ect~r . UAW Sub r e -
gional Office, Wa t e rloo , I owa 
Pr es id e nt, UAW Lo cal 450 , Des 
Moine s , I owa 
Vice Presi d e nt, Aw.er ican Federa tion 
of Labor-C o n g r ess In d u s trial Or ga n-
i~a tion ( AFL- CI O) , Des Moines , Iowa 
In addition t o t he fo rm al i nt erv i ews , I talked to a 
number of Loca l 450 members a t Joh n De e r e Des Moi n es Wo r ks 
t o gain t heir view s o r. guaran t eed annual s~lary . 
The foll o win g lett e r was sen t t o al l int erv i ew ee s 
after an inter v iew a pp o int me nt was ar r anged b y pho n e . This 
was done to orient a t e and pre - condi t ion the inte~viewee to 
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my purp ose and anticipated goals. 
Dear Mr. 
The purpose of t his letter is to introduce you 
in advance to the r ange of topics I h ope we can 
cover in our forthcoming intervi ew . 
I need authoritative opinion and data on the 
~omic implications of converting f r om a standard 
hour wage incentive to a salaried method of payment 
for pro d u c ti on workers. The choice by mana geme nt a n d 
un ion people between wage incentives and sal~ry or 
guarant eed a nnua l in come is not clear c ut . Much 
depend s on th e predominance arid importance of the 
inherent advantage s of each system . Wage incentives 
p os sess many advantages but not the preponderance 
claimed in the literature . The predicted union d e -
mands t o chang e the method of payment in upcoming 
ne iotiat ions prov id es evidence of dissatisfaction. 
I do n ot have preconceived hypotheses . I expect 
to formulate th em after th e interviews so that th e 
interviewees ' wealth of kJowledge can be used . Your 
data anci expert opinion will help in fram in g the 
assumptions and condition the conclusi o ns of this 
the sis . 
The fir&t part of the study will stress present 
conditions rel ating to e nvironme nt, management, ·and 
union relations a t John Deere Des Moines Works . 
Next, process functions wil l be analyzed for both 
systems of p ayment. Since few sala r y systems f or 
producti on workers a re now in operation, mos t of 
the information in this area will depend on infor-
· mation (f ac tual and opi ni o n ) that you can provide. 
Some process functions t had in mind are work measu r e-
ment, incentive, administration, control , earn ing s , 
and supervisory. 
I plan to use two measure~ents of effec tiveness, 
l abor relati ons and labor cost. How wo uld th e con -
version affect managemen t- emp lo yee and manageme nt-
union relati ons? How would it affect labor e f fi-
cienc y an d a dminis tr at ion costs? Answers to these 
questions require your assistance . 
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I am looking forward to o u r interview and appre -
ciat e ve r y much your willingness t o s ee ree . 
As furtber pre-interview o rient ation , review of the 
present me tho d of p ay aud th e p r edict2d future pr o p ose d 
me t h od of pay was given orally from the in fo r mat i on shown 
b e l ow. Th e same pres en ta tio n was made t o all t he int e r -
v i ewees . 
P r e-interview orientat i on 
Pr esent ..E_lan 
P ayment of wages is by the Standard Hour Incentive Plan, 
as exist i ng and described in th e present J chn Deere Des 
Moines Works and UAW Loca l 450 contract . Basically , c hi s 
means employ e e s are rewarded in d ir ec t pr o p o rtion to t heir 
o ut put; they a r e paid individual incentives fo r production 
h ours abov G s t a ndard. SUB plans are in effect for employees 
on pr olo n ged absence o r layoff . Minimum gua r anteed earnings 
for th e job is equa l to hours worked times the occupat i onal 
r at e . 
Prop osed plan 
Sala r ied method of payment , or gua r anteed aDnual income , 
is a contract of empl o ym ~nt . The following assu mptions 
will be made as t o what th e denand plan will be: 
1. Max im um g u a r ant ee d earnings for the year is equa l to 
occ upational y e arly rate (based on fo rty hours per week , 
f ifty - two weeks pe r. y ea r). 
2 . Pay would be by weekly ~a lar y r ather t han hourly rate . 
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3. Employe es must have five yea rs seniority t o be e ligible 
for g u aranteed annual i n come . 
4. Abs ence~ due t o heal th will be paid up t o t went y - six 
wee ks . 
5. Perso nal convenience absences wi ll not be paid except 
for th e pr e s ent five cas u a l da ys. " Reasonable ne ss " 
will be use d in dete r minin g whe th e r to pay for ab se n ces 
due t o per sonal reasons . 
6. Time off with pay is consid e r e d as h ours worked f or 
the purp ose of compu t i n g daily o r weekly overtime. 
7. Empl oyees on layoff wi ll receive f ul l salary minus 
un employment compensation or f ull salary if unemp l oy -
ment comp e n sation runs out. 
8. Year end bonu ses wi ll b e r ewa rd ed on a mer it and 
seniority basi s . 
9. St andard hour iucEn~ivcs wi ll be abolished in favo r of 
high e r income in creases. 
10. SUB p l ans will n o longe r be required , excep t fo r those 
with l ess than fiv~ years seniority . 
11. All it ems un d e r the plan are a rbitrat able except elibi-
bility f or st a t ~ ben ef~ ~ s . 
Condi tion s of th e interview 
1. Feel free to state a ll t h e r easo n s for you r answer . 
2. Assume th a t yo~ are an ? lyzin g the economic e ff ects of 
the uni~n demand for salaried me thod of paym ent in 
prep aration f or upcom ing negotiation s . 
3 . Ass ume salari ed method of payment a n d guaran t eed annual 
incom e a r e synonymous t e rm s: 
4 . Assume "unio n" to mea n the UAW int erna t ion?l and it s 
eight Dee r e aGd Company locals. 
5. Assume "compa n y " t o mea n Deer e and Compa n y a nd i ts eigh t 
UAW plant s . 
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6. If you have any apprehensions or objccti~~ to a recorded 
interview the recorder will not be used . ~ 
The most import3nt aspect of effective co mprehensive 
in terviews is development of the questions . The que stions 
are broken into two parts , one set is specific , the othe r 
general review. 
The specific questions we r e ask e d first, under a formal 
interview atmosphere. After these were completed, the 
atmosphere was relaxed by stating " This is the end of the 
formal interview . ~ow let's just discuss a few general 
r eview q uest i ons I have". The pu r pose of the general 
que s tions we re to allo w :~e interviewe r to review in his 
mind his feelings and to obtain any spontaneous responses 
which he might otherwise have suppressed in the formal 
interview. 
Both un ion and management were asked exactly the same 
qu estions, in the same manner , except for question numbers 
eighte en , nineteen, and twenty, which were just asked to 
management . The questions were asked orally and a copy of 
all th e questions was furnished each interviewee at the 
t i me of the in: er vie:~ . The intervi ewee was not permitted 
t o see any of the questions until th e time of the actual 
interview . This was done to enable SFOntaneous responses 
r ather than planned biased r esponses . 
Only one manager objected to being recorded . 
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The qu estions were developed with both un i on and manage-
ment in mind and were created to avoid any sugges ti on of a 
d esired respon se . The entire int e r view took t hir ty to forty-
five mi nu tes and was re co rd ed on a porta b l e magne tic tap e 
record e r. In order to tabulate the type of the respon se , a 
+, and 0 were assigned values according to t he question. 
The plu s code was assigned with the management r esponse in 
mind, the mi n us code was assigned wi t h the union r esponse 
in mind, while the zero code was assigned for a neutral or 
n o response . Th ese code assignments were made af ter all the 
intervi ews were completed. 
B . fh e Interview Questions 
The following is a list of th e q11estion~ asked and below 
each qu estion th e cedes are shown with th eir assigned values . 
Specific form~l int ~rview questions 
1. What economically differentiates a blue collar worker 
fr om a white collar worker in the existing factory en -
vironment? 
- noth ing, + something , 0 no opi nion 
2. Should all blue collar factory operations be co nv erted 
t o salary? 
+ none, - yes, 0 some 
3 . Will ther e b e changes in the - amount o f l abor ' s earnings? 
+ lower, - higher, 0 no 
4. How do you feel fring benefit s offered by management 
will be affecte d? 
+increas ed, - decreased, 0 same 
5 . Whi ch pl a n a ll ows mo r e flexibility of vpe r at i o n? 
+ i n centive, - guaran t eed ann ual income , 0 no cha n ge 
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6 . What will be the effects on shop supervision in terms 
o f em p 1 o ye e motivation and numb e-::- of em p.l o ye.es per 
su pervisor? 
+ mo r e employees/supervisor, - l ?ss employ~es/supervisor 
0 n o c hange 
7. Wi l l cha nges initiated and imple~ent ed by methods 
e n gineers become easier, more difficult , or r emai n the 
same? 
+ eas~e r, - more difficult , 0 remain the same 
8. Wi l l t he amount and content of employee suggestions 
su bmitted under t he company ' s focmal suggestion plan 
b e altered? 
+ i n crease, - decrease, 0 no change 
9 . How d o you feel the basic functi o ns of Industrial 
En gineering will chang e? 
+ l ess work, - more work, 0 no chang e 
1 0. Do you feel thece will be a change in the m2a ning of 
th e t ime study function? 
+yes, - n o , 0 n o opinion 
11 . Wi l l there be a shift in employe~ effort intensity and 
e ffo r t duration? 
+ more, - less, 0 no change 
1 2 . Will production output per man and labor efficiency 
change in magnitude? 
+ more, - l ess, 0 no change 
1 3 . Will t he r e be a reduction , an in~rease, or no change in 
th e amount of grievances filed p e r year? 
+ reduc ti on , - increase, 0 no ch~nge 
14. Do you feel labor grades should be a management 
pr erogative or established in the cont-::-act under the 
s ala r y pl an? 
+management prerogative , - i n contract, 0 no opini o n 
15 . Will any t hing happen to product quality under the 
pr oposed plan? 
+ i n c r ease, - decrease , 0 n o change 
1 6. Will there be an y shift in employee loyalty or indivi -
du a l ity? 
+ t oward company, - t oward union, 0 no change 
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17. Will the employee feel mo r e , l ess o r th e same jo ~ 
securit y? 
+mor e, - le ss , 0 same 
18. What , if any, admi n is trative functions and costs will 
be affected? How wil l they c hang e? 
+ affect ed , - not affected, 0 no opinion 
19 . Will th e accuracy of ce rtain ma n agement func ti o n s , 
such as production scheduling and forecasting, b e 
changed? 
+ no, - yes , 0 no opinion 
20. Do you f ee l there ~il l be any shifts in t he emp hasi s 
of mana geme nt concer n, say fr om wage incentive control 
to r ealizing production objectives? 
+ yes, - no, 0 no opinio n 
General review q u estio ns 
1 . Will th e ad op t ion qf th e sa l ary plan o ff er an ove r a ll 
improveme n t ove r the present wdge in ce nti ve plan? 
+ yes, - no, 0 n o opinio n 
2. Do you f ee l that a ~ayment system neecis so~e so rt of 
individual monetary outpu t incen t ive to mai ntain 
prod u ction o ut pu t and labor efficiency? 
+ no, - yes, 0 no O?i~ion 
3 . Ho w do you feel abo u t t he labor r e l ations climate a t 
John Deere . Wi ll a cha n ge in t h 2 method of payments 
r ealize any chan ges in thi s climate? 
+ good, - p oor , 0 ave rage 
4. Do you f ee l th e sala r y - sta tu s wi ll have any direct or 
indir ec t e ff ects on u ni o n strengt h ? 
+ no, - yes, 0 no change 
5. Do y o u thin k the union and th e company are headed 
t oward a collision course in upcoming negotiati0ns? 
+no, - yes , 0 no opinion 
C . The Cod ed Respon se Resu l ts 
The r esults of the int e rvi ews proved to be very inte r -
e stin g and extr eme ly valuable in pinpointing areas of man age -
ment-uni o n ag r eement a nd disa g ree me n: on t he effec t s o f 
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guaranteed annual in ccme or salary . Althou gh t he questions 
we re n ot designed fo:- a "yes" or "no" ansr..:er, an inter-
viewe e ' s genera l a tti tude could alm os t always be assigned a 
cod e . Each r eco r ding tape was car e fully r eviewed . Attitudes 
were coded and tabulat ed; then the codes wer e summarized and 
classif ied as "uni on " or " management", dep ending on th e 
i nterviewee's affiliation (Tab les 10 and 11). 
D. Summary of Interviewees ' Comments and Opinions 
In addition t o coding attitudes, any pertinent and/or 
interest ing comments were noted from the interview tape . 
To gain a thorough . understanding of th e pr evailing 
management and union op ~nion of guaranteed an~ual income and 
its effects , each questio n will n ow be r eviewed with p er-
tinent interviewe e comments anJ opinions noted . 
1. Specifi c formal interi1ie\o.T a11es tion s , coC\ment£ and 
opinions 
1. What economically differentiates a blue colla r wo rker 
from a white collar worker in th e exis ting factory 
environment? 
A majority of management. and union interviewees agreed 
t hat th e r e was an economic differentiation. To summerize all 
th e re sponses, thr ee ~enera l differentials w~re me nti o ned: 
1 . method of pay - hourly wage versus biweekly salary 
2 . type of wo:-k 
3. fringe b enefits 
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In the b e nefit ar ea , th e blue co llar worker receives 
les s health insurance benefits , does n ot dr aw sick pay as 
lon g , and has no contr i b ut ory life in s u~an ce benefits . Most 
John De e re blue collar wo rkers a lso p ay $5 . 00 mon thl y uni on 
dues, even though most of them come under th e state right -
to-work laws. Since the wh i t e collar wo rk e r does n ot wo r k 
un<ler contract , h e has no employmen t or s alary g~a rantee. 
The continuan ce of his employment i s at th e discretion of 
the company . The blu e co l la r worker cannot be fi r ed af t e r 
t he nin e ty day prob a ti o n a r y ~eriod except for good and ju s t 
cause, supported b y substantiaJ e vid e n ce , that ca n be proved , 
if nec essa ry, in an arbri tr atio n p r ecedi n g . If the bl u e 
coll a r worker ls separat ed or l aid of f, he is ~ uaranteed 
s e paration pay and SUB. T h erefo r e , the blu e col J.a r worke r 
is guarant eed throu Kh the cont r ac~, mo r e eccnomic security 
.. 
than the whit e co l lar worker . 
The white collar wo r ke r does not perform wo rk that is 
of immediate economic n ecess ity t o th e company . Bis f u nc ti ons 
are n ot as t imely . With o ut tbe b lu e co ll ar w0 r ke r there 
wo uld be no production and , h ence , no prcduct . to sell to 
obtain i n come. Th e conpa n y co uld ~ o t func t i0n wi t ho ut t he 
blue colla r worker . The whit e co ll a r worker attempts to 
add to the smoothnes s a nd " profitability" o f th e blue collar 
fun c ti on . On the surface it would seem that me thod of pay 
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is the only economic di ff e r e ntial, but p r esently there are 
other i mporta nt differ e n tials . When vie~cd as en overtime 
pay situation , meth o d of pay n o l o n ger b ecomes ~ differential, 
bu t inste ad an hou rly wage for both types of employees. 
2. Should a ll blu e co ll ar facto ry op e rations be converted 
to salary? 
A maj ori ty of the union officials th oug ht tha_t if the 
conversion were to take place, all ope r ati o n s s hould be con-
verted rath er than l ea ving some workers on wage in cen t ives 
and changing others to sala r y status . Four of the managers 
t hought n o ope rati ons should be conv e rt e d, whil e the o t her 
three thou ght that so me shou ld b e conve rt ed . If conversion 
was n ecessary , mana geme nt would l ike t o ch a n ge prese nt hourly 
workers to sala r y and leave inc e ntiv e workers on wage incen -
tives, or give the m a b~se salar y upon which they co uld 
bµild incentive pay . Managem~nt admitted, however , that 
there wer e so me incentive o peration s n ow tha t shou ld be on 
salary because of limit e d incentive opportunity . They 
spec u l ated that, on th e whol~ , the inc e ntive operatio n s 
r etained would b e bett e r off if certain t y?es o f work and 
consequent manipul a t ions made to pr ovi d e incentives were to 
be converted to salary . 
3. Will th e r e be changes i n th e amount of labor 's ea rnings? 
The uni on officials b e lieve ear n ings would have to be 
the same o r hi gher under the g uaranteed sa l a ry plan ~o be 
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acceptabl e t o th e uni o n in c o ll ec ti ve bar gain in g . They 
agreed that ~ he memb e r s wo uld not a c c e pt l ess e ar nings for 
the privile g~ of s alary s t a tus. 
Six of the sev e n ma n ag ers a ss u me d ear ni n g s would have 
to decrease. One ma na ge r s tat e d, "Earnings wo ul d drop 20 % 
to 30% for in ce nt ive worke r s b ec au se e arnings c o uld not b e 
equalized wi ~ hout eq u a l iz in g pr o du c ti v ity. If th e salary 
were based on a ve rage y ea rl y ea rnin gs f o r eac. h o cc up a tion a l 
rate, some w0uld r ece iv e mo re e a rnings , but th e g r e ater 
majority would rec e i ve l ess ". An o th e r ma n age r sa id, " A 
worker can't g et t h~ same pay on Sd lar y as inc~ntive , his 
ear nings mu s !:. g o d ow n ". Ma n ageme nt see med ~o b~se th e ir 
belief on the p r econception th a t pr c1duc ti vity oo u ld d e cr ease , 
while the uni o n r easons th e compa n y mu st ~atntain t he sa me 
or hi ghe r e arnings . T he u n i o n is o n th e ini t iP. t iv~ wi th 
the guaran teed sal a r y d emand a n d th e compa n y seems t o beli eve 
the pr e sent plan is b es t . If the d e ma n d we r ~ acce pt e d b y 
the compan y , ther e wo ul d def i n a t e l y be some p ri ce for t he 
conversion . A go od t es t t o d e t e r min e exactly how se ri o u s 
th e uni o n is a bout t h i s d e ma nd i s t o see if they a r e willin g 
to accept a small e r ge n era l in come in c r ease for t h e co n-
. * version . 
General in co~e in c r eas e mea n s mo r e mo n ey f o r h o u~ s 
worked. An over a ll in come in c r ease with g u a r a nt eed i nc o me 
would mean money f or h o ur s wo r ke d p lu s h ou r s no t wo rk e d 
which would be hi g h e r th a n pr e s e nt o v er a l l in ~ome . 
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4 . How do yo u fe el fringe b e n ef its offered by ma n ageme nt 
will be affect e d? 
Th e union offici a l s speculated fringe benefits would 
hav e t o b e hi g h e r t o be a ccept ab l e t o th e union in collective 
bargaining . They did concede, however , that if the guaran -
t eed salary did cost the compan y more, th en ther e wo uld have 
t o be less i~prov ement in fr in ge b e nefits . The ge_ne ral 
attitude of th e Local 450 membe r s is that th ey wo ul d ha ve 
t o t hink twi ce about taking a r e du c tion in f rin ge be n efit s 
or take-h ome ea rn ings in exchange fo r g u a r anteed salary . 
The mana ge rs mai nt ai n that frin ge ben ~ fits offered would 
h ave t o be less due co the anticipated in c re~sed cost ~f t he 
guarant eed salary d e~an d. Although t he cos: of fringe b e n e -
fits is predict e d t o be l c w this year, cer t ain b e n efi t s 
would be a ff ec t ed b y g~a r a nt eed sa l a r y . These include 
excus ed personal absence days , sick p ay , disabil it y pay, and 
t he supp l emental u n em ployment benefit p l an. "It is d oubtf u l 
t hat the uni o n wo u ld b u y some thing new at ~ he expense of 
so mething they already hav e '', . a manager co n cluded . 
Management con cedes fringe benef it s mu st rise, but b y 
how much? On e manager M~in ta ins if salary were to be adopted 
fo r blue collar worke r s, th e only differential r emaining 
between th e m a nd whit e co llar workers wou ld be f rin ge bene-
fits. He b e lieve s white co llar wor ke r s deserve more ben ef its 
becaus e they usual ly have mo re i nv es t ed i n education and 
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s el f develop ment . The only diff ~ r e nttal r emaining wo ul d be 
frin ge benefits and type o f work . 
5 . Which plan allows more f l exibility of opera ti o n ? 
The majority of manageme n t and u~ion interviewees ag r eed 
th e pr esent i n centive wage system wo uld allow more flexi-
bility in terms of manpower c h anges . Their reasons why the 
salary plan would be less flexible may be summar ized as 
follows: 
1. Workers would be held on the job when not needed 
be cause if full s alary is to be paid , some sort of 
~or k for the company should result . 
2. Produc t ion schedules would h3ve to be mo r e acc ur ate 
and r elatively !ixed. This would be mo~e difficult 
be ca u se o f less operator conce rn ove r pieces ?re -
duc ed . 
3. Pr oduction sche~ules would hav e to be leveled off , 
whi ch is difficult in a seasonal business . 
6 . What will be tl1e ~ffe~ts o n shop supervisiori in terms of 
employee mo ti vation and number of employees per super -
v isor? 
The majori t y of management and u~ion interviewees agreed 
there would have t o be less employee s per sup e rvisor and 
that supervisors woul d have t o increase their use of motiva -
tional t echni ques. Management concluded thac , supe r visors 
would hav e more r espons i bilities which would require high e r 
skills and mo re tr aini n g . Because the incentive system 
offers motivation , ma n y su pe rvi so r s have become lax in this 
area . "Th ey ~ould be forced to perform more objective 
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s up e rvisor y f un c t ions and i t' s q u i t e l ikely ma n y o f o ur pr e -
s e nt s u pe r viso r s co u :dn ' t h a n dle th is ", says one ma n age r. 
A un i.:> n of fic i a l s t a t es , " I t' s go ing t o t ~ke rilore supe r v i so r s 
t o k ee p p roduc tio n going because t he i n ce n tive wo r ker will 
look f or wo rk t o keep himself b u sy wh i l e the sala r y wo r ke r 
wouldn ' t i n mo st cases " . An o t he r ma nager surmises th a t th e 
n umb er o f worke r s would have t o inc r ease to get t h e s a me 
production , t h erefore, t he n umbe r of s u pervisors wo ul d have 
t o i n c r e a se pr opo r tionately . 
7. Wi l l ch a n ges initiated 3 n d implemented by methods 
enginee r s become easier , more difficul t, or r emai n t he 
same ? 
The ma j o ri ty of the union off i cials conceive t ha t methods 
cha n ges wou l d be easier because of e l imination of worke r 
fea r s t h at the metho d c h ange is to ~ake th e product cheaper 
a t h i s wage ince n tive expense. 
Th e ma n agement consensus was t h at the methods changes 
wo uld n either become easier no r mo r e dif f icult . They agreed 
that met h ods e n gineers wou~d face the same problems o f 
r e si s t ance to ch a nge . " I n cidence of methods changes cou l d 
b e l owe r b ecause of ~ore wo r ker initiated changes, b u t t h e 
s e ri ousness 0 r gravity of t he changes would b e greater ", 
suggested o n e manager . 
8 . Will th e amoun t and content of employee suggest i o n s sub -
mitt e d under the company's fo r mal suggestion pla n be 
alt e r e d ? 
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T h e majority of management and uni o n interviewees 
agreed t her e wo ul d be more empl oy ee su gges ti o~s if the guar-
a nteed salary were ad o pted . It was conclud ed th e r e would be 
more suggesti ons turn ed in on oper a ti on con t e nt because the 
ope r ator would n ow formally submit changes. One manager 
s t ates , '' Und er th e pre se nt wage incentive sys t em , su ggest ions 
are rest r a ined b ecause th e worker fin ds he can make mo re 
money by simpl ify ing th e operation and rec e i v ing t he wage 
i n cen ti v e than he can from th e suggestion awa r d ". 
9 . How do you feel the basic f unc t io n s of industrial 
engi n eering will change? 
Ma n agement an<l ~n i0 n i nt erv iewees agree d c hat basi c 
i n dustrial engineering du ties wo ul d be r educe d i n magnitude, 
detail, rigidity, a nd int e nsity. They provid e~ the fo ll owing 
reasons: 
1. The job of work measurement would s till have to b e 
p erform ed t o maintain co ntrol, ~!though i t could 
b e less r efin ed a nd accurate . 
2 . The emphasis wou l d chang e fro~ earni n gs control 
l imit s t o performar.ce . 
3 . Less emphasis wou l d b e pla ce d o n me th ods and motion 
anal ys is . 
4 . Disciplinar y action , rather than red~ced ea rn ings , 
would become t he penal t y f or low perfo r ma nce . 
5. The r e would be l es s p r essu re on Inc e ntive a nd 
Stand ards Engin 2e ri ng Depar tm e nts, in th e shor t 
run, to pr ovide standards. 
· A mo r e r e laxed atmosphere in th e In cen tive and Standards 
En gineering Depart ~e nt would resu lt , allow i ng attention to 
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more basic industri al engineering functions . 
10. Do you feel t here will be a change in the mea ning of 
th e time study functi on ? 
Man agers and un ion offic i als co n c lud ed that th e r e would 
be few e r ope r a ti o ns time s tudied a nd more s t a ndar d data u sed . 
Th ey offered the following p r edictions: 
1. The direct involveme nt of the time study ~ould be 
r ed u ced. 
2 . The standards could become more gene r al with the 
industrial engineer taking ov?r some me thods 
engineering functions . 
3. The basic wor~ study method might have to change 
emphasis f r om what an employee could produc~ i n a 
standar d hour to ~ha t he could produce in a day 
or we ek . 
The union officials be l ieved t he unio~ time study man 
mu st b e retained. His duties would be to deter~ine whether 
th e employee is assigr.cd a fair work l oad and whe th er he can 
per form the designated job in eight hours at a n ormal pace . 
11 . Will there be a shift i n employee effor t intensity and 
effort duration? 
Two t hi r ds of the union officials surmised effort inten-
sity ind duratio n would increase . They believed that 
employ ee effort depends on factors other than money . Mo ti-
v ation is supplied by the supervisor and the employees ' 
attit ude toward the company and th e job . " The same effort 
woul d be attained under the n ew plan if the plan ~as properly 
sol d to the emp l oyees ", said one union officia l . 
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All the managers thou gh t e f fort int e nsity and duration 
would decrease . A majority believed the employe=s would 
n ot work a s hard because t he j ob stand ards wo u la not requir e 
them t o . On e man ager mai nta i n ed that effo rt int ens it y 
would be l ess which wo uld allow effort duration to in c r ease. 
"But, in order to mai nta in duration , the employee must be 
kept on the job , a functi o n the wage in centive now performs ." 
12. Will produc ti on output pe r man and l abor efficiency 
change in mag ~ itude? 
Managers and union officials agr~ed t hat output pe r man 
and labor efficiency would be r educed under the n ew plan . It 
is int e r es t i n g t o n o t e that uni o n officials have cont ra-
die ting opi ni o n s between questions e l ~ven and tw~ lv e . Wit h 
t he same effo rt int ensi ty a n d duration , how c an p r o du c t ion 
a nd labor efficiency be l ess? Their answar vas that u nde r 
t he n ew plan , standards wou l d only deman d 1 00% perfo r mance 
r ather than the present expec t ed 1 35% perforreance. T he r e for e , 
effort and intensity wo uld be . the same r elative to th e 
standa r d demands, but ou tput and effi~iency wou l d be r educed . 
The overal l consensus was that employee pe rf ormance , and 
con sequently o utput, would drop 30 % iremedi ate ly and probably" 
average somewhere around 1 00% or 105 % in t e r ms o f present 
standard hour plan crite ria. One manager said that ef f i -
cien cy of pres en t hour l y machine maintenance wo r ke r s is 60% 
t o 65 % pe r fo rm ance and if p r oduc ti on wo r kers we re o n sa lary 
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thei r eff icien cy would tend to be the same. Anothe r 
manager expressed the v iew that proper morale , and therefore 
productivit y , has n othing to do with t he pay method . 
1 3 . Wi ll there b e a reduction , an increase, or no change in 
t he amount of g r ievances filed per year? 
Both sides agreed that the number of formal grievances 
would be r ed uc ed becaus e of th e elimination of incentive 
g r ievances . Manage me nt and union officials a g reed that 
g r ievances on disciplinary action would increas e because of 
greater use of discipline by f oremen . " Average earnin gs 
grievances wo uld be elimin a t e d , but job classification 
grievances would increas e ", pr P.dicted one uni 0 n official . 
14. Do you f ee l l ab or gr ades sho~ld b2 a ma na geme nt pre r o -
gative or establi s hed i n th e contract u n cle£ the salary 
plan? 
The major ity of mana g ers and uG i on offi c ials c o ncluded 
i t would be neces s ary t o estab li sh salary lab o r g rades and 
occupati o n al r ates in the co ntr act. (P resentl y salary lab o r 
grade s a re available o nly t o middle and high manage ment . ) 
15 . Will anythin g happen t o product quality under thz 
p r o posed pl an? 
Un ion officials cesponded that quality would increase 
while th e majority of managers felt there wo uld b e no change . 
Un ion men th o u ght that if there is l ess pressur e and em -
p has i s on making incentive earni n gs , g r eater concen tr a tion 
ca n be giv en to quality . Sched uling would have to a ll ow 
mo r e l ead t im e und e r the new plan. Th is would mean a longer 
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per iod in which t o pro<lu ce a higher qu a lity part or 
ass em bly. Th e uni on men we re of t he opinion that f e we r in-
specter s would b e r equ ir e d u nd e r th e n ew plan . Most 
ma n age r s s aid pr esen t ly th e r e i s now n u r elationship be -
t ween th e amount of sc r ap and high incentive earn e rs. 
Th erefore , qua l ity pr oba b l y would n o t chan ge . A few mana -
g ers predic t ed l ower quality. The i r r e as o n was th a t present 
incentive sta n da rds p r ov ide mo r e and b e tt e r defined measu r es 
of quality, and be cause th ese s t an<lard3 now d e t e r mi n e their 
pay, oper ato r s foll ow them. 
16 . Will there b e ~ny sh ift in employee l oy alty or indi-
vidu a lity? 
A majcrit y of manag€me nt an d un i on in te~viewees co n-
elude d t hat there would 0e no shif t in employee l oya lty 
toward th e union or comµany . Th e pres Ldent of Loca l 450 
estimates the pr esent union - company loyal ty ratio is sixty 
t o forty. A manag e r ag r eed that th e wage emp l oyee loyalty 
favors t he uni on quit e a bit . One ma n ager had an in terest-
ing ly di fferent opinion . He ~ad r ecently visited Al uminum 
Company of Canada . He s tated t ha t th ey found their employees 
t o be much rno:::-e loyal t o _the c o mpa ny and tha t the unio n had 
few funct ions l eft . He claime d , " Alcan found tha:: th ei r 
salary p l an :::- emove<l ma n y areas o~ fric:ion that p r ovide d t he 
union with a pu rp ose ." He speculate s that in the l o n g run, 
the emplo yee will becoffic mo~e com pany o rie~tated . 
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All intervi ewees agreed that t he inc e ntive system pro-
motes individuality and that this quality would be stifled 
somewhat under th e salary plan . One union official stated 
tha t members expressed to him the idea chat a salary plan 
would allow them to thin k more for themsel ves instead of 
being guided by rigid standards. 
17. Wi ll th e employee f ee l more , less, or the same job 
security? 
Bo th manag ement and union officia l s said t ha t emp loyees 
would definitely feel more job secur it y thr o ugh th e annual 
guarante'e . A union official stated, "The elimination of 
layoff concern woul~ e~able an empl o yee to accurately plan 
a yearly budget" . The s~me union official believed that 
many workers becom e frus:rat ed and ins~ c ure uncle= the 
pressure of the inc e ntl·.re system. "El imina':ion of the 
in centive system wo uld attract more labor to John Deere 
' 
because they could be mo r e secure ." A manager p o inted out 
th at those with less than five years seniority would not be 
eligible for the guarantee and that John Deere se ld om lays 
off employees over thi s seniority level . He also noted that 
at first the company may have to.trim labor because of the 
higher cost of the salary plan , which would adversely affect 
job security . 
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18. What , if any , administrative funcLions a~d cos ts will 
b e affected? Ho~ will th ey change?* 
A majority of manage r s intervie wed thought the following 
a dmi n istrative functions and costs would be affected by 
ad o pt io n of the sa l ary p lan . 
1 . Time slips, which re p ort the daily work, wo u ld be 
simplified. 
2. There would be no n eed for wage employees t o punch 
a t ime clock. 
3. P aper work would be r educed for accounting and 
indust r ial engineering. 
4. No ready baromet er , availabl e with the incentive 
p lan , c ould be us e d to determine slipping of work 
for ce contrcl. 
3 . Tighter audi ting would be needed on standards and 
pro duction . 
6. The nuruber of forem e n would hav e to inc r ease . The 
n ew and exist i n g foremen would need g7eater super -
v isory abil ic~~s and th erefo r e more training in 
motivationa 1 t ech n iques . 
7 . Mo r e capital investment wou ld b e needed b eca use of 
less efficiency from machines. 
8 . More maint enance wo rkers would be ne eded . 
9. Mo r e s t aff ~orkers would b e need ed . 
A few ma n agers thought administrative functions and 
cos t s would not be affec~ed , but did n o t provide any reasons . 
*Questions eight ee n to twenty were asked to managers 
o nly . 
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19 . Will the accur acy of cer t ai n manageme nt fu nc t ions , such 
as prod ucti o n scheduling and forecasting~ be changed? 
Most of th e ~anage r s int er vi e wed were of the opinion 
t hat th e f o llowing mana geme nt function s would be af f ec t ed . 
1. More accur a t e forecasting, and fewer last minu te 
change s wou l d b e required from branch house 
d istribut ors . 
2 . Sales depart me nt s wo uld be r ~ quire d , in tur n , t o 
ba l ance t heir re q uireme nt s an d hav e be tter con tr o l 
of their i npu t s . 
3. Prod uc tion de part men ts would need to balanc e out 
thei r schedules ove r th e e ntir e year t o reduce 
employment fluctu a ti o n s . 
4. More lead time wou l d b e required to pr od u ce parts . 
5. Difficult ies wo uld arise in accurately predicting 
t he pr oduction pace. 
20. Do you fee l there wil l be any sh i ft s i n th e emphasis 
o f manag eme nt concer n, say fr om wage i n ce n tive contr ol 
t o r ealizing production object i ves? 
All the ~ana gers who offered an op ini on conc lud ed th e re 
wou l d b e a shi f t of concern fr om wage incentive control to 
produ c tion o utput co ntr o l . Th ey stres sed th e n eed for be t ter 
labor cost analysis reports t o repla ce th e ones n ow gen erated 
b y the in c entive system. They also support ed t he need for 
p roduction worker appraisa l s to replace the pr esent detailed 
dai l y wage ince nti ve reports. 
2 . General review ques ti o n s , comments and opi ni o n s 
1 . Wil l the adopti o n of the sa l ary p lan offe r an o verall 
improvem e nt ov e r the p res e n t wag e i ncentive plan? 
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This i s th e o n ly ge n eral ques t io n on which managers a n d 
uni o n o f f i cia l s strongly disag r eed . All uni on officials 
intervie wed be li eved the guaranteed sa l ary plan wo u ld offe r 
an improvemen t. Al l co mpany ma n age r s in t e r v i ewed be l ieved 
the pr e s e nt wa ge incen t ive plan was b est . 
One manage r said , " From t h e viewpoint of the company , 
ab a n do n me n t of th e i ncen t ive system wo u ld be impossib l e . " 
Anoth er ma n age r st a t ed , "Abolish i ng th e i n cen t ive sys t em is 
the wo r s t t h ing th a t cou l d eve r happen t o us ". A t hir d 
manage r co n c luded, "1 00% SUB wi th th e incen tive sys t em , yes; 
guarant eed sa l a r y wit :1ou t the incentive sy~ t em , no !". 
A uni o n o ff i cial sums up t h e ove r a ll si t uatio n ni ce l y , 
"The unio n could s t r i ke John Dee r e for years and t he 
c o mp any wou l dn ' t get r i d of the incentive system . In 
the s h or t ru n no incentive system mean; low e r ea r nings , 
whi c h woul d caus~ bitterness . I f p r oduction dropped 
25 % it wo ul d mean that more workers would be r e qui r ed , 
which would i nc r ease the company ' s cost , cause profits 
to dr o p, a nd leave a smal l e r cut of the pie for t he 
unio n." 
" The un io n h as made a g r ea t co n t r ibution to peop l es ' 
live s . But t ry ing t o convi n ce t h e i ncentive worker o f 
this i s a di ff i cult t ask fo r the u n ion. These workers 
are mor e int erested in t "h e short r u n incentive system 
gain s in t erms of money . Because of this difficul t 
task a n d t he gains in the ph ysica l- human elemen t s , I 
think h o u r l y wo rkers should. first be converted c: o salary 
and a ft e r th e incentive wo r kers r ealize the advantages , 
conve rt th em . " 
2. Do y ou fee l th at a paymen t system needs some so rt of 
individual mo n etary o u tp ut i n ce nt ive to main t ain pro -
duction o ut p u t and l abor efficiency ? 
All th e ma na ge r s a n d a ll b ut o n e u n ion o f ficia l thi n k 
118 
that output incent ives are needed . They r eason that since 
John Deere has the incentive system that any change now 
would be difficult or impossible. Once the employees 
experience a direct monetary r eward for extra individual 
eff o rt, it is impossible to remove this r eward and expect 
the same production and labor efficiency . The responses to 
quest ions one and two reflect an interesting cont ra st . The 
union leaders conclude the salary plan would be an improve-
ment over the wage incentive plan , but in relation to th e 
J ohn Deere environment, the incentive worker needs the 
individual reward to maintain performance. They lik~ the 
prop osed plan, but they are afraid tha t certain members will 
not want to sacrific e theic incentive benefits for it. A 
manager speculated that the company could drive a wedge 
between the l ocal and nati onal union on this is s u e . 
3. How do yo~ feel about the labor relations climate at 
John Deere . W~ll a change in the method of payments 
r ealize a~y chQnges in this climate? 
A majori ty of manage rs and union officials believe 
that labor r e l ations is good ~t John Deere and probably would 
be affected by adoption of the sa l ary plan. The following 
are some management opinions : 
1 . The l oss of incentive earnings would cause employees 
to be more concerned over price or the occupational 
r a t e of the job , rather than the standar<l . 
2. The trans ition would cause prob l ems of work force 
control. 
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3 . Contr ol would change from th e! incentive system t o 
d irect fori; ma n surveil lan ce. "F oremen breathing 
d own employee ' s necks would be bad for the labor 
r elations climate ", exp la ined a manage: · 
4 . Contract changes wou l d be extensive. Ic would 
take a l ong time to work out all the changes 
n eeded and for the employee to become familiar wi th 
and accept t he chan ges . 
The uni o n official8 thought there would b~ fewer labor 
r ela t ions problems because of abandonuent of incentives . 
4 . Do you feel the salary sta tu s will have any direct or 
indirect effects on union strength? 
Most managers and u ni 0n officials thought the r e would be 
n o effec t or change . One manager speculated that salary 
stat us might weaken th e union sin ce there would probably be 
l ess strife und er the salary plan . He said 11 A union stag -
n ates , except in an atr.iosphere of str:.fe ." Another manager 
conceived that the union migh t weaken becau~~ of fewer 
g ri evan ces and less " rally fo r ce ", but admitted p r obably n ·· 
c hange would occur. 
A th ird manager surmised sa l ary for uni o n blue collar 
workers would be the first step to encroachment by the union 
int o white collar jobs . He speculated that o n ce ~alary 
status was a ttained by present union member6 there would be 
little left to differ en tiate the white collar worke r s , so 
th e advantages 6f the union cont r act might become appealing 
t o th em . This could increase the quantity and sta tus of 
u nion membership and conseq u ently , it s st~ength . 
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S . Do you think th e union and the company are headed t oward 
a co ll ision course in upcomin g negotiations? 
Both man agers and union o ffi c i als we r e split in t hei r 
opinion. Six t y-six per cent of the union officia l s though t 
th ere would be a stri ke , while 45~ of th e manage rs th o u gh t 
a s tr ike mi g ht occu r in Oc t ober, 1 967 . The ge n e r al opinion 
is that ne go ti a t ions are go in g to be II • 11 rougn . 
One un ion official said , " There is a new element of 
members wh o have n eve r experienced a s tr ike and fee l th ey 
must st r ike to get it out of their systems. " A ma nager 
s t ates, "If a st r ike did r esu lt eve r g u aranteed s alary, ... ]_,_ 
would not b e a popula :".' s t -;.-ike at the l ocaJ l eve l ." 
An o th e r ma n ager t hink s t hat union and ma n agement e nj oy a 
mat ur e re l atio n ship . " The union knows how far t he company 
ca n go o n t his is sue, th ey won ' t try to bre ak the company ." 
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VIII. EFF ECTS OF GUARANTEED SALARY AT THE COMPANY LEVEL 
In th e f o r egoing pages , th e interview data a n d opinions 
of dir ec tly involved p eop l e h a v e b ee n presented . I will now 
attemp t t o formulat e and s ummari ze my own ideas and opinions 
in sane of th e c rit ical a r eas t hat could be affec t ed by th e 
proposed guaranteed sa l ary . 
A. Pr od u ctivity 
Of primar y im po rt ance is the p o t en tial influence of 
salaries o n progressive improvement of productivi ty. 
It is an ordinary cha~ge that one of th e majo r ~ffec ts 
of uni o nism is to o~gani ze th e r es tr ictlon Jf p r o du c tion . 
This may or may n ot b~ t~ue . The basic cause of t he restric-
ti on of o utput is t he belief th a t failure t o restrict 
inev it ably i ncrease~ insecurity. Most work e rs think thar 
there is a given amount of work t o be done; that th e mo r e 
quickly th e work i s do n e , th e soo n e r wi ll une mployme n t o r 
layoff r esult . Con seq u Ently , the worker ' s primary p r o t ec -
t i~n a gai n s t r educed ea r nings is t o limi t outpu t. The 
company is pr ese ntl y of the opinion th at wage i ncentives 
mo r e than offset th e ph~none~on of limited o utput . This 
could be tru e . But it seems that at some poin t ea rnin gs 
must leave off and security mu s t t ake ove r. It has been 
found in man y stud ies that secu rity places hi g h e r o n th e 
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l ist of workers n eed than wages (3,8,12,19,26 , 47 , and 48). 
In a company with approximately 20,000 wage employees 
th e r e are pe r sons of a]l backgrounds, motivations , predis-
p osi t ions, and tendencie s . Therefore . the increas e in 
s ec u rity, r esul t ing from salaries, would l ead some workers 
t o l oiter, become lazy and in general produce l ess than the y 
d id u nder pre v ious conditions . Many ~ ndiv iduals would permit 
t h e assurance of a full year ' s pay to slowly erode away 
t heir personal initiative and cause them to perform at a 
mi n imum leve l whenever possible for a s lon g as possible . 
Bu t , what is import an t is the aggregate effect . 
Gene r a l ly spe3king , an advance in security ought to have the 
same general effect a s wage incent!v es o n prod u ction . All 
t he mo r e so in the case of salaries which assu r es the senior 
worke r against the loss in ~ve r age yeErly income that might 
othe r wise result from any improvement in output. It will be 
assumed that the effect of security or. workers i n the a g gre-
gate is to lift, r ather than limi t, produ ction and the 
deg r ee of increased security . An additi o nal contribut i on 
to p r oductivity may arise from the fact that because of 
i n c r eased security the qu~t rate under salary is likely to 
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decl ine , thu s reducin g th£ cos t of turnover.* Whether the 
motivation through increased security will mo r e than offset 
the motivation that was supplied by the wage incentive would 
be difficult to predi c t. Even if the carrot of a year end 
b onus based on merit rating and seniority were adopted, pro-
ducti o n performance wou ld probably n o t be much over 105% 
compared to the pres~nt 135%. Increasing efficiency by 
eliminating the disincentive, or motivational drop produced 
by the fear o f j ob loss, often is more effective than 
institut ing new incentives . 
If, on the other hand , p r oductivity cf the company 
sho u ld be a dv ersely a (fec t e d, the very source of the 
employee s ' l o ng-t erm securi ty wo ulrl be worn away. Without 
ever-increasing productivity through th e more efficient us e 
of machines and manrower , the company ' s Econooic p r og ress 
would be stifled. 
B. Loyalty 
The all-on-salary plan und er certain cond itions develops 
close employee identification with th e company , its goals , 
and its welfare. Tangible proof is provided bl Int e rnational 
Busines s Machines, Gillette , Cannon Electric and Alcan 
*Empl oyees with five years se niority would expe rience 
th e immediat e effects of increas e d security fro~ salary. 
Employees with le ss seniority wou ld want t o remain employed 
t o attain the securi t y offered t o his seniors . The company 
would n ot b e r e luc tant to l ayoff these less senior employees 
be cause th is cost would n ot be much greater than it is n ow . 
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where salaries now exi~t. Generally , th e y found more loyalty 
t o job, t o sup e rvis o r, and to fellow worker s in th e organi -
z a tion . Where a union was involved , th ey noticed a shift 
f r om ~ore union loyalty to more company loyalty (13 and 21). 
Ca nn o n Electric was " delighted" b y the many tangible ind i-
c a ti o n s of employee identification with corporate goods (21) . 
In 1 962, little Sabo Machine and Tool Works in Buffalo , New 
Yo r k , put a s a 1 a r y proposal before the UAW 1oca1 w·i th which 
i t ba r gains. It was quickly accepted . C . Taylow Kew~ assist -
a n t t o the president, said, " We figured th at putting pro -
du ct i on men on salary would give them a better feeling of 
being part of the company" (21). 
La bor r e l ations at Joh n Deere a re excellent, accordi n g 
t o Robert S . Wolff, Director of Labor Relation s for Deere 
and Company . This is ev idenced by few g r ievR~ces and no 
a r bitration cases in almost tw o years at the Des Moines 
Wo r ks (Table 6) . The conditio n s are proba bly ri gh t for 
i ncreased company l oyalty at Des Moines Works and other 
J o hn Deere plants through the adoption of salaries . 
C. S t atus 
Co mpa n y l oyalty is ro o ted in status. The ratio of 
whi t e collar workero t o blue collar wo rk ers i s s teadily 
r ising and with technol ogy advances forcing th e upgrading of 
t h e industrial work force, man~geme~t and union are feelin g 
th e p r essure of worke r ' s expectations for increased 
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status (48) . 
Betwe cr. 1953 and 1963 blue collar employment r emained 
at about the t wenty-five million level. During ' the same 
period the nu mber of whi t e collar job3 increased from twenty-
three poi nt six million to thirty point two mil l ion, a gain 
of 28% . Production wcrkers in manufa~turing indt1stri~s 
declin ed from fourt ee n point one million in 1953 to twelve 
point six millio n in 1963. At the same tim e , the civilian 
labor force increased by more than niue million (48) . 
The company has been anxious to re c o gnize the increased 
importance of skilled wa~kers by affo ~di n g them the same 
employment a r ran gement as other e mployee s . It has st ru ck 
them as somewhat incongruous th at their skilled maintenance 
(no incentives) and operating people sho uld receive income 
on an hourly basis , while r e lative ly ur. skil led clerical 
p eople enjoy salary status (45) . 
The uni on thinks pay by the t e nth of an hour deni es the 
dign it y of man a n d degrades him t o a status of less irnpor-
tance than the machines he services . Wages treat the physi-
cal and men tal effort of human be i ng s at work as a commodity 
to be used o r cast aside at will (35) . 
The best way to upgrade th e status of production workers 
is to redu ce the di:f erences in the way they and white 
collar workers a r e treated . However, the r e lationship of 
former wage paid workers on a sa l ary basi s with white collar 
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worker s in trad i tional salaried job s could be one o f ~Dn -
tent ion. In many ca ses , white collar wo rk ers are content 
with s malle r yearly incomes than most b lu e collar workers 
earn. This is beca u se of the no r ma ll y accep t ed salaried job 
privi leges , such as full pay dur i ng absence for sickn ess or 
pers onal business and the belief of greater opportu~ities 
at incr eased salary in th e future. 
Should blue co l lar wo r kers achieve sa l a r y status, 
especiall y on a y ea rl y contract b as is, th e r ese ntment o f 
white collar workers would probably be shown in demands for 
mor e pa y , the same gu a rant ee of annua l inco me , plus new bene -
fits, in order to maintaln thei r tr aditionally higher soc i a l 
status. Such d emands would increase th e company ' s c os ts. 
The blu e collar worker wo u ld have more security t han th e 
whi te c ol l a r worker , but would still lack a certain socia l 
status con n ected with the white collar work e r . Is this 
subjecti ve security sufficient fo r th e white co llar worker 
to fe e l diff e r e nti ated f ro m the blue collar wo rker? Maybe 
the. white collar wo r ker will seek unionizati on to e nsure 
an economic security the same a s those no w union i zed? 
The se and other questions in thi s ar ea are difficult t o 
answer . 
With salaries f o r production wo r ke r s comes s tatus, but 
this also means more r esponsibi lit y. The company shows its 
genuin e trust and faith in the employee as a p ro du ctive adult, 
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and at the s a me time , ass ur es him r easonab l e eco n om i c 
security throu g h s a l a rie s . The e mpl o y ee on th e o th e r hand , 
must no w acc e pt thi s r es p o n s i b il i ty throu g h sel f motivation 
to make his contribution t o th e succes s of th e c o mp any. 
D. Security - Financial and Empl o y me nt 
Security wa s me ntion e d brie f ly in connecti on with 
produ c t i vit y , but n eeds mo re e xp a n s i o n a t t h i s point. The 
worker's greate s t wo rr y i s pr o bably th e f ea r o f losin g hi s 
job or his plac e in th e "pi cking ord e r ' ' of hi s i n f o r mal wo rk 
g r .o up ( 2 2 ) . Among h is goa l s i s a s tandard o f living e qual 
;o that of his b es t s u i t~ d assoc i a t es , a s t d n dacd tha~ 
as su r e s hi m a g ainst int e rm i tt e nt pove rc y . Worke r s wh o are 
purchas in g h ome s and pa r ticipa t i n g f ul ly in the co n s um e r 
c r e dit bo om pl ace a g r ea t v a l ue o n s t able in c o me s . A man' s 
ec o n om i c ~ell -bein g is de t e r mine d n o t by h is da il y wage , b u t 
by his earnings ov er a pe r io d o f time . Reg u lari t y of inc ome 
is n ece s s a ry for s at i sfyi n g h is e c onomic n e eds , whi ch aris e 
daily, for th e wh o l e yea r. Onl y in this way can a wor ke r 
purpue a s tabl e a nd sec ur e li f e , pl a n ah ead , and deve l o p 
him s elf ful l y. But, wh i l e th e wor k e r sees o n e f o r m of hi s 
security a s f ina n cia l o r i n h i s p ay e n v e l ope, sa l a ri es c a n 
b e meanin gf ul only as p r od u c ti ve emp l oyment co ntin ues a nd 
gives a d eq u a te g ood s a n d se rvic es th a t a r e p u rch a sabl e with 
pay check s . To reali z~ t he pro mi se of a va li d , r egular, 
. 
continuin g pa y che c k, th e wo r ker ' s att e nti o n mu s t inevitabl y 
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be directed t oward the company . 
Fifty-two pay checks per year would r esult in no loss 
of pension credits, giv ing the worke r another aspect of 
f i n ancial security . 
A philosophical question to ask ~ n relation to f inancial 
se curity is: Should a man who do e sn't work r eceive a~ much 
money as the man who does? 
Of c ou r se ther e i s also th e conc ep t of employment 
secur i ty . A distinction needs t o be nade betwee n t wo aspects 
of employment security. One is r ef l ected in continuing 
employment on a given job . The other l ies in the opportunity 
to find one's best nich e as an emp l oyee , without being 
barre d by guarantees T.vh i ch solidify the existing labo r force 
against outsiders. Taking on additional empl oye es wo uld 
mean additional guar an t eed overhead cost obligations . It 
would also probably mean a longer " brea k -i n" peri o d because 
of the lack of mon e t a r y incentive mo t ivation . The result 
would be caution in hiring a nd the freezin g of emp loyment 
among the older ge n eration of· workers. It would, in that 
re spect, hamper compa~y op por tunities to hir e young er wo r ke r s 
looking for their pl ace . The company wou l d pro bably prefer 
to offe r large amounts of overtime to existing worke rs 
bef ore opening the ranks to new empl o y ees . Security would 
r esu lt for t hose in the company 's labor for ce , but make it 
more difficult for th ose s eeking opportunity to get in . 
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The pr ess ur e t o get by with f ewe r workers takes other 
forms. For example, in th e su ga r industry conside r able 
mechanizatio n h as t aken place whil e sa lari es were presen t . 
As a r esu lt, no new workers have be e n hir e d for the last 
fi ve years (30). Natural l y , this means r educed tr ain ing 
costs for new employ ees . If a company speculates t hat i t 
will n ot have a full year of emp l oyment f or a n individual , 
t hen he i s l a id o ff at the end o f th e g ua ran t eed year a n d 
his r emai ning work is allocated to mo r e senior e mployees on 
an overtime basis . The only s o l u ti o n for this defect is for 
the union to d emand l onge r guarantees . But 1 such an 
alternative woul d on l y in crease the compa n y ' s in c lina t i o n 
to u se less labo r . 
The re could b e o trouble some problem witn securit y 
through sen i or it y . Traditionally, senirotiy was in tended 
to assur e workers wi r h the l ongest service f i ~st chance at 
a v ailabl e jobs. But with salaries , thos e wi th t he grea t es t 
seniority may wa nt t he fi rst chance t o be laid-off in a 
d ownturn or seaso n al f l uctua ti on s in ce th ere would be n o l oss 
of inc ome . This woul d clash with present s t ate laws that 
requ i r e l ayoff t o be inv olunta r y before wo r kers can r eceive 
benefits . 
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E . Absenteeism 
. 
A t ypical hypothesis with guaranteed salary is that 
it causes an increase in absenteeism . However, empirica l 
evidenc e does not prove this hypothesi3 to be true. The 
National Industrial Conference Board study , mentioned 
earlier (4 8) , showed that of thirt y - one companies making 
studies of absenteeism before and after salary programs 
we re be gun, only thre e r eported worke r s stayed off the job 
more of t e n. Five sai<l their absent ee ~ate actually dropped 
and th e r es t could discern no lon g-t erm change in the rate . 
One of th e t hree companies showed a ri se i n absen t eeism 
r eco rd s and on l y a " slight " i n crease in the number of sick 
day s taken . The remainjng two compani es d o not indicate 
the excent of the increase. Five companies reported a 
general declin e in absenteeism, but only one of the m indi-
cated its exten t; absenteeism was 8% lower than it had been 
durin g th e year before th e conversio n was made . 
Thre e companies that changed all em ploye es to salaried 
status carefully monitored a~sen t eeism rates on a monthly 
b asis. They noted that f o r a period of thr ee to six months 
after the co n version, absenteeism rose slightly but dropp ed 
ba ck to it s norma l pattern by the yea r following t he 
transition . 
On b a l ance, it appears t h at in companies s tudied which 
ha ve small groups of blue ~o ll a r workers paid on a salaried 
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basis , th ei r absenteeism r ates t e nd ta be about th e S~me as 
white co llar workers ~nd i n a large pa rt lower than their 
r emaining hourly paid count e rparts . However , this difference 
ma y well be due to th e ge n era l characceri s tics of the 
sa l aried blue collar work force - its stability , l e ngt h of 
service , and skill education l eve l, rath e r than t o th e sala r y 
system it self (48) . 
IBM claims t here was a brief s purt of absenteeism 
immedia tely after it s move to blue collar salar i es , bu t 
that th~ r ate soon r e turned t o norma l . The r ate of abse n-
teei sm am o ng f ormer h ou rl y emp l oyees ls now approxima t e l y 
th e same as for employ ees who h ave always been on sala r y (21) . 
Gill e tt e actually experienced a dr op ln absenteeism after 
installation of it s salary p l an , althou gh not s ubstantial 
enough t o be statistically significant (13). Cannon Elect ri c 
Compan y fine s absente e ism rat es for production emp l oyees in 
their tw o non- union d i visions on sa l a~y far be l ow th ose of 
other manuf ac turing firm s whose emp l oyees are on clocks . 
In o n e of the se t wo divisions·, p l a nt employees regularly 
show a bett er attenda n ~e r eco rd th a n do their breth r e n wh o 
ha ve tr aditionally been on salary . How e v e r, in the com -
pan y ' s t hird UAW uni onized divis i on , three times as much 
absent eeism i s of t en expe r ie n ced (21) . 
F rom the a b o v e evidence it can b e stated with some 
assuran ce that in the lon g run, on th e average, absent eeism 
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will not increase for the company due to adoption of 
salaries for everyone . However, there will probably be a 
small hard core of violent anti - company wo r kers who would 
t ake advantage of their position for absence and create 
problems for all the workers . This.policing pr oblem for both 
t he union and management would r eqtiire continuing work and 
probably arbitration t o keep peace within t he work ing 
groups. The supervisor could no w be "har d nosed" about 
these hard core groups sin ce under th e sa l ary plan they would 
be paid for more than five p ersonal absences, while 
pre sent ly they are n o t. 
F. Administration 
1. Industrial engineering 
The industrial engineering and time study functions are 
more formal with incentives t han with salaries. ihe present 
performanc e rating is based on the industrial enginee~ing 
conc ept of n o rmal . Where earnings and effort inequalities 
exist it is difficult for the industrial engineer to ma inta in 
a consistent concept of normai. With salaries, standards 
woul d have to exist for control purposes. However , non-
standard conditions could n ow exist and be a function of 
te chn ology instead of "necessary " plant coverage . Sec-ups 
are more efficient in the i n cen tive system . Wi::h salaries 
the set-up would be measu r ed on a burden basis. A yearly 
r atio of set - up to. prod uctive time could be established for 
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ea ch l abor classification . How eve r, in th e companies ' 
job shop type atmosphere , work measurem e nt o n each se t - up 
is imp o rt a nt since s e t - up s comp ri se so mu ch of the ela ps ed 
time. Under salarie s , more sta n dard data cou ld be app li e d . 
Presently some ope r atio n s ca nn ot b e standardized sufficiently 
t o use standard data and pay an inc en tive . · 
Indu s tri al eng inee rs u nder an inc en ti ve sys t em are 
n ormally bett e r tra i ne d in t ime and mo t ion study than t hose 
und e r a sala r y s yst em ( 14 ) . Th e siz e of the i n dustrial 
e~gine e~i n g department is n o t c ompl e tely a function of wage 
payment , bu t i s also a f unction of the company ' s typ i of 
te chnol og~. A job s ho p state of t ec hnology n eeds mo r e indus -
trial engin eers (Table 20) . 
2 . Pr od u ction 
Under incentives , mana geme nt ia more concerned with 
foc using its a ttenti on pr imarily o n contr o lling the wag e 
pa yment sy s t em a nd not di r ec tl y on increasing ou t put . 
Unde r incentives the em ploy ee ' s effort is self d ir ec ted 
wi t hin th e fra mewo r k o r reguia ti ons a s p r escribed by t he 
system; s a l a ries would r equi r e ski llfu l management an d new 
or great e r us e of p~ese n t tech ni ques. Techniques that could 
b e used or exp a nd ed are work bac k log, pacing , selection , 
trainin g , placement, compe tition, mass appeals , p r eceden t, 
r elating salary increases t o per fo rmanc e , tr ansfe r, di s -
qu alificati o n, and discipline. 
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Qu ali ty of produ ccion is more a function of employee ' s 
and sup e r visors ' attitudes than th e exist ing t ype of wa g e 
paym e nt system . 
The incentive system emphasizes ?erfo rm ance ; the sa l a ry 
syst em emphasizes efficiency . Performa n ce em p has is causes 
for eme n to be preoc cupied wi th acquir ing e~tra produc~ion 
stand a rd s and allocating e l apsed ho ur s into non-productive 
acc ounts . The primary objec tive of t oe salary foreman 
would be to impro ve operati n g r es ults and methods of achiev~ 
ing the se r esu lts . Under th e company ' s in centive system , 
th e nu mb er of employees per f o r e man a verages thirty t o 
thirty- five . It i s probable that a company can ge t a given 
output with " poo r er " foreme n un der an incentive sys t em than 
under a sal a ry system. 
3. Industri al r e l ations 
Grievanc e s in a salary situation wo u ld be mo re int e n -
sive and troubl esome s in ce discussions regarding t h em wou l d 
often be focused on effort . Under incen tives , the d i scus -
si ons are focused on earn ings which i s not as nebulous a 
subje c t. P r e ssure en the sa l ar i ed employee t o r each an 
agr eement wo uld not be as strong s i nce it would cos t him 
nothing t o p r o l ong th e di sp ute . 
suffer throu gh r educed earnings . 
An incentive emp l oyee co u ld 
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4 . S u mmary 
Th e following is a list of some of the inherent advan-
t ages in administ r ation of incentiv e s and salaries for 
pr od u c tion worke rs . 
Incentives 
1. The y pr ovide a th o rou gh bar ometer of earnings which 
enabl es management to appraise ho w effectively it 
is analyzin g methods and establis hin g produc tion 
st a nd ards. 
2. The work measur eme nt fun c ti on is more sophi s ti cated: 
a. tim e study is detailed and exact l y accurate 
b. non- standard conditions are easily measured 
c. set - ups are measu red specifi ca lly 
d . industri a l engineers are bett er ~ra ined 
3 . Elicitin g effort is self direct ed as prescribed 
b y the system. 
4 . Ch anges are ~o r e rapidly assimi l ated both in 
introducing cew employees t o exi s tin g jobs o r 
adjustment of r egu lar employees t o changed 
operation s . 
5 . Less disciplin e is needed t o s e c ure employee effo rt. 
6 . Grievanc es and disputes over employee ef fort are 
individually l ess troub l esome . 
Salaries 
1. Management has more freedom in ad mi n ist e rin g the 
work measure men t f un ct i o n . Manageme nt could est ab -
lis h stand a rd s , determine th e typ e of standard, or 
r evise st an d ards more a t its own discretion . The 
b asis f or work measurement (stand a r d data o r infor-
mal ti me stud y ) a nd th e extent of c han ge needed to 
req uire retimin g would be establishei at manage- . 
me nt' s di scretion . 
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2. Th e scope of work measurement could be extended to 
more factory operations . 
3 . The scope of work in indu s trial e n gi~eeri ng could 
encomp ass cos t r ed uction as well as work measure -
ment . 
4. No earnings inequalities would exist. 
5. Management could put more emphasis on realizing 
product i on objectives than on control of the wage 
payment system. 
6. Changes by me th ods engineers and employee~ could 
b e more frequent and acceptable. 
7. More emphasis by management on efficiency than per -
formanc e (that is; on factors affecting utilization 
of labor r ather than solely the factor level of 
effort) could r esult . 
8. Management could be more flexible in establi~hing 
and changing man assignmen t s and machine opera ting 
spe eds. 
9. Fever grieva n ces wou ld be incurred over industrial 
engineering standards. 
10. The collective bargaining agreement would contain 
fewer p rovisions dealing with employee effort. 
11 . Employee advancement would be more o rderly (as -
suming guaranteed salaries would eliminate the 
bidd i n g syste m) . 
G. Cost Estimat es 
What effects will a guar~nteed income or salary plan 
have on costs for th e company? This section does n ot provide 
a s ophisticated depth study into the subjec t of costs 
becaus e of the complexities of the pre sent and proposed plan, 
the time limitations, and the unavailability of necessary 
data. However, an effort has been made to provide some idea 
of the a re as t hat need to be consider ed . In some cases a 
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short inv es tiga ti ou into actua l cos t s ha s bee n attempt e d . 
In order to d e t erm in e a s accu r ately as p~ss ible the 
increa s ed costs for the company , r e ali s t ic mode l s wou ld have 
t o b e built and programmed f or c omput e r analysis . Real 
economic situation s , based on assumptions abou t such vari -
ables as numb e r of layoffs a nd emp l oymen t levels , could be 
r epresent ed by mod e ls wit h simu l a t io n and summary p rovi ded 
by a computer . But th is mo r e pr ec is e method of cost analysis 
would requ i r e a l e ngth y s tud y in it self . 
For th e present a n alys is , cos ts a r e divided into: 1) 
manpower costs , 2) ad mi n ist r at i o n coses , 3) l abo r ear nings , 
and 4) te mpo r a r y unemp l oyme n t costs . 
Any estimate of potent i al cos t of a g u aran t eed sa l a r y 
pla n mu s t be der i ved f : om an a n a l ysis of past employme n t 
e x p e ri e n ce using th e assump ti o n that the firm , in t h e past, 
had b een ope r ati n g under suc h a plan . The ques ti o n must be 
asked; Ho w much wou l d hav e be e n added t o costs had t he fir m 
b een obligated t o me e t provisions of n giv e n plan? Two 
po ints should be n o t e d : in derivin g a n estiQate of what t he 
plan is likel y to cos t, account shoul d be t ake n of th e 
poss ibility t hat past emp l oyme nt experie ~ ce would hav e been 
differ e n t i f ma n agement we r e ope rating und e r such a plan . 
Secondly, the extent t o which the es t ima t e l s va lid for the 
futur e dep e nd s o n h ow c l ose l y employment conditions in t he 
~utur e ap p r oxima t e t hose of t he pa s t. Th e r e for e , i f the 
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analy s is t akes th ese co n side r ations i nt o a cco unt-, o n e mi gh t 
e nd up, not with a sin g l e f i gu r e of p o t e nt ial c o s t, but 
r a t her wi t h a rang e of c o s t s wit hin wh ic h t h e a ctual c os t is 
likely to fall . 
1. Ma npowe r cos t s 
In th i s a ge of hi g h emp l oymen t, vo l u n ta r y ch a n g ing o f 
j o bs is on e of th e mos t impo r ta n t ca u ses of l abo r tu r n ove r . 
Labor turnover r a i ses pr oduc t io n cos t s because of l osses i n 
o utput when l e ss wo r kers a r e avai l ab l e fo r esse nt ia l o p era -
t ions, and be c au se of lo we r pro d u c t ivi t y of in e xpe ri e n ced 
labor. A r e du c ti o n in t he vo l ume of turnover , du e t o g u a r -
a n t eed s a lari es wo u ld r esu lt in dis t i n c t econom i es to th e 
c ompany b y in c r e a s ing agg r egate pr od u c t ivi t y , ap art from 
a ny c hange in th e l evel of p r o du ct i vi t y , oc worke rs of give n 
e x p e ri e n ce a nd tr aini n g I t a lso eliminates the l osses 
which arise out o f hi rin g a nd b r eakin g in new wo r ke r s . 
Thr ou g h biddin g a nd ot h e r p r ocedures , t he un io n limit s 
th e comp a n y ' s right to tran s f e r wor k e r s . Em pl o y ee s find 
th ese p rov i s ions u se ful i n prot ec t i n g th e wage str u ctur e 
the y have bu i lt up a nd in ass urin g th a t jobs a r e not a r b i - -
tr arily aboli sh ed . On t he o th e r hand , manag~ment n eeds c o 
mainta i n a fl ex ibl e l abo r fo r ce c o mee t wi t h v aria b l es . 
A s alar y wo ul d pr otec t emp l o y ees eve n t ho u gh it c o uld r emo v e 
th e l imitations on p e r so nne l t r ansfe r s which were t ho u gh t 
es se n tial to protec t la bo r st a n da r ds . Thi s in cr eas ed 
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flexibility could aid i n reducing manpower costs . It may 
als o al low pr oduction scheduli n g t o tak e advantage of t he 
r e inforc ed employment stability . 
Since collective bargaining wou ld center around annual 
ea r ning s rather than hou rl y rate, manpower costs wou l d become 
st ab ili zed in relation to productivity , assuming productivity 
r emained co n stant . Control of produ ct ion could still be 
maintained by measured daywork. Relativ e stability in man -
power costs is important to any busine ss in the planning of 
i ts pro duc t ion and sales , and in securing a nd maintaining 
its po s ition in a corapetitive market . 
Some of these effect s of salarie s would be realized in 
a short time; others would become significant only o v er a 
lon ger period of time. The e ff ec t of lab or turnover and 
reduction of training costs would be f e lt in l ess t ha n a 
year . Th e benefits of a bility to make transf ers and the 
advant ages of stabil i zed manpower costa would r equire a 
longer period of time and some serious planning . John D ee ~e 
ha s. a high wag e bill in c omparison ~ith t ota l costs (In 
196 6 $ 147 . 3 million versus $858 million from Ta ble s 1 and 
18), ther e fore the y run more risk in adop tin g sa larie s than 
a firm with a small wage bill. Manpow~ r cost would n o t 
immed ia t ely be as l o w as it is under incentives , but after 
awhile an improvem en t co uld wel l r es ult . 
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2 . Ad mi n istration coats 
To pl ace a d ollar and cent figu r e on administ r a ti on cos t 
i s diff icu lt . The added and reduced administration functions 
have a l ready been mentioned . In most cas es the addi ti ona l 
ad mi nistr a t io n costs imposed by guaraate ed salaries wo ul d 
improv e th e company ' s present admini stration . To men·t i on a 
f ew added functions in r ev i ew : 
1. Additional trai~ing of s u perv i sors in mo tivational 
and disci p l inary t echniques 
2 . More superv isors 
3 . Closer audits of worker production and pe r formance 
4 . Gre a t er produ ction lead time 
5. Mo r e accur ~te sales forecasting 
An added fixed cost w~uld also be incur~ed in convert -
i ng t o th e new plan . 
Reduced administiation costs would result t hrough : 
1. Fewer g r ievances (Table 6) 
2 . Eliminatio n of the comp l ex SUB plan 
3. Fe we r industrial e n g_inee r s (Table 20) 
4. Less time to set standa r ds 
5 . Reduced accounting department auditing 
6. El i minati on of comp l icated daily time sl ip r epo rting 
The Eddy-Ru cker-Nickels consulti ng f irm estimated and 
summari ze d per ce nt increases or decreases in administration 
cost s o f the t wo meth o d s of pay considered over a unm easu r ed 
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daywork typ e of op eratio n (38). 
Tab l e 12. Administration cost comparison 
Gene ral relativ e cost 
t o develop a n d inst a ll 
p l an in % of a nnual 
direc t lab o r payrol : + 
Gener a l r e l ative c ost 
t o maintain plan i n % 
of annu a l direct 
labor p ayrol l+ 
Net saving s the first I 
year I 
P r esen t 
Stan. hr . 
in centi ve 
wag e 
15 % 
9 % 
Propo sed Change 
Gu a r . a n nual If propo sed 
salary with plan adopted 
mea sured I 
da y work 
- 3% 
1% 
+ 12 %* 
+ 8% 
+ 5% or 
$7 ,11 5 , 000 
* Thi s can n ot be co n s i dered a savin gs si n ce th e incentive 
plan is alr eady installed at the company . 
+ Based o n 19 66 straigh~ time earnings fo r Dee r e and 
Comp a n y ' s eight UAW plants. 
From th ese fi gures it ca n b e see n th ere is a relative l y 
small in s t alla t ion cost and a very smal l ~os t of maintaining 
the sa l a r y plan . Although thi s t ab l e was establis h ed as a 
univ e r sa l es tim a te, it co uld wel l be app li ed to the company 
cost an a lysis . 
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3 . Labor earn in gs 
What is th e difference between t ~e pres e nt and proposed 
pl an in r elation to hours wo r ked and cons e quently labors ' 
earnings? The choice was to a nalyze Labor's ea r nings cost 
from a n effective hours worked standpoint . Inc en ti ve and 
~on-incentive work distribution and performance of em~loyees 
on this work were mu ltipl ied by the hours t hey ac tually 
worked to arrive at effe c tiv e hours worked. The results of 
my analysis are shown in Table 13. I ~ is concluded labor 
earnings would be reduced $12 . 5 million a year . This figure 
is based on the foll o wing assumptions: 
1 . Direct l abo r produces at 65% of the n ormal rat e 
when not on incentive an~ 133 % of th 2 normal rate 
when on incentiv e . 
2. Indir ec~ labor (toolmakers , maintenance, etc . ), 
which is never ~xposed to inc e nti ve3 , presently 
produ ces at the same rat~ as direct labor when not 
on incentive. 
3 . In th e absenc e of incentive , direct labor wi ll 
aver age 100 % - 105 % of th e normal ~ a te, due t o 
increased job s ec urity, r emoval of t he discourage-
ment of not having all work on ince ntive, better 
trained supervi sio n, etc . 
4. The r eac t ion of indirect labo r t o g uaranteed 
annual salary will be a r ise of 35% - 40 % in per-
formance due t o increased job security , bet t er 
trained sup e rvi s i o n, etc . 
5. The figure of 135% of normal p r oduction rate pre-
sently r epresents "r eal " hours and a cqnsequent loss 
of 30 % - 35% in productivity o f sellable goods . 
6. Earnings for incentive workers c o uld not fall below 
the present average s trai ght time hou rl y earnings . 
Tab l e 1 3 . 
1 4 3 
Hours worked analysis - salary versus incen t ive 
and n o n-in centive work (ba sed on June 1967 
e a rnin gs figur es fo r Deere and Com~any ' s eight 
UAW pl ants) 
An alysis of hours wo rked in June 1967 - Incentive and non -
inc e ntive 
( AxC) 
(BxC) 
(FxD) 
(GxE) 
(H+I) 
(H-1) 
(K/J) 
A. 
B. 
c. 
u. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
K. 
L. 
P e r ce nt of total hours worked by incentive em -
pl oyees = 40 . 4% 
Percent of total hours worked by non- incentive 
employees* = 59.6% 
Total hou r s wo r ked (June 1 967) = 4 , 750 , 542 
To tal h ou r s wo r ked by in centiv e employees = 
1,919, 219 
Total hours worked by non-incentive employees = 
2,831, 323 
Average perc ent perfo r mance by incentive ~m ­
plo ye es = 1 35% 
Average ?ercent performance by n on - inc ent ive 
empl oyees = 65% (estimat ed) 
Effecti ve hours worked by i n centive employees 
2,590, 945 
Effective h vurs worked by non-incen t ive em-
plo yees = 1, 840 , 160 
Total effect jve hours worked n 4 , 431 ,3 05 
More effective hou r s worked by incentive em-
ploy ees = 75 0 , 584 
Percent more effec tive hours worked by inc en tive 
employees = 41% 
Pr ojected analysis of hours worked in June 19 67 for ~alarv 
wo r k replacinf n on - in c entive wo rk 
M. ve r age percent performan ce by sala ry em -
plo yees = lOO r. (estimated) 
(MxE) N . Effecti ve hours worked by salary employees + 
2,831, 323 
( N-H) 0. Mo re effectiv e h ours work ed by s~lary employees 
(O/ N) 
(H+N) 
(J-Q) 
P. 
Q . 
R. 
240,3 78 
Percent more effective hours ~orked by salary 
empl oyees = 9 % 
Total eff ec tive hours wo r ked = 5 , 621 , 2~8 
Increase in total ef fecti ve hours wo rked = 
989,9 63 
*No n-in cen tive employees or work means hourly employees 
p lus incenti ve employees performing non-incentive wo r k . 
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Tabl e 13. Continu ed 
Proj ected analysis o f hours worked in June 1967 fo r ~~r-:-' ~­
work r e pla cins non-incentive work 
(R /J ) S . Percent increase in total effective hours 
worked = 22% 
Proj ect.ed analysis of hours uo r ked in June 1967 for sala -ry 
wor k regla c in g incentive work 
T. 
u. 
(H-U) v. 
(V/H) w. 
(U+I) x. 
(J- X) Y. 
z . 
Average percent performance by salary employees 
= 100% (es t imated) 
Effect ive p r od u ctive h ou r s by salary emp l oyees 
= 1,919, 219 
Less effe c tive hours worked b y sa l ary emp l oyees 
= 571, 726 
Percent l ess effec t ive hours worked by sa la ry 
empl o ye es ""' 22% 
Total effective hour s worked = 3,759 , 579 
Decrease in t o tal effective hours worked 
671,726 
Percent decrease in total e ff ect ive hours 
work ed = 15 % 
Proj ected a n a l ys i s of hours worked in J une 1~ 67 for a 
complete convers i on to salarv work 
I. Ave r age percent performan~e by sala r y employees 
= 10 0% (estimated) 
(C) II. 
(J) III. 
(C -J ) IV . 
(IV/III) V. 
(IVx VI. 
3. 28) 
(VIxl2) VII . 
Total effective hours worked by salary em-
pl o y ees= 4 , 750 , 542 
Total effective h ours wo r ked by incentive and 
non-in ce n tive employees= 4 , 431 , 305 
Increase in total effective hours + worked= 319, 237 
Per cent increas~ i n total effective hou r s 
worke d = . 07% 
Reduce d labcr cost for Ju n e 1 967 $1 , 047 , 097 
(using $3. 28 per hour) 
Project ed reduced lab o r cost for a yea r = 
$12,565,164 
+ the effec t iv e ~ours are n o t necessaril y p r oduc tive 
hour s, therefore, i t is possible a dec r ease i n productivity 
could result from the conversion. 
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7 . Employees ~ot eligible for g~aranteed an~ual sala ry 
we r e n o t d e d u ~ :: e d . Th e y a r e ex p e c t e-d t o p e r f o rm 
at t he norm of 1 00% - 105 % d~ e to the l u r e of 
i n creas ed secu r ity throu gh t~e event u a l elig ibilit y 
f o r the annual g u a r a nt ee . 
4. Temporary un emplo y me nt cost s 
The company presently incur s costs in this are a und e r 
t he SUB pl a n. What would be th e added cost if a gua rante ed 
income were provid ed t o emp l o ye es wit h five or mo r e y ea r s of 
se niority ? It is assumed for thi s cos t analysis that a 
limited liability fun d wou l d b e u se d to pay the guarante ed 
income . , The resu~t s of my analy si s a~e shown in Table 14 . 
It is concluded r egula r funding cos ts would rise one cent 
per employee p e r h our, or $53 2 , 405 p er year . 
5 . A general operating c o st analysis 
.-
Joh n De e re Des Moines Wo rk s looks at the cost p ictur e 
in r egard t o ince nt ives from a different vie wpoint (T abl e 15) . 
They fi g ure the incr eased cos t of operation i f incentives 
we r e n ot in force . On wo r k where incentives have not been 
se t , empl oyees are found to operate 60%*. On work where 
i ncentives ar e in fo r ce , th e wo rker operates a t 13 5 %. Thi s 
r ep r esents an increase of 75% due t o incentives . ' Their 
r easoning is that Lf an incentive system were not in f o r ce , 
production would decline . 
*This is an estimate for De s Moines Works only , ve r s u s 
t he Dee r e and Comp any estima t e for eight UAW nlants of 65% . 
Tabl e 1 4 . 
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CJst analysis - guaranteed ann ual ~~ l ary versus 
supplementa l un emp l oyme nt benefits 
1 966 r egular SUB costs for Deer e and Company ' s eight UAW 
pl ants* 
(B/A) 
(DxC) 
(6"2%xF) 
(G - C) 
A. 
B. 
c . 
D. 
E. 
F. 
c. 
H. 
Total nuwbe r emp l oyees receivin g 
r egular SUB payment 
Total company r egula r SUB payme nt s 
Average weekly company SUB pay -
ment s p e r emp loyee 
Average weeks of layoff ~e r em -
pl oyee (5 yrs. or mere se niority)+ 
Average total compa n y SUB pay-
ment p e r emp l oyee 
Avera ge weekly s tr aigh t time earn -
ings per emp. (w/o additives) 
Avera ge week ly unemployment paymen t 
p er em p. (company and s tate) 
Avera ge state weekly unemployffient 
payment pe r emp . 
= 
= 
4,544 
$183,518 
$40 . 39 
2 
$ 80.78 
$ 1 31. 20 
$81. 34 
$40 . 95 
Proj ected 19 66 guaranteed salary cos t s for eigh t Dee r e and 
Company UAW u lant s 
( F-G) I. Added weekly company payment p e r em p= $49 . 86 
(IxD) J. Add ed total company pa.yment per emp.= $99 . 72 
(AxJ) K. Added t otal company pdyments $532 . ~05 
L. Average number of wage emp l oyees 2 3 , 646 
(K/L) M. Added cost per employee = $22.52 
N. Averag e ho u rs wo r ked per emp l oyee 190 0 . 77 
( M[N2 o. Added cosc per hour per employee = $ . 01184 
+Th is fi gure is an es~ima t e provided by the company , its 
ac curacy i s affected by the lack of seniority records i n con-
nection wi th SUB pa yme nts a nd unreported inventory layoff . 
* . These are r egular SUB costs only, short work week cos t s 
are not i n c l uded becaus e oi i n ava il ab i lity of records on th e 
nu mb e r of emp l oyees r eceivi ng these p aymen t s and th e ave r age 
amount of payment l evelin g costs are not included because of 
their special natur e and co verag e under guaracceed mon t hly 
in come . 
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Tabl e 14. Continued . 
19 66 funding l eve l gu~ranteed salary ver sus SUB 8 
(Q-K) 
(Q-R/Q) 
(T+O ) 
p. 
Q. 
R. 
s . 
T. 
u. 
Percent increase over SUB payment 
due t o guaranteed salary 
Doll a r s left in fund with SUB+ 
Doll a r s left in f und with guaran-
salary 
Percent reduction in fund due to 
guarant-= ed salary 
Total cost per employee p er hour 
for SUB fund 
Total cost per employee per hour 
for . gu a r an t eed salary fund 
(appr oximate) 
108% 
= 2,353,138 
1,8 20 , 733 
= 23% 
$ . OS 
= $ . 06b 
aThe rati o of r egu lar to l eveling payments affects the 
fundin g level . 
bThis figure would be higher if short work weeks and 
guaranteed month l y income were considered but inavailability 
of information p l aced these costs beyond t he depth of this 
analysis. 
Table 15. 
Ar ea of 
Operation 
Machine 
main t enance 
Machines & 
eq uipment 
Dies & 
t ooling 
Buildings 
Pr oduction 
employe es 
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Added op eration co sts due to eliminat io n of wage 
i n centives - John Dee r e D e~ Moin~~ Works* 
Wage Incenti ve If no out - put 
in force in centiv2s 
Present cost Added % or Add e d 
or nu mber numb er ;) f cos t 
of empl o yees employees 
314 3 L $ 86 ,0 00 
$ "1 0 , 000,000 30% 3 , 000 , 000 
1,500 , 000 30% 450,000 
9,000,000 30% 2 , 700,000 
339 293 1,3 00 , 000 
Non - incentive 
emplo yees 392 150 
Factory 
su pervisors 140 23 161,000 
Tota l $ 7 , 697,00 0 * 
*Dollar figu r es are a r b~trary. Incre ased cost in the 
areas of operation should ~e conside r ed by the r e ader, how-
e ve r, dol l ar figur es for the ove rhead item s we re not 
a vai l able from Deere and Company . 
In order t o bring production up ~ o the i uce ntive level, 
additi onal operational requirem e nts and costs wo u ld be added. 
The t otal figure r epresen cs , t o them , the t o tal worth of the 
incenti ve system at Des Moines Wor ks . 
Employees a t John De ere Des Moines Wo r ks were on 
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incentiv e 78% of the time in 19 66 . Manag eme nt feels if they 
could increase this coverage 1 % by e limin a t i ng so me delay s , 
day work , and untim ed jobs and setups th e r es ulting savings 
would be $100,000 (Table 26). It can be c onc lud ed , from an 
economic standpoint, Des Moines Works i s strongly in favor 
of the incentive system . 
Th e key differenc e b e tween th e calculations in tables 
thirteen and fifteen lie s in t he employees ' pe rf o r ma nce 
with out output in c entives . Des Moines Works think s perf or -
mance would be at 6 0% just as it is now when inc e ntive 
emplo yees woTk at n o n-in ce ntive job s . Th e ot~e = viewpoint 
is that the atmosphere of the inc e ntive p ace wou ld remain 
and e mployees would perform at the expected 1 00% level o r a 
little higher . 
6 . Summary 
"Cost s " 
More un employmen t $ 
benefits (Table 1 4) 
More trained fac-
tory superviso rs 
Install proposed 
plan (Tab le 12) 
Overhead costs 
(Table 15) 
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Dol l a rs " Benefits " Dol l ars 
532 , 405 Low e r total labor 
cost (T able 13) 
$12 ,5 65 ,1 64 
?* More empl oyee sugges -
t ion s (Table 5) 
1,348,374 Fewe r ind. eng . 
(Tabl e 20) 
? Few e r g r ievances 
(Tab l e 6) 
? 
? 
? 
Lo wer manpower costs ? 
Admini st r ation costs 
savings (Ta ble 12) 3 ,5 95 , 664 
Total $1, 880 , 779 $16,16 0 , 828 
The probable r esult , in t he l o n g run, is t ha t po t ential 
"benefits" would o ut we i gh potential " cos t s" if the pr oposed 
guar an t eed annual sala r y we r e adopted by th e company . 
Dollar figur e difficul t t o determine. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
I n the fir s t ?art of th e th esis a prediction is made 
t hat , "The compa ny and the union will bargain collectively 
i n 1967 without undue co nfli c t • .. ". Many f ac tors have a 
bearing on th e accu r acy of thi s speculation . Th e fir ? t is, 
h ow far will ~he UAW push its demand for month l y and annu al 
gua r antees of in come? The e vid e n ce mi ght be r ef lected in 
t he UAW strik~ against Ford Moto r Company, and hence in 
t heory al l au tomo bil e ma nuf ac tur e r s , which began Sep t em b e r 7, 
1 967 . On e of the issues of thi s str ike, wh i ch ~uthorities 
predict will last at least a month, i s the eco n omic demand 
of monthl y and annu a l guara nt~es. Hovever , a str i ke over 
t his is s u e would a~pear sowewhat r idicu l ous since the union 
and its c hi ef bargainer and president, Wa lt er P. Reuther, 
have n ot r eally spell ed out this demacd in detail . This 
could mean the uni o n is n ot really se ri o u s about guaranteed 
salaries and is just u sing the ge n era l proposal as a handy 
strike issue . 
Mr . Re u the r and the UAW have much at stake in t he 
year ' s n ego tiat io n s. Mr. Reu th er ' s r ecent power struggle 
wi t h Mr . George Meany for cont rol of th e Ame ri can Fed e ration 
of Labor - Congress In dustr ial Organization (AFL - CIO) o r 
some Reuth e r created federat i o n of unions res t s on h ow wel l 
t he UAW fares i n n ego t ia t io n s this ye ar . Mr . Reut h e r re p r e-
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sents th e industrial union approach in which all workers in 
one factory or one industry belong to the sane union, regard -
le ss of the many different kinds of work t hey do . Mr. Meany 
repr esents the craft , or trad e union approach in which all 
worker s of on e craft are organiz ed into separ~te unions. If 
Mr. Reuther succeeds in attaining significant and r eco rd 
br eaking economic gains for industrial union worke rs, it 
could well mean th e downfall cf Mr . Meany ' s leadership of 
the Am e rica n labor movement and the ev~ntual doom of separ-
at e craft uni ons . 
However , Mr. Reuther has a more immediate problem t o 
cont end with . There are political probl ems within h is union 
that Mr . Reuther apparently hopes to r eso l ve at management's 
exp ense . The UAW is badly fragmented into power blocks; 
young workers who want more money , sk i l l ed ve terans who 
demand special boosts in income, o l der workers who want 
bigger pens io:is and 11 soc ia 1 r eformers 11 (including Mr . Reuther 
himself) who want income guarantees and cost-of -living 
escalators for pension payMen.ts. If all these segments are 
satisfied in 1967 n egotiations with autom ob ile and agri-
cultural machinery ma n ~fac turers, Mr. Reuther and the UAW 
will hav e sco r ed a victory. 
It is evident ti:.at some company or comp a nies are headed 
toward a collision coarse with th e UAW . It t..-ill not 
n ecessarily be John Deere . - Mr. Re~ther feels prospects are 
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fairly bright for both the automobile and agricultural 
machinery manufacturers and surmises they are ripe for a 
good package settlement. 
Apparently the automobile companies feel prospects are 
not bright enough to accept Mr. Reuther's pr oposed package 
of a $ .13 an hour income increase in the first year, a 
24% increase in pension benefits with escalators, an extra 
large boost in incomes for skilled workers, g uaranteed salary, 
and ~anadian income parity. Ford Motor Company wil l probably 
remain struck for a long period before accepting such demands 
for themselv es and the rest of the industry . 
There will probably be considerable pressure from the 
Administration to resolve negoti a tions in the a utomobile 
industry . If a strike results in a damaged economy, it may 
signal a rash of anti-union legislation. 
If the a utomobile strike is resolved b efore the 
October 1, 1967 Deere and Company contract deadline , it will 
probably mean a 5% per year total packag e inc r ease . In 
1964, most of the total package repres ented increases in 
benefits rather than wages . This year 3% to 4 % will most 
likely repr esent an increase in money income with another 
1% to 2% for a guara nt eed monthly and an nual income plan . 
Thus, a revoluti o nary, pace setting, and hi storic g uarant eed 
income plan would go to Mr. Reuther ' s a nd the UAW ' s credit . 
Since the automobile contract usually sets the pace for 
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agri cu lt~r a l machinery manufacturers , Dee r e and Company would 
prob a bly b e forced and wil lin g to also accept- such a pa ckage . 
The union wi ll b e forced to dr op its demand to elim inat e 
t he incentive syst em b ecause th ey could not sustai n a 
strike long e noug h to re solve t he is s ue. 
If , on th e other hanJ , the aut omob il e st ri ke is not 
resolve d by October 1, 1 967, a strike at John Dee~e · p r obably 
will be unavoidable (Contracts also expi r e at Int ernationa l 
Ha r vester and Cater p ill a r on Octobe r 1, 1967). An un settled 
auto mobil e strike wou l d mean the union is staying wit h its 
demand of a 6 % to 7 % total package in c r ease p e r yea r _which 
could not be much d ifferent fo r Dee r e a nd Company , I nt e r-
national Harvester u r Caterpillar . 
Union strategis ts probably will n ot cxtenft the farm 
implement manu f ac tur er con tract if t hey still l ack an auto -
mobile man u fac t urers settlemen t (although this is an 
alternative). The ba r ga ining wi th agricultura l machinery 
manuf ac turer s will th en be a r erun of the au tomoti ve ne go -
t iations . The target company in ag ri cu lt ural , industrial 
and construction machi nery n egotia ti ons will be Dee r e a nd 
Co mpany because o f its smal l e r size* (less dep letion o f 
st r ike fund) and r eputation for strong p r inciples . 
* In tern a ti onal Harvester employs 42 , 000 UAw workers. 
Ca t erpill a r emp l oys 25,000 UAW workers . Deere and Company 
emp l oys 20,650 workers. 
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With both Ford Motor Company and Deer e anu Com p an y on strike 
(approximate ly 180, 000 workers would b e idle ; not t o mention 
supplier s ' cut b acks) increased p r essure for a set tl ement 
from the administration would be inevitable. Econo mi c 
pre ssure on the un ion to pay s tri ke benef i ts would also 
cause a mo re immediate se ttl emen t. If so, this co uld mean 
an eventua l lowe r package increase (say 4%) than in the 
first situ a ti o n . 
From the above decision , it can be conc l uded th e first 
part of my the sis will be rejected if an autombile manu -
facturer' s agreement is not r eached by October 1, 1967, and 
will b e ac ce pt ed i f an au t omobile manufactu r er ' s ag r eemen t 
is reached by Octo~er 1 , 1967. Neithe r co~clusion would be 
correct, however , if the unio n sticks by its demand to 
abandon th e incentive system at J ohn Dee r e . 
Becaus e of centr ~lized bargaining with Dee r e and 
Compa ny, national union iss u es a~e st r essed with little 
consideration of l ocal union feelin gs . Since t he local 
unions seem to favor the inc~ntive sys t em , if such a strike 
did result, it would not be a popular s tr ike a t the local 
leve l and would ca u se disse nti on be t wee n the local unions 
and internatio n a l headqua rt ers . 
prec edi ng a lterna t ives. 
T ab l e 16 summerizes the 
Now to consider the seco n d prediction, '' ... . t ha t th e 
r esu lting new agr eement will adop t a limi:ed l iabil ity 
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Tabl e 16 . Summary of automobile nego t iation effects on 
Deere and Company negotiation resuits 
Deere a nd Company r esults 
Automoti ve GAS a GAS 5 %/ yr. 
ne got iat ion w/I NCb w/ o INC inc r . 
effe c t s w/ INC 
End Oct. 1 Stri ke S tri ke No 
5%/yr. increase Strike 
w/o GAS 
End Oct. 1 No Strike No 
w/GA S Strike Strike 
Ford st ri ke Strikec S tr ike No 
still on Strike 
after Oct . 1 
a 
GAS = Guar anteed annua l salary 
bIN C = Standard hour incentive plan 
Al t er n acive Compa ny 
r esults 
Cater- In te rna t . 
pilla r Harvester 
No No 
Strike Strike 
No No 
St ri.ke Strike 
No No 
S tr iked Strike 
CAn alt e rn a tiv e theory is that the UAW will extend the 
Deere and Co~pany contr ac t to k2ep members working so they 
can cont ribute $ 5 . 0J per week to thos e o n strika . 
· dAn other a lt ernative is that Caterpillar or Internation -
al Harves t e r wil l be chosen as the company to s t rike. 
guaranteed annual incom2 or sa l a r y because of inherent 
ad va nt ages and abandon the .s t anda r d hour inc~ntive plan 
b e c aus e of inherent disadvantages . " 
Not consid e r ing the inher e nt values of gu ar•nteed 
. 
sal a ri es vers u s wage ince n tives , John Dee r e wil l accept 
guaranteed income if the automobi l e companies do before 
Octob e r 1, 1967, but will i n sis t th at p r e se nt standard hoar 
incenti ves b e built i n to s u c h a plan. Th e guaran.ceed 
annu al sa lary ca n be wo r ked o uc b e t ween che company and th e 
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u nion staying close to what wa s pres en ted as the union demand 
( Chap ter III B) . There would probably be some contract 
l a nguage difficulties involved in incorpor a ting guaranteed 
salaries and standard hour incentives. If th e incentive 
system remains , the union will demand that some changes be 
made. The worker will no longer be able to collect average 
ea rn ings in certain situat ions, ther e for e , some other 
differential will have to be re so lved . The union will 
question conditions under which standa~ds may be recalcu-
, 
l ated. They are also unhappy with fatigue elements in 
standa r ds and some changes will no dou bt be asked. 
If no settlement is r eac hed by Octo~er 1, 1967 the guar -
anteed income plan could we ll b e missing fr om any r esulting 
automobil e or agriculture nachin ery company agreeme nts 
with the ryAw (Table 1 6) . 
If the guarantee were not adopted it would p~obably 
mean increasing tte present SUB and short wo ~k week benefits. 
The short wo r k week b e nefit would be increased to approxi -
mat~ l y 80 % of straight tim e p~y for both schedu led and un -
l 
scheduled short work weeks . SUB payments, when ~dded to 
unemploym ent compensatio~, would most likely remain at the 
same 62 % of normal weekly pay plus $1.50 for each dep~ndent. 
Bu t , the maximum company paid week ly benefit would probably 
i n c r ease to $70 . 
It h as been established that the company will not 
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abandon th e standard hour incentive plan. Whether t he com -
pany feels it has more advantages than salaries or that it 
is simply a rationalized t r adition is not clear . It is 
evident that the company and th e l oca l work e rs like the 
present plan and will not abandon it this year without a 
long strike i~posed by the national union. The company and 
the union should objectively review th e inh e rent advantages 
and disadvantages of each p l an . The r esulting conclusion 
should b e that guaranteed salaries, i n the long run, could 
result in potential ben e fits greater t han ex pected "cost s ". 
An agreement between the company and t ~e union in 197~ to 
install salaries for non-incentive wage e arners and skilled 
wor kers is prob a ble . Aft e r non-incenti ve wa~e earners have 
achieved salary status, the re v i ew of salary v ersus incen-
tive, rec ommended above , could b e accomplished by utilizing 
experience rather than opin i on . 
Incentives may be f easible from an industria l engineer -
ing point of view, but they are not as nece ssa ry or desir-
abl_e as the company believes . Such fa c t ors as _.Plant cha r-
acteristi cs , paced te c hnolo gy , man agement emphasis on 
effi ciency, weak or cooperative unions exert a far greate~ 
influence on employe e e ffort than do wa ge incentives . 
The company c lings to the ince n tive sys tem b eca use: 
1 . It retain s a cercain amount of pu!l on production . 
2. Supervision do e5 not have t o continuall y exhort 
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employees to a chieve output. 
3 . Increa se d performance is di fferent befo r e and after an 
op eration is pla ced on i n cent ives . 
4. Employee s h ave become acc u s t omed to in cen ti ves as a 
ri ght rathe r th a n a privilege. 
Fr om an industri a l e n gi n e eri ng po int of view , in centives 
are endorsed because most ind u st ri a l engineers ass ume t ha t 
with out them , their function would b e de - emphas i zed . But 
s alaries would all ow more time fo r ''true" i n dustrial en-
gineerin g fu n ction s t o be pe r fo r med. 
Employe2 s lik e t he fr eedom of incentives. Transferring 
from a job p a id on an hourly basis t o o n e paid on an ou tput 
basis is norma lly co n sidered a prom o ti on bec8use lt means 
indep endence and usually higher earnings. Salaries , howeve r, 
would pro v ide eve n g r ea ter status and independence . 
The ass um ptio n (incentives increase output 2 0% - 3 57.) 
which o riginally l ed to the inst al l a ti on of incentives was 
validat e d b ecause of the presence of inc e nt ives , b ut n ot in 
the mann e r o riginally con t emplated . In effect, manageme nt 
u s e d in c e n t i v e s t o a c h i e v e " n. o rm a 1 " e f f o r t and in t h e 
proc ess , t o avoid th e exhortatio~ n ecessary with salaries . 
For mal abandonment of incentives does not eliminate 
in ce nt ive thinkin g and conditioning which has bee n ingrained 
i nto the o r ganizati on fabric . In th e short run, conve rsi on 
would be difficult and perhaps not worth the cos t an d head -
a ches . In t he long r un , however, the policy choice of 
16 0 
abandonm ent of the incentive system becomes a more meaningful 
alternativ e . John Deere ' s biggest que stio n is; "Will sala-
r ies give us the same efficient production as wage incentives 
do n ow? 
The answer is; although wage in cen tiv es are the most 
common positive method of mo tivation, guaranteed salaries 
with good supervisi on can more closely fulfill the five 
hum an d esi r es which should be satisfied to ge nerat e equal 
or higher productivit y . They are: 
1. Employees want to belong to a team. 
2. Employees want an opportunity to take part in wha t they 
think is an imp ~rtd~t e nter pris ~ . 
3. Ereploy ees want t~ ass o ciate with people whom th ey 
consid er important. 
4. Employee s want an opport un ity t o increase their 
prestige and i mpor t an ~ e while havin g th a t g ain matched 
by additions t o th~ir income . 
S . Employees want to be able to d o something to p r event 
arbitrar y and unpleasant changes in the continuity of 
their employment, income , and socia l prestige (37 , p . 2) 
The p otential exists and can be met t hrou g h effec tive 
plann ing, prediction, and support by both th e co~p~ny and 
the u n ion . 
The more general policy question , in c~ ntives or salarie s 
cannot be answered in the abstract, but only in opera t i n g 
charact e ri s tic s; those characteristics inher e nt in each 
system and those dep e nd ent upon the context of conditions 
encountered. 
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X. POT ENTIAL MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS 
A program to put firms and industries und~r guaranteed 
annual salary may start out with short steps , but this fact 
does n ot relieve us from the n ecess ity of considering what the 
cumulative effects may be of programming toward a widening 
coverage of guaranteed salaries . 
A. Manpower 
The inf erence that the lowered rate of turnover will 
re s ult in a drop in the mobility of l abor to a point which 
wo u ld become dangerously inflexible is unwarranted . An em-
player wl10 guarantees salaries will immediately eliminate any 
1 ab or res e r v e , nu r r:. a 11 y u nde r em p 1 o y e d , w hi ch h e r.. a y have main -
tained for peak periods or emergencies . This would be an 
economic, as we ll as a social gain . Elimination of l abor ce-
serves has a one-time effec t. Low turnover has both a fairly 
imm ed i ate and a permanent long-ran ge effect . A pe r manently 
low e r ed turnover will become dangerous only if there are 
groups of pe r sons receiving ~ay for idle time while there are 
' employees looking for work with unfilled suitable jobs avail -
able. Much of lab or mob~lity is unnecessary and excessive , 
and red~cti ons in mobility are to be looked upon as beneficial 
r at h e r than otherwise (2J) . 
Undu e r estrictions on the mobility of labor relate s n o t 
on l y t o t rans fer s b e tween e_m p 1 o y e r s but a 1 s o t o ch an g es in 
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" jobs without changing employers . The effect of salary 
guarantees i s likely to incredse the flexibility of the work 
force and to break down barriers that unions have up to now 
dee~ed necessa~y to erect for th e protection of their members . 
A guaranteed salary can be best applied when it is least 
needed; and when it is most needed, it can be least applied . 
This is th e tragedy of g uaranteed sa l aries . Highly skilled 
worker s , key workers , maintenance men , and those with high 
seniority ranking often do not need t~e guarantee ; but it is 
easiest to give it to them. Young worker s , n ew entrants into 
-a trade, less ski lled , and the whole ~ost of marginal workers 
are in need of the guarantee , but it is dif f icult and oft~n 
impossible to extend it to them. I &d~stries ~here demand is 
stable or exp a ndin g , predictable and protecte d , where labor 
costs form a small proportion of t o tal costs , where labor 
relati ons a r e cordial - and top managem~nt interested can most 
easily afford the guarantee . But in industries wi th revers e 
conditions, stabilization is difficu lt for much of the time 
and many of t he employees . 
Guaranteed salaries may make a real ~on tribution toward 
increasin g securit y in a hi gh employment economy , when prope~-
ly integrated with other ful l e~ployment measures . Du rin g 
high employm e nt, indi v idu al firm s and industries with unstable 
employment saddle the comm unity with " social costs " which 
they should bear themselves. These enterp r ises a ttract 
• 
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workers who must finan ce th e ir un emp loyment t hemse l ves or be 
support e d by the commu n i ty . I t seems on l y f~ir th a t consume r s 
with u ns t ab le pur chase habits ( whe re applicable) should bear 
th e cost of such idieness throu gh extra charges and t h e em-
ployers should d ev i se means of redu c in g th ese e rratic , and 
secular fluctu atior.s . 
The stipulated integration of une mp l oymen t compensati on 
funds with the annual sala ry commi tm e nt, so that the em-
ployer ' s g u ~rant ee wou l d supp le ment soc i al secu r i t y payments , 
would introcuce a confl i c t of objectives . Un employment com-
pe nsation r ~p res ents o ur commo n responsbility t o be a r th e 
soc i al cost of una,,oldab l e layoffs . It r equi r es that eligib l e 
beneficia r ies seek o ther s uitable employment anJ accept it 
when of f e r e Ci • It aids the r emova l of the employees f r om the 
business sit uati on t hat cannot suppor t him. Fhen these pay-
ment s are included as pa rt of the gua r antee paynent , tha t 
would mean a public cont ri b uti on to c a rr y o u t a priva~e con-
t r act b etween employ e r a n d employee . I n effect , it would 
bring un employment compensa t ion up t o 100% of full time ea rn-
in gs wh~le the emp l oyee was attached t o t he payro ll: It 
would , in th e case of ex~ended layoff , leave che empl0yee 
with o ut a n y un emp l oyment compensation benefits on whi c h t o 
fall back on when his annua l guarantee ended. I do n ot have e. 
pat solution . However , th e gove rn ment compensa tio n pr ogram as 
a ba ckstop for t~e wo rk e r seek in g emp loyment , should n o t b e 
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confused wi th t erms of employment worked ou t b ~tween the 
employe e and th e employer. 
A national employment pro gram directed toward full 
employment, irrespective of the degree of government partici -
pation, can be successful to th e extent that it opens new job 
opportunities . In that respect the driv e toward full employ -
ment would be inconsistent with the widespr2ad guar? ntee of 
the status quo in employ e r-employee relationships . The 
achievement of the latt er could well involve the enlistment 
of government in the role of supporting specific industries 
and individuals ra ther than expanding total emp l oyment oppor -
tunit y . 
B . Inflati on 
A majo r critici sm of the g u a r anteed annual inco me is the 
strong possibility cf its inflationary effe~t . Whatever for m 
of funding a c ompany uses to provide the mon2y to guarantee 
its work ers ' income, it would be g r eater than cur r ent SUB 
contributi ons . An increase would probably add to product 
cost , thus erasing to a degree the increased purchasing power 
b e i .n g r e 1 e as e d on th e e c on om y . 
Another infl a tionary factor is the inherent tendency of 
our free ma rket to raise its price in order to capture every 
possible dollar of predictive or assured incom2 in the economy . 
This force would help the cost of living continue its upward 
movement, forcing workers in other industries to seek wage 
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and b enefit increzse s compa r ab l e to tho s e proposed by the 
UAW. If inflat ion arose this would add to the reasons for 
government to raise federal taxes or trim domes t ic spending . 
C. Guaranteed Annu al Profit 
The idea of a guaranteed annual income for production 
worker s i s not th eoretically reconcilable with the b~sic con -
cep t of a free market in a free society . Labor is considered 
by managemen t to be a variable cost . The United States 
eco n omy is a wan t economy . Most of t1 e basic needs for a 
large segment of our employe d population are avai l able with 
a n excess of disposable income used t o buy the " want" 
products - better furniture , automobiles, clothEs , homes , 
television s - and other nume r o u s " want " products for comfort , 
pleasure , or status . This i s in direct contrast to underde-
veloped coun tr ies , wh ic h have a " ne ed" econ0my . In many 
of th ese coun tr ies the basic need i s food . Much of the effort 
of th e wo r ker is ne~e ssari ly directed towards the product i on 
of food, and there is a pr e dictive market for it . All that 
i s produced will be sold or utilized . 
th e food are assured jobs and income . 
The workers who produce 
Our " want " economy , has no guarantee tha': all of its pro -
ducts wi ll be sold and that th e p r oducing com~anies will be 
guaranteed a profit. Individu a l companies compete in the free 
market presumably t o maximize profits . Guaranteed annual 
inco me could stifle p~oduc t innova t ion since most manufacturers 
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canno t afford long work stoppages for ret oolin~: Some fi r ms 
would be forced to add or drop products from ·their lines in 
order to smooth out seasona l variations . It could also make 
fir ms seek techfiiqu es for stabilizin g production and sales a 
prerequisite . 
But an industry or company cannot n ecessar ily apply its 
techno lo gica l planning abilities to spread the wo r k over a 
year . Some improvements have been made , for example at John 
Deere (Table 17). The fact remains that manufacturers wil l 
produce and sell only as much as the market will buy . When 
sale s slump , just as mater ial s that go int o products are no 
longer re quired , nei ther i s lab o r . It is unfortunate t ha t 
this causes ha r dship o n the worker and the ec o~omy . 
Compani es and their stockholders and salaried personnel 
also undergo financial strain during long unproductive 
p ~riods when their produc::.s are not "want ed '' by the free ma r-
ket. Profits that might normally go into improving products 
or p rocesses become non-existent. Stockholders , many of them 
employ ees , see the value of their equity go d ow~ . The his -
tory of co r pora t e success is filled with stories of companies 
who se p r o ducts became " unwanted " · in the free mar~et for one 
re ason or a n other and thus had to close down forever . Even 
in our present high level of prosperity mo r e tha~ one lar ge 
corporation is having difficulties. The picture with respect 
to the hourly worker who "su ffe r s " and the corporation "which 
167 
does no t " is not as o n e - sided as union s cl aim . 
The p ro ducer or s eller has only limited .freedom of 
choice. In most in stances fr eedom belongs to the buye r. I n 
our free economy , governmen t do es not contro l his wants . He 
is fre e t o bu y whate ve r he " wants ", wh eneve r he want s it. A 
guarante e d income for a large segment of th e e conomy is 
pos sib l e o nly when the buying habits of peop le can be t hor -
oughly and predictably con trolle d . This is undesirab l e 
because i t wo uld r equire co ntro llin g most other segmen ts of 
our econ omy a n d so cia l structu re . 
D. Other Guarantees 
One f ina l a s p ect 0f t he proposed guaranteed annual 
income is that it app ro aches t he developin g t he o ry amon g a 
number o f econo mis ts a nd social scientis t s t ha t income s ho ul d 
be separate d from work. This t heory is b asic t o t he id ea of 
~ national guaranteed inc ome o r a n egative inco me tax pro -
posal which wou ld p r ovide a guar a nteed in come to those 
persons who cannot earn a minimu m ex ist ence . 
Such group s as the Pr es id en t' s Com mission on Techn o lo gy , 
Aut·omation , and Ec onomic Freedom ; t he Co un ci l o f Economic 
Advisers; and the 'ilhite House Conference "T o ?ulfill These 
Ri gh ts," he.ve already studied ve r sions of the s e g u a r <e ntees . 
1. Negative incom e t ax 
The mos t fam ous proponen t of ne gat iv ~ income ta x is 
Profess o r Mil t on Frie iruan of t he Universit y of Chicago . An 
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exampl e of th e negative income tax will best express the 
idea . 
Under current income tax brackets , a family with two 
children has deducti o ns and exemption s of $3000 , call this th~ 
" b r eak even " point . A family with $4000 inc ome would pay only 
$1000 , the amount above the " break even " point. A fa mi ly with 
only $2000 income wo uld pay no tax . It would have ·a "negative 
i ncome " and government funds would be paid to them at a neg -
a t ive rate of 50 per cent. That f amily would receive $500 (S~ 
p er cent of the amount r eq uired to meet the " break even " 
p oin t ) . 
2 . National guarante~J income 
Robert Theobal ~ cla~ms t echnology will eve~ tually lead tc 
fewer jobs with fewer people having the capabilities for doing 
t hem . He th inks the need for a nationa l gua r anteed income 
~ecome s appa r e nt since every citizen has the ri gh t to an in-
come fr om the Fed e ra l Government sufficient t~ live with dig -
nity (43) . 
Mr . Th eobald's theory about a h i gh l y automated economy 
k ii ling jobs has not yet proved true . After many years of i n -
t ense automation, emp lc y ~en t i s s till rising , and there are 
many shorta ges among ski lled labor groups although his theory 
might some day prove itself . 
It is c l ai mP-d that much of the national guaranteed income 
could be paid for by doing away with ~elfare spending and per -
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mitting social workers t o mo~e profitab ly use their time 
counseling and educating inst ead of on paperwork . 
Ther e is , of course , much opposition t o th e i dea of a 
n ational guaranteed income. First comes the th ough t of 
the tremendous power over our lives that the Federal Govern -
ment wou ld hold . Unless the national guaranteed income plan 
became a Constitutional right, finagling by individuals in the 
government could coerce its intent and give them che power of 
tyrant s. 
There is the qu es tion of the plan ' s morality . It contra -
d:i,cts tradit ional American feeling against " getting something 
for nothing". The value · system of western rnan has for cen -
turi es associated work with income . Ca~ a right to income 
without wcrk be adopted witho ut d eep cleav a ges in our society? 
It is plain th at the full-b l own versions of national 
guarante~d income for everybody would destroy t he value of 
personal responsibility. Some of the proponents say exactly 
as much: Personal responsibility is a thin g of the past ; the 
only responsibility is of the society to the members. The 
i mP.lications of that, in a world already abundant l y supplied 
with irresponsible pers0ns of all ages is something to think 
about . 
E . The Outloo k 
Th e time may be near to end an invid io u s distinction 
which has denied workers in th e United States a sense of full 
part icipation in the social enterprise . What once may have 
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be en difficult is t oday more manageable . In ·i h e em e r gin g 
economy , the majority of worke r s are in service and white -
collar jobs, and th e · relative numb e r of blue- c~llar workers is 
declinin g . In the changing nature of work , it is more and more 
difficult to measure the contribution of the single worker in 
the productive process , and the concept of "the piece " or "the 
h our" loses meaning where work is a team affair and production 
processes are continuous . 
The est a blished differences in the treatment of the two 
groups have adverse ly influenced the willingness of many wage 
earners to approach the idea of change with an open mind . The 
proposal to put all worke r s on a weekly , mo nthl y or annual 
sa l ary - with its implicatio n s af greater continuity of employ-
ment, closer equalization of f ring e benefits, and abolition of 
divisive class distinctions within the e~terp ri c e - i s worthy 
of the most ca r eful consideration by employers and u nions . 
Among other things, such a seep would ten d to br e ak down 
barriers between present gro up s of salary and wage earners on 
issues of mutual concern and make possibl e a more fruitful 
collaboration . 
To say that these are matte r s of public ?Olicy does not 
mean that they are , therefore , ma tters for legislative or 
governmental action (although i~ some ins tances legislative 
policy ma y stand in th e way of certain actions) . The reorgan-
ization of work and the single standard of pay are questions 
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whi ch devolve on industry and labor , and are a legitimate 
subject for collective bar ga ining . All such ·improvements 
r equire g i ve - and -take en both sides. 
To dec l a r e t hese matters of public policy is , however , to 
de c l a r e t hem ma t ters of community conscience , requ ir ing the 
es t ablishment of public standards by which we can judge ou r-
selves . There is another and large r implication . Fo r if such 
a s t ep i s taken , it would demonstrate to all other countries 
that t he American way can give a new meaning and substan ce to 
t ha t anc i ent ph r ase , " the digni t y of work " . It would indeed 
b e a l andmark in the history of work and of civilized society . 
Obj ective students of economics generally seem to agree 
that economic fluctu at ions and general economic ~nstability 
wo ul d not be overco~e with a private guarantee of salaries and 
that i t would not achieve the macroe~o~omi~ objectives sought 
b y i t s proponents . However , a growing nation is marked by 
confidence in the ability of its individual s t o create oppor -
tunit ies for expanding output and improving economic levels . 
What g u a r anteed sala r i es see~ _ mainly to protect is the freedom 
of o pp o r tunity t o make the most of one ' s abilities . The 
e mphasis on i nsurance of status develops 
. 
as con fidenc e in the 
rewa r ds of individual en terprise g~ves way to ~h e fea r that 
th e r e may not be en o ugh to go around , unless the shares in 
total prod u ct are rationed . The gene r al guarantee of salaries 
impl ies t he ge n e~al acceptance of fixed placements in a 
17 2 
r egu l ated economy . A basic decision to be made before wide -
spread income guarantees are adopted conc e rns the kind of 
economic discipline we are prepared to accept in o r de r t o en-
sure existing pay rolls. 
17 3 
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Data and calculations for regr ession and correlation 
Data* 
Year Wage 
x 
19 58 15 . 5 
1959 18.7 
1960 1 6 . 6 
19 61 1 7 . 2 
19 62 14.9 
1 963 17. 9 
1 964 20 . 4 
1965 21. 5 
1966 2 3. 7 
Calcula tio ns 
n = 9 
~ x = 166.4 
x = 18 . 49 
{ x2 = 3143.8 6 
(~x)2/n = 3076 . 55 
!x2 = 67 .31 
i XY = 8.37.26 
Salary 
y 
4.0 
4 . 4 
4. 7 
4 . 8 
4 . 7 
5 . 0 
5 . 3 
5 . 7 
6.0 
(~ X) (~Y) /n .., 824. 60 
! xy = 1 2 . 66 
x2 y2 
240.25 16 . 00 
349. 6 9 19.3 6 
275.56 22.09 
295 . 84 23.04 
222.01 22.09 
320. 41 25 . 00 
416.16 28 . 09 
462.25 32 . 49 
561. 69 36.00 
~y = 44 . 6 
? = 4 . 96 
~ y2 = 224 . 16 
( i Y)2/n = 22 1.11 
~ y2 = 3 .05 
b1 = ~xy/~x2 = 12 . 66/67 . 31 = . 18 
~o = 4 . 96 - . 18 (18 . 49) = 1 . 63 
Y = 1.63 + .1 8X 
r = f~ x~) 2 (12 .6 6 )2 
((:<) (! y2) = 6 7.31 . 3 . 05 = 
*Fr om Table 16 . 
160 . 28 
205 . 30 = . 7 8 
analysis 
XY 
62 . 00 
82.28 
78.02 
82 . 5 0 
70.03 
89 . 50 
1 08 . 12 
122 . 55 
142 . 20 
180 
Simpl e linear re gr ~ s s i on ana l ysis and correlatio n analy s i s 
of sal a r y -wag e em?loym e nt va r ia t ions fer DeeT e and Com pany ' s 
eight UAW plan ts 
10 
Y Sal a ry Emplo yment 
Thous ands 
----Q 
5 
0 
1 9 6 2 ° Q _..0- ._..--_..-- . 
--------------- " y -· 1 . 6 3 + . 1 8 x --
1-T--r - 1---r--·1-·~111--r---1 · - ,-T .. ·r 
5 10 15 
-__..- .. -- . 
20 
Wage Em ployment 
Thousand s 
Anal ysis of va r iance 
Sou r ce of Degrees of 
var ia tio n freedom 
- ---
Due to b o 1 
----
Du e t o b1/bo 1 
Sum of 
squares 
221.11 
D
-
e an 
___'.:!_ _u a r e 
221 . 11 
'2.28 ~ 2 . 28 
i dL;al 7 . 7 7 I . 096 
·- - - [ -·- · -·-----1 
al _ _ _ L_~9 ___ _,__2_2_4_ ._1 __ 6 _ ....... _____ _ 
r = 0 Salary employme nt. doesn ' t var y with uage e mplo yme n t . 
r ) 0 Sa la r y employment does vary wi t h wage e~ploymen t . . 
r = . 7 8 (act u a 1 val 1! e o f r) 
r = + l One variable is capable of explaining n ea rl y all t he 
variation in the othe r. 
v 
4 \.-
I I 
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XIV. APPENDIX II 
Table 17. Number of wage-salary employees - Deer e and 
Company's eight UAW plants, 1957 - 1966 
No. of Em-
ployees Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. 
1956 -1957 
Wage 17,791 17,873 18,050 . 18,173 17,924 
Salary 1,182 1,178 1,177 1,174 1,177 
Total 18,973 19,051 19,227 19,347 19,101 
1957-1958 
Wage 14,017 14,451 14,837 14,972 15,371 
Salary 3,835 3,892 3,904 3,939 3,943 
Total 17,852 18,343 18,741 18,911 19,314 
1958-1959 
Wage 16,828 17,444 18~662 19,398 19,712 
Salary 4,163 4,222 4,257 4,291 4,355 
Total 20,991 21,666 22,919 23,689 24,067 
1252-1260 
Wage 16,480 15,405 15,596 14,995 14,643 
Salary 4,621 !f,639 4,628 4,677 4,651 
Total 21,101 20.044 20,224 19,672 19,294 
1960 -1961 
Wage 19,990 20,168 20,276 19,652 18,628 
Salary 4,840 4,867 4,869 4,864 4,855 
Total 24,830 25,035 25,145 24,516 2 3, Lf 8 3 
1261-1962 
Wage 12,964 13,691 14,572 14,971 15,076 
Salary 4,626 4,606 4,621 4,610 4,601 
Total 17,590 18,297 19,193 19,581 19,677 
1262-1263 
Wage 15,751 17,128 18,101 18,900 19,061 
Salary 4,703 4,756 4,813 4,869 4,913 
Total 20,454 21,884 22,914 23,769 23,974 
1963-1964 
Wage 18,382 19,804 20,728 21,045 20,942 
Salary 5,067 5,151 5,169 5,208 5,227 
Total 23,449 24,955 25,897 26,253 26,169 
1964-1965 
Wage 20,289 20,732 21,438 22,074 22,253 
Salary 5,490 5,534 5,580 5,p27 5,665 
Total 25,779 26,266 27,018 27,701 27,918 
1265-1266 
Wage 22,018 22,582 23,307 23,741 23,813 
Salary 5,655 5,703 5,757 5,826 5,868 
Total 272673 282285 292064 292567 292681 
% of ·total 
salary 1966 20 .4 20.2 19.8 19.7 19.8 
wage 1966 7 9. 6 79.8 80.2 80.3 80.2 
Wage/salary 
ratio 1966 3.9 4.0 4.1 4. 1 4.1 
Apr. 
17,317 
1,165 
18,482 
15,987 
3,966 
19,953 
19,662 
4,395 
24,057 
14,674 
4,653 
19,327 
18,050 
4,842 
22,892 
15,095 
4,602 
19,697 
18,856 
4,944 
23,800 
20,785 
5,244 
26,029 
21,747 
5,671 
27,418 
23,825 
5,895 
292720 
19.8 
80 . 
4. ( 
183 
May June July Aug. 
16,392 16,342 16,146 16,201 
1,146 1,157 1,146 1,144 
17,538 17,499 17,292 17,345 
16,089 
16,089 16,229 15,844 16,127 
3,982 4,127 4,140 4,153 
20,071 20,356 19,984 20,280 
19,504 19,691 18,787 18,673 
4,434 4,609 4,646 4,658 
23,938 24,300 23,433 23,331 
15,125 16,754 18,021 1.8,965 
4,645 4,774 4,807 4,821 
19,770 21,528 22,828 23,786 
17,398 16,364 14,589 13,770 
4,802 4,922 4,900 4,838 
22,200 21,286 19,489 18,608 
.. 
'15,283 15,746 15,627 15,618 
4,620 4,758 4,766 4,756 
19,903 20,504 20,393 20,374 
18,083 17,970 17,786 17,725 
4,964 5,137 5,135 5,122 
23,047 23,107 22,921 22,847 
20,759 20,963 20,634 20,528 
5,252 5,527 5,558 5,569 
26,011 26,490 26,192 26,097 
21,296 21,601 21,802 21,849 
5,658 5,787 5,809 5,807 
26,954 27,388 27,611 27,656 
23,854 24,388 23,577 24,126 
5,934 6,406 6,448 6,419 
29,788 30,794 30,025 30,545 
19.9 20.8 21. 5 21. 0 
80.1 79.2 78.5 79.0 
4.0 3.8 3. 7 3. 8 
Sept. Oct. 
16,050 12,789 
1,136 3,841 
17,186 16,630 
i6,032 15, 391 
4,085 4,112 
20,117 19,503 
18,464 17,644 
4,595 4,593 
23,059 22,237 
19,593 19,203 
4,764 4,809 
24,357 24,012 
13,830 13,147 
4,693 4,655 
18,523 17,802 
15,495 14,905 
4,683 4,692 
20,178 19,642 
18,052 17,577 
4,999 5,035 
23,051 22,612 
20,346 19,816 
5,408 5,442 
25,754 25,258 
21,315 21,579 
5,617 5,625 
26,932 27,204 
24,124 24,403 
6,173 6,222 
30,297 30,625 
20.4 20.3 
79.6 79. 7 
3. 9 3. 9 
Average 
and wage/ 
salary ratio 
16,087 
1,385 
11. 6 
15,446 
4,006 
3. 9 
18,706 
4,435 
4.2 
16,621 
4,707 
3.5 
17,155 
4,829 
3. 6 
14,924 
4,662 
3.2 
17,915 
4,949 
3. 6 
20,394 
5,319 
3.8 
. 21,498 
5,656 
3.8 
23,646 
6,026 
3. 9 
Table 18. Wee k ly - salary earnings a ·1d benefits - Deere 
and Co mpany's eight UAW plants, 1~57-196 6 
Earnings and B~nefits 
Total h ours worked 
Aver . hours worked/emp . 
Reg . straight -time ea~n. 
Aver. straight-time hourl y earn. 
Year end bonus 
Supp . workmen's ace.* comp. 
Workm en ' s acc. comp. 
Health & acc . ins . 
Pension 
Grouplife - non contrib. 
Gr ouplife - contrib. 
Supp. unemp. - contrib. 
i. emp . benefits to total pay roll 
Wages in lieu of sua 
'veekly 
27,165,287 
1,688 . 65 
$63,742 , 195 
2 . 35 
1,130,070 
N. A. 
458,485 
1,208,770 
3,397,462 
560,613 
1,211,41)9 
11. 6% 
234,988 
___ Weekly 
Total hours wo r ked 31,634,464 
Aver . hours wo r ked/emp. 1,9)3 . 28 
Reg . straight-time earn. $80,423,396 
Aver . straight - time hourly earn. 2.54 
Year end bonus 771,4 64 
Supp . workmen's acc. comp . N.A. 
Workmen's acc . comp. 718,51 4 
Health & acc. ins. 2,167,476 
Pension 6,021 , 973 
Grouplife - non contrib. 775,939 
Grouplife - contrib. 
S u pp . un emp. - contrib. 
% emp. benefits to total payroll 
Wages in lie u of SUB 
* acc . accident 
1,403,512 
14 . 3% 
282,300 
1"95 7 
Salary 
$23,927,544 
1 960 
1,226,767 
39 , 880 
271,727 
1,709,673 
187 , 884 
121,302 
11.1 % 
Salary 
$34,393, 084 
807,057 
52,171 
512,577 
2,787,911 
286,647 
164,794 
13.1% 
1 85 
195 8 1 959 
Weekly Salary Week'-Y Salary 
29,248,579 35 ,6 61 ,567 
1 ,893.60 1 , 906.42 
$72,100 , 992 $27 , 54 1, 040 $90 , 302 ,2 12 $31 ,70 8 , 616 
2 . 4 7 2. 5 3 
1,4 83 , 905 1,780 , 307 2,035 , 711 2 , 333,157 
N.A. N. A. 
53 3 , 415 45 ,1 58 650,613 57,039 
1,869,738 409 , 588 1,933,926 392,691 
4,218,754 2,072,300 5,277,690 2,506 , 570 
629 , 141 208,194 503,643 163,795 
1 38,889 155,136 
1 , 286,458 1, 376,498 
12. 2% 11 .1 % 11. J % 11. 5% 
266 , 680 265,064 
1961 1 962 
Weekly Salary Weekl_y__ Salary 
32,250 , 844 27 , 624. 774 
1, 879 . 97 .. 1, 851.03 
$86 , 875,204 $36 ' 562 ,116 $79,027, 220 $37,044,188 
2.69 2 .8 6 
1,194,320 1,362 , 518 1,144,338 1,587,868 
N. A. 39 , 565 
654,771 92,065 539 , 373 59,465 
2,750,219 636 , 510 3 , 885,264 1 , 144,477 
5,626,905 2 , 852,875 5,763,912 2 , 885 , 990 
852,475 310 , 059 671,813 269 , 643 
1 83,167 186 , 338 
870,999 1, 406,263 
13 . 7% 13 . 5% 17.0% 15.i% 
244,189 
1 86 
Tabl e 18. Continued 
1963 1964 
We ekly Salary We ek Jy Salarv 
33,922,218 40,05 2 ,121 
1,893.51 1,9 63 . 92 
$98 , 853,897 $40,568,318 $119, 633 , 634 $4~ , 756,240 
3 . 91 2. 9 9 
1,905,219 2 , 611,715 2 , 26 7,33 3 2 ,859, 2 70 
83,840 1 32,134 
642,3 56 63,579 851,333 96,675 
4,724,947 1,249,148 5,332,702 1,281, 42 7 
6,255,68 2 3,134,401 7,170,706 3,568,659 
635,557 275 , 299 645,572 224,444 
19 9,177 206,951 
1,728,005 2 ,0 35,936 
17.0% 14 . 8 % 15.0% 14 . 5% 
1965 19 66 
We ek l y Sa lat .. week l v Salary 
10,29 8 , 468 44,9 45 , 809 
1, 874.52 1 ,900 . 77 
$1 22 ,6 55,047 $43,106,719 $142,319 , 506 $4 7, 56 9,375 
3.04 3 . 17 
1,7 92 , 998 2 ,1 98 , 333 2 ,7 86,546 3,457 , 58 1 
136, 625 11 0 , 627 
1,141, 449 72, 3 7 9 1,213 , 225 66 , 241 
7,674,5 43 1, 3 1 2 , 76 1 10,064 ,1 24 1, 75 6,656 
11,170 , 603 4 ,71 8 ,7 47- 11,879,77 3 4,950 , 935 
1,514,780 457,527 1,879,7 77 532 , 3 14 
218,1 38 236 ,4 4 7 
2,110,6 2 9 2,353,1 38 
1 8 . 7 % 16.0% 19.0% 16 . 5% 
Table 19. Unemployment benefit information - Deere and 
Company's eight UAW plants, 1957-1966 
Laid off with credit units* 
(more than one year seniority) Nov. 
1957 2,220 
1958 820 
1 959 37 
1960 905 
1961 365 
1962 3,9 65 
1963 784 
1964 253 
1965 448 
1966 337 
*Per month - not cumulative 
SUB payments 
1957 - Regular 
Leveling 
Short week 
1958 - Regular 
Leveling 
Short week 
1959 - Regular 
Leveling 
Short week 
1960 - Regul ar 
Leveling 
Short week 
1961 - Regular 
Leveling 
Short week 
1962 - Regular 
Leveling 
Short week 
1963 - Regular 
Leveling 
Short week 
19 64 - Regular 
Leveling 
Shor t week 
1965 - Regular 
Leveling 
Short week 
1966 - Regular 
Leveling 
Short week 
Grand Total 
Re gular 
All 
Av eraie per Year 
Regular 
Leveling 
Short week 
$ 21,657 
29,495 
30,882 
56,812 
34, 276 
223,106 
103,563 
$ 4,573,924 
5 , 660,677 
457 , 392 
73,738 
143 , 612 
29 , 959 
97,229 
26 , 463 
34,065 
13,136 
35,956 
16,785 
31,622 
81,039 
5,265 
31,103 
Dec. 
361 
541 
14 
1,52 9 
272 
3, 346 
255 
211 
350 
136 
$ 3,309 $ 
5,380 
2,066 
54,416 
17,435 
238,898 
66,671 
6 , 155 
1,635 
22 , 082 
1 , 918 
100,603 
75,229 
34 , 554 
140,075 
61,692 
2 , 550 
13,954 
Jan. 
308 
286 
14 
1,929 
219 
2,5 94 
94 
17 
100 
2 
1,111 
3,355 
384 
93,5 84 
14,195 
290,702 
12 , 084 
171 
2, 9 6 9 
13 , 816 
343 
47,935 
50,51 2 
823 
5,460 
20 , 182 
398 
7,5 45 
188 
Feb . Ma r. Apr . May June July 
323 226 241 245 2 69 316 
354 254 13 14 15 1 7 
13 9 10 17 175 290 
2 , 809 3 , 230 3 , 062 1, 052 1 , 021 4 78 
262 459 527 423 7 64 2, 4 9 7 
2 , 225 1,758 1 , 386 1, 005 727 5 94 
64 75 69 236 6 7 2 550 
12 13 64 29 112 123 
6 1 2 214 114 196 
2 
$ 919 $ 2 75 $ 684 $ 1,468 $ 958 $ 2 , o"3 9 
3,805 20,036 332 468 104 448 
38 51 1 , 699 11 , 324 
131,382 19 6 ,764 200, 4 13 200 , 970 94 , 666 2 7, 405 
... 
9 , 982 21 , 335 20,898 23, 36 9 17 , 745 30,480 
135,734 93,587 240 , 803 41 , 99 7 19 , 121 11,294 
565 59 
5 , 77 2 1 2 ,143 
1, 309 550 332 63 1 2 6 ' 04 9 68 , 036 
5 , 896 4 , 712 
543 1 , 148 1 , 432 7, 2 7 2 7 , 651 14,226 
80 1 , 161 323 1 , 028 3, 301 14 , 208 
7 61 94 84 348 836 
25,302 1 , 565 1,145 1 , 034 1 , 020 3 , 735 
16, 830 2,662 114 2 , 124 23, 606 13,4 69 
85 482 217 654 309 
904 6 , 505 5,176 6 , 000 6,532 6 , 403 
2 , 815 288 195 
77 119 340 1 , 183 799 
14,111 8 , 9 51 9 ,7 23 5 , 960 5,528 6 , 292 
189 
Table 19. Continued 
Yearly 
Aug . Sept . Oct . Total 
570 725 1 , 061 6,865 
16 15 420 2, 7 6 5 
414 395 762 2 , 150 
423 416 703 17,557 
3 , 456 3 , 153 3,274 15 , 671 
742 892 1 , 305 20 , 539 
379 284 594 4,056 
188 147 655 1,824 
5 88 578 2 , 102 
1 62 130 670 
$4 , 40 2 $4 , 56 4 $4 , 366 $45,7 52 
2 24 1 , 13 7 2 , 425 67 , 209 
25 , 60 7 26 , 670 21 , 185 119 , 906 
1 9 , 88 4 13 , 162 1 5, 495 1, 104 , 953 
1 40 ,7 08 209 , 31 2 2 7 2 , 980 812 , 715 
24 , 986 31,778 60 , 457 1, 412 , 460 
231 7 , 041 1 , 8 73 9 , 769 
6 , 277 50 , 814 1 , 356 76 , 362 
52,651 41 , 739 25,788 399 , 403 
14,645 4,278 1 , 04 1 66 , 857 
11 , 724 8 , 264 4 , 280 15 8 , 373 
16 , 522 31 , 196 16 , 989 147 , 169 
29 , 913 6,129 1 , 322 75,813 
8,863 4 , 459 4,259 213 , 056 
15,406 37 , 773 7,158 280 , 839 
24,426 61,505 4,393 144 , 233 
12 , 075 l ~ , 294 11 , 830 118,876 
4 , 885 4 , 644 7 '7 7 8 183 , 518 
39 , 272 19 , 905 2 , 114 72 , 022 
24 , 89 7 9 , 34 5 13 , 983 151 , 392 
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